porates and adopts the relevant state law, we hold that it does not do so where the sole basis for the vacation and reentry of judgment is to repair the omission to make the statutory recommendation against deportation permitted by § 1251 (b). To hold otherwise would be to defeat the plain command of the statute, which strictly, and for a good purpose, limits the time within which the extraordinary power vested in the trial court must be exercised.' An examination of the various steps in the coram nobis proceedings, particularly the reference to deportation and the plea of guilty upon rearraignment, leads to the inescapable conclusion that the vacation and reentry of the judgment was for the sole purpose of petitioning the court to make the statutory recommendation against deportation permitted by 8 U.S.C. 1251(b). Such recommendation was not timely and was ineffectual. It is concluded the respondent is subject to deportation on the charge stated in the order to show cause. In view of his criminal record, discretionary relief is not warranted. Although not necessary to the disposition of the case in view of the decision we have already reached as to deportability, we believe that appropriate comment should be made regarding the contention of the sufficiency of the notice by counsel in accordance with the provisions of section 241(b), 8 U.S.C. 1251(b). It is undisputed that subsequent to the granting of the motion to vacate the judgment of conviction, the respondent's counsel on September 14, 1959, notified the District Attorney of New York County, the District Director of the Service at New York, and the Attorney General at Washington, D.C., of the action taken by the City Magistrates Court and gave notice of his intention to move the court for a recommendation that the alien be not deported. The examining officer conceded that such notice was received. The statute, 8 U.S.C. 1251(b)(2), in appropriate part reads: ** due notice having been given prior to making such recommendation to representatives of the interested State, the Service, and prosecution authorities, who shall be granted an opportunity to make representations in the matter. It is noted that the portion quoted above does not specify who shall give the required notice prior to the making of the recommendation. The purpose of this provision, as plainly stated therein, is to afford the Government an opportunity to present argument in opposition to such application for recommendation against deportation, if it so desires. The Government admittedly has received 3 Cf. Matter of B- 7 I. & N. Dec. 227; Matter of M-G 5 I. & N. Dec. 531; also see United States ex rel. Klonis v. Davis, 13 F.2d 630, which dealt with a recommendation against deportation under the 1917 act. The lower court in the Piperkoff case, 164 F. Supp. 528, observed that the present statute is more stringent than the 1917 act since 8 U.S.C. 1251(b) requires the recommendation to be made "at the time of first imposing judgment or passing sentence." adequate notice, but chose not to appear in opposition. It does not appear to be important whether such notice be given by the court or by counsel for the alien, in the absence of specific statutory provision, since the purpose of such notice has been satisfied. Indeed, the court's sole interest would appear to lie in hearing arguments on both sides concerning the application for the recommendation against deportation. It is believed that in the absence of any specific limitation in the statute, the notice herein constituted compliance with the provisions of the law. Order: It is ordered that the alien be deported pursuant to law on the charge contained in the order to show cause. MATTER OF PAWA PLANE No. 715 In FINE Proceedings HHW-10/24.1 & 10/24.3 Decided by Board June 22, 1960 Fine-Section 231 of 1952 act-Opportunity for correction not required where history of errors and warnings exists. Carrier which has repeatedly submitted incorrect Forms I-94 and has been warned about further errors incurs liability for fine under section 231 of 1952 act because of clerical errors in its manifests even without an oppor tunity for correction, withheld because of resultant delay in inspection. (Cf. Matter of PAWA Plane No. 774, 7 I. & N. Dec. 403.) IN RE: PAWA Plane No. 715, "Flight 852/19," which arrived at Honolulu from foreign on October 19, 1959-12 passengers involved; PAWA Plane "Flight 852/26," which arrived at Honolulu from foreign on October 25, 1959-15 alien passengers involved. BASIS FOR FINE: Act of 1952-Section 231 [8 U.S.C. 1221] and 8 CFR 231.1. BEFORE THE BOARD Discussion: These appeals are directed to administrative penalties totaling $270 ($10 as to each passenger involved), which the District Director at Honolulu has ordered imposed on this carrier for failure to present properly executed Forms I-94 as a part of the arrival manifests submitted as to them. Specifically, it is charged that the Forms I-94 were deficient in that the passengers' names were incompletely or incorrectly reported; their addresses in the United States were not shown; information as to the issuance of their visas was omitted; or the forms were not legible. The carrier does not dispute the fact that the Forms I-94 presented were not properly