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Michael R. Bromwich

Inspector General, U.S. Department of Justice

Statement for the Record

Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs

Hearing on the Inspector General Act of 1978

September 9, 1998

Dear Mr. Chairman, Senator Glenn, and Members of the Committee:

I appreciate the opportunity to provide a statement to the Committee as it examines the operation of Inspectors General in the federal government on this, the 20th anniversary of the Inspector General Act.

Having reviewed the transcript from the Committee's September 9, 1998, hearing, I believe the witnesses addressed, in large measure, the major issue posed by the Chairman in his opening remarks: whether Inspectors General are receiving the support and attention necessary to ensure their independence and effectiveness. I agree with the witnesses that a successful Inspector General must strike a balance between serving as an advisor to the agency head and other senior officials while maintaining the independence needed to objectively assess, audit, and investigate agency programs and personnel. I am confident that here at the Department of Justice the Office of Inspector General (OIG) has struck the appropriate balance. We enjoy a strong working relationship with the Attorney General and other top executives in the Department, while at the same time conducting tough but fair investigations, audits, and inspections that relate to central responsibilities of the Department.

I wish to note a matter of more pervasive concern to OIGS and something that the Congress is in a position to remedy. Specific problematic relationships between agency heads and IGs can be addressed through mediation by the Administration or, in extreme cases, through intervention by the appropriate congressional oversight committee. By contrast, a sustained lack of adequate support can have debilitating consequences for OIGs across government. Like all OIGS, the Department of Justice OIG relies on Congress and the Administration to adequately fund our operations in order to meet ongoing demands for audits, inspections, and investigations as well as an increasing number of new responsibilities. To date, we have not received the funding necessary to allow us to provide appropriate oversight to many Department of Justice programs, or to provide the necessary level of investigative effort to deal with the record number of allegations of misconduct, both criminal and administrative, that we are receiving.

The Department has experienced tremendous growth during the past six years, moving from an annual appropriation of $11.2 billion and 83,000 employees in FY 1993 to almost $21 billion and 110,000 employees in FY 1999. In fact, the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the Federal Bureau of Prisons - the two Justice Department components that command the bulk of our attention – have grown by more than 13,000 employees and 6,000 employees, respectively, during this period. In contrast, the OIG's Investigations Division, the unit charged with investigating allegations of criminal and serious administrative conduct at these agencies, has not grown at all during this same period. If the OIG had merely kept pace with the Department's growth, we would be in line to receive an appropriation of $59.9 million rather than the $34.6 million request contained in the President's FY 1999 budget.

Experience has shown that a rapid and dramatic increase in resources provides a breeding ground for increased waste, fraud, and abuse. Congress, having made the decision to substantially increase funding for many Department programs, should authorize a concomitant increase in the OIG's budget so that it can be assured that the additional funds it has made available to the Department are being used appropriately and effectively. To date, this has not occurred. We believe the failure to provide this OIG with the resources necessary to fulfill our mission sends the wrong message to us, the Department, and the public.

This funding shortfall comes at a time when the jurisdiction of the Justice OIG has expanded beyond its traditional duties to include, among other things:

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increasing number of high profile and expensive special investigations (e.g., FBI Labs, CIA-Crack Cocaine, Gatekeeper, ICITAP, Trentadue);

investigation of Department attorneys (other than in the exercise of their prosecutorial duties);

increased emphasis on Southwest Border corruption and civil rights issues, including participation in numerous inter-agency and federal-state task forces; and

jurisdiction over FBI whistleblower allegations as well as whistleblower complaints
filed by FBI employees that involve classified intelligence information.

Without an increase in resources, the OIG must handle the new responsibilities listed above as well as a continual increase in the number of complaints against Department employees. One of the foreseeable results of this comparative loss of OIG capacity will be a continuation of a trend that has gathered momentum in recent years and that strikes at the heart of the IG concept. In the absence of a substantial infusion of additional resources, we will have no choice but to accelerate the transfer of investigative matters to the internal affairs arms of various Department of Justice components. Although we do not object to the existence of these entities, and indeed believe they play a very useful function, we do not believe that they should serve to displace an increasing share of our investigative workload. Yet because these components, most notably INS and the Bureau of Prisons, have been far more successful in the appropriations process of the past several years than we have, they have been able to augment their internal affairs staffs while we have not. I strongly believe that this is a trend that needs to be reversed. It can only be reversed through the provision of substantial additional resources to the OIG. ̈*

The dedication to furnish OIGs with the necessary resources must be shared among the Administration and the Congress. OIGs must be responsible for formulating requests that appropriately reflect their actual needs; the Departments and agencies must recognize the importance of the OIG mission and function and be supportive of reasonable resource requests; OMB must give more than lip service to supporting the OIG mission; and Congress needs to take a more active interest in ensuring that OIGs have the resources to adequately perform their important jobs. At a time when integrity in government is an issue that occupies the public and the Congress, it makes little sense to deprive the principal institutional guardians of governmental integrity of the necessary means of support.

We very much appreciate your holding these hearings and look forward to the continued focus on these issues in the next Congress.

TOTAL P.05

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I write in response to the invitation extended to members of the President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency to submit a statement on the importance of the relationship between Inspectors General and agency heads.

I concur with the Inspectors General from the Department of Health and Human Services and the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) that the working relationship between an Inspector General (IG) and an Agency Head is critical. I wish to report my past experience with the previous Chairman of the Railroad Retirement Board that has strong similarities to that encountered by the Honorable Susan Gaffney at HUD.

From October 1994 through December 1997, the working environment at the Railroad Retirement Board between the agency's Chairman and the Office of Inspector General was extremely problematic. The Chairman had permitted the previous IG to assume temporary residence in Florida for four years, expend large amounts of RRB trust funds for equipment, supplies, telephone calls from government-funded telephones, first class air travel, eight handguns and 5,000 rounds of ammunition. The Chairman handsomely rewarded the IG with these monetary awards and turned a blind eye to the IG's expenditure of trust funds. When this office raised the issue of his lack of oversight for the IG's conduct, the Chairman embarked on a mission to ensure the funding levels for this office were reduced and took actions to disrupt our efforts and interfere with the operation of this office.

The Office of Management and Budget selected the OIG to be one of seven Offices of Inspector Generals to participate in a Department of Justice (DOJ) pilot program for blanket deputation. DOJ requested the approval from the head of the selected agencies before entering into the formal Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). The RRB was the only agency not to endorse participation of its IG in the pilot program. As a result, the Department of Justice declined to enter into the MOU with this office.

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