Nuclear Disarmament in International LawMcFarland, 1 feb. 2000 - 237 pagini When German physicists Otto Hahn and Fritz Strassman first split the uranium atom in 1938, they might have little imagined the potential power their experiments had unleashed. Since the United States successfully detonated the first atomic weapons in 1945, the entire world has lived in fear of annihilation. Technological advances in weaponry and, importantly, their delivery systems have only heightened the sense of dread. Yet, since the end of World War II, world governments have been unable to agree on a strategy for nuclear disarmament. This led first to the Cold War and ultimately to the proliferation of nuclear weapons throughout the world.
This work examines the nuclear question within the framework of international law. The advent of the nuclear age and its impact on postwar peace and law is first covered. This is followed by analyses of the initial United Nations disarmament initiatives and the reasons they were doomed from the start. The globalization of the Cold War, the expansion of the nuclear arms race, and the START treaties and the legacy of 1970s-era detente efforts in the years leading up to the end of the Cold War are then detailed. How the United Nations reacted to the end of the Cold War and the prospects for disarmament in the 21st century are the subjects of the concluding section. |
Cuprins
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United Nations Nuclear Disarmament Legal Initiatives and the Development of the United Nations Law of Regional and Global Nuclear Weapons No... | 33 |
Continuation of the Superpowers Nuclear Arms Race and Their Arms Control and Disarmament Legal Process 19761985 | 52 |
United Nations Nuclear Disarmament Efforts and the Expansion of the United Nations Law of Arms Control and Regional Nuclear Weapon Nonproli... | 57 |
The End of the Cold War the End of the Soviet Union and the Beginning of Superpower Nuclear Disarmament 19861997 The INF and START Trea... | 85 |
The End of the Cold War the United Nations and GlobalNuclear Disarmament 19861997 | 127 |
Concluding Remarks and an Analysis of Future Prospects | 172 |
Notes | 179 |
Bibliography | 209 |
Index | 219 |
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Termeni și expresii frecvente
ABM Treaty acquire nuclear weapons adopted agreed agreement American analysis armaments Arms Control Reporter Article Assembly atomic bomb ballistic missiles Cold Cold War compliance comprehensive nuclear disarmament conclusion contracting parties convention CTBT denuclearization deployment destruction détente elimination ensure entered into force establishment further global and comprehensive global nuclear disarmament Gorbachev IAEA Ibid ICBMS India INF missile INF Treaty international law international legal Korea launchers legal objective legal obligation legal process legal regime ment military missile systems Moon Treaty negotiations non-nuclear weapon NTM of verification nuclear arms race nuclear arsenals nuclear forces nuclear material nuclear superpowers nuclear warheads nuclear weapon tests on-site inspections outer space peaceful post-Cold prevent prohibited proliferation of nuclear proposed Protocol provides Rarotonga Treaty reduction rule of international Russia safeguards Singh and McWhinney SLBMS South Pacific Soviet Union START II strategic nuclear weapons threat tion Treaty of Tlatelolco U.S.-Russian U.S.-Soviet United Nations zone
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Pagina 22 - Antarctica shall be used for peaceful purposes only. There shall be prohibited, inter alia, any measures of a military nature, such as the establishment of military bases and fortifications, the carrying out of military manoeuvres, as well as the testing of any type of weapons.
Pagina 50 - Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material...
Pagina 157 - Court cannot conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake; F.
Pagina 46 - Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
Pagina 61 - Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to engage in military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques having widespread, long-lasting or severe effects as the means of destruction, damage or injury to any other State Party.
Pagina 46 - State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices...
Pagina 170 - Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.
Pagina 157 - It follows from the above-mentioned requirements that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law...
Pagina 22 - Treaty, any of the Contracting Parties whose representatives are entitled to participate in the meetings provided for under Article IX...