executed. It states that one of its employees was assigned in the immigration clearance area to screen these forms for each of these flights. It contends that in connection with the arrival of each of these aircraft said employees aver that they were not notified of deficiencies during the examination of the passengers. Under such circumstances, it claims that no fines lie on the authority of an unreported decision of this Board (F-0300/ 7725, August 14, 1956) wherein we held that where the errors involved in the Forms I-94 were minor, of a clerical nature, inadver tent, and not made with the intent to violate the immigration laws of the United States, the provisions of paragraphs 11.3 and 11.4 of Annex 9, International Civil Aviation Convention, governed and that a fine could not be imposed unless the carrier had first been given an opportunity to correct the errors. The district director states that Service officers, as a matter of practice, have been instructed to call such deficiencies as existed here to the attention of the carrier's representatives and to give them an opportunity to correct the errors, and that this practice was followed in this instance. He asserts that the carrier's available representatives were unable to make the corrections without abnormal and undue delay of immigration inspection. He sets forth that as recently as August 11, 1959, he formally notified this carrier in writing of numerous deficiencies and mistakes in the presentation of the Forms I-94 the carrier was presenting for its passengers and advised the carrier that repeated errors of this nature would result in the imposition of penalties. Under such circumstances, he held that liability to fine had been incurred on the authority of a prior precedent decision of this Board involving the same carrier (Matter of PAWA Plane No. 774, 7 I. & N. Dec. 403). In doing so, he properly distinguished this case from the one relied on by the carrier wherein (1) no opportunity was given for the correction of minor clerical and inadvertent errors; (2) there was no history of such errors; and (3) delay of inspection would not have resulted had the carrier been given an opportunity to correct the errors. Upon careful consideration of the entire evidence, together with the representations throughout, we are of the opinion that the district director has properly ordered the penalties imposed in these cases for the reasons and on the authority stated in his opinion. Briefly, a carrier which has repeatedly submitted incorrect manifests and has been warned about further errors is subject to a fine for clerical errors in its manifests, even without the opportunity for correction. In such a situation the United States implementation to paragraphs 11.3 and 11.4 of Annex 9 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, is controlling on the question of liability (7 I. & N. Dec. 403, supra). While that decision involves a different section of the law (section 251 of the Immigration and Nationality Act; 8 U.S.C. 1281), the reasoning thereof is equally applicable here. Order: It is ordered that the appeals be and the same are hereby dismissed. MATTER OF C— In DEPORTATION Proceedings A-3873207 Decided by Board June 23, 1960 Evidence Jencks rule—Responsibility for determining existence of pre-hearing statements-Recall of Government witnesses for cross-examination on basis of pre-hearing statements-Alien's rights controlled by Jencks statute. (1) Special inquiry officer was not required to make independent determination of whether additional Jencks statements were available where examining officer's declaration that the two pre-hearing statements supplied respondent were the only ones in existence was supported by the record. (2) Special inquiry officer's refusal to recall Government witnesses for crossexamination on basis of pre-hearing statements made available for first time at reopened hearing was not prejudicial error where witnesses had previously testified in great detail on very matters contained in pre-hearing statements and full and adequate cross-examination on such matters had been allowed. (3) Respondent is not entitled to greater rights under Jencks rule than he has under Jencks statute (18 U.S.C. 3500). CHARGE: Warrant: Act of 1952-Section 241(a)(6) [8 U.S.C. 1251(a)(6)]—After entry, member of Communist Party of United States. BEFORE THE BOARD Discussion: This is an appeal from the order of the special inquiry officer requiring respondent's deportation on the charge stated above. The appeal will be dismissed. Respondent, a 56-year-old male, a native and national of Russia, has been a resident of the United States since 1921. In 1954, he was ordered deported on the ground that after his entry he had been a voluntary member of the Communist Party (about 1925 to 1937). Judicial review resulted in a remand of the case to the administrative authorities so that it could be considered under Rowoldt v. Perfetto, 355 U.S. 115 (1957). Reopened hearing was held on February 10, 1959. No evidence was submitted by either the Service or respondent. The special inquiry officer reviewed the evidence of record and concluded that respondent had been a voluntary member of the Communist Party and that the membership had been |