As a primary agency, the Customs Service is part of the organized crime drug enforcement task force and the new National Narcotics Border Interdiction System. In spite of the Custom Service's regular duties and their increased activities, we find that their 1984 budget has been cut. As you pointed out, Mr. Chairman, this decreased budget could result in the elimination of a number of jobs. It has been estimated that some 2,000 Customs Service personnel could be eliminated as a result of these budget cuts-something that we should be concerned about. I am interested in how Customs intends to handle this reduction in budget and to learn exactly what role it is playing in the new Federal strategy, in the new crime drug task forces. Commissioner von Raab, we welcome you and we welcome your associates. We look forward to your testimony. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. SCHEUER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to congratulate you for carrying out this set of public policy hearings on drug interdiction. I have been a member of this committee since its inception, under the chairmanship of former Congressman Lester Wolfe. I have been active abroad, looking at our problems of interdiction, of cutting the flow of narcotics from abroad. I guess I visited Jack Cusack in his beautiful Paris apartment maybe 15 years ago. I must say the whole scene is very depressing. This is not to cast the finger of blame or guilt at anybody, but the system isn't working. Year after year after year we are told by the enforcement people that we are not stopping more than 5 percent, or 10 percent at the outside, of the drugs that are coming into our country. Today, we know that after spending several billion dollars on enforcement efforts, that all of the hard drugs are freely available in all of our major cities. They are available in our schoolyards, they are available everywhere freely, at a comparatively high price, which means that there is the necessity for an addict to support his habit. We know that approximately 50 percent of violent crime in our cities is drug-related. At some point in time, one has to face up to the question, if our present system isn't working; with all the best efforts of our devoted law enforcement people, who are represented here so well today, we can't stop more than 5 or 10 percent of the narcotic drugs from coming into our country; if the best we can do is raise the price and raise the risk of being a pusher, so that that price has to be passed on, and we have to raise the price and raise the risk of being an addict, so that the addict is almost forced into a life of violent crime to support his habit, shouldn't we at some time have a painful re-evaluation, a painful, agonizing reappraisal of the entire institutional system with which we are trying to control narcotic drugs? I know it is tough on those of us. Jack Cusack has devoted a lifetime to controlling narcotic drugs with the highest level of professionalism that this profession provides, as well as the men who are appearing here before us today, but it does seem to me at some time we ought to step back to the mountain top and see whether enforcement is capable of doing anything more than stopping somewhere between 5 and 10 percent of the drugs coming in with an enormously increased price tag on the 90 or 95 percent that does come in, with all the primogenic characteristics that then places on both the pusher and the user. I hope, Mr. Chairman, at some time we will consider that and at some point in time this morning the witnesses will respond to the question, "Is the system working and is it intrinsically capable of working?" Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Hall. Mr. HALL. Mr. Chairman, just briefly, I want to compliment Mr. von Raab on the testimony that he has not given yet. I read his testimony. It is an excellent presentation. Even the little old lady who came in with the ivory pillbox I thought was very appropriate. I am very encouraged by the progress that is obviously and evidently being made in the activities of the drug enforcement people: the DEA, the Coast Guard, Customs, and the FBI. I believe that this thing is on an upturn as far as enforcement is concerned. As I say, I look forward to seeing if his testimony sounds as good orally as it did when I read it myself. That is all I have to say at this time. Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Levine? Mr. LEVINE. I have no statement, Mr. Chairman. Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Oxley. Mr. OXLEY. I do not have a statement at this time, Mr. Chair man. Mr. RANGEL. Let me thank you again, Commissioner. You may proceed. As you know, we have your full statement. That will be entered into the record without objection. You may proceed as you find most comfortable. Please introduce the people who are with you. TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM VON RAAB, COMMISSIONER, U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE, ACCOMPANIED BY GEORGE C. CORCORAN, JR., ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER FOR ENFORCEMENT; AND JOHN A. HURLEY, DEPUTY ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER FOR ENFORCEMENT Mr. VON RAAB. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and members of the Select Committee. First I would like to introduce on my right Mr. George Corcoran, who is the Assistant Commissioner of the Customs Service for Enforcement. On my left is Mr. John Hurley, who is the Deputy Assistant Commissioner for Enforcement. Just to describe briefly, their responsibilities encompass most of our enforcement efforts. They are responsible for the coordination, development, and direction of policy in the enforcement area. I would like to thank all of you for the kind comments that you have made about the Customs Service and to tell you that the Customs Service appreciates the support and efforts of this committee and looks forward to working with it in order together to continue to try to fight this battle. Mr. Chairman, as you know, the Customs Service is an old and proud agency with a rich heritage and a colorful background. It is our Nation's first law enforcement agency, and traditionally it has had a broad mission, including the collection of revenues and numerous activities in the law enforcement area, especially activities relating to the smuggling of contraband which include narcotics. When I came to the Customs Service nearly 2 years ago, I was distressed to find that within Customs law enforcement activities generally had been somewhat de-emphasized under the previous administration. As Commissioner, I immediately set about correcting what I felt were deficiencies in the enforcement area, and rebuilding the enforcement capability of the Customs Service became my top priority. Today, strengthening the enforcement posture of the Customs Service remains my top priority. We have significantly restructured the management of our enforcement activities not only in headquarters, but down to the regional level as well. We have attempted, whenever and wherever possible, to devote more resources and more attention to serious law enforcement matters. I believe that in a relatively short period of time we have come a long way and have made some significant progress in our efforts to insure that the U.S. Customs Service functions as a highly effective law enforcement agency. I would point out that when I talk about enforcement, our first priority within enforcement is the prevention of narcotics smuggling. I think, Mr. Chairman, that by anybody's standards today Customs can be regarded as a very aggressive agency that is doggedly determined to do the very best job possible to combat narcotics smuggling. In the past year the Reagan administration has taken several bold steps toward a solution to the drug problem facing this country. Soon after I was sworn in as Commissioner of Customs, in October 1981, I was asked to make decisive moves to combat the drug smuggling threat in south Florida. I immediately relocated 102 Customs patrol officers from northern locations to the southeast and southcentral regions. Enforcement resources were also deployed in support of the Vice President's south Florida task force. The first rotation of 256 Customs officers assigned to the Florida task force reported to Miami on March 15, 1982. They consisted of 89 special agents, 127 patrol officers, 11 inspectors, 1 analyst, and 28 support personnel. This first 3-month rotation cost about $7.5 million. After four rotations of 3 months each, the Customs established 91 new permanent positions over those 102 patrol officers that I spoke of in Florida. $10.5 million has been budgeted for 1983, and $8 million has been requested for 1984 to support those new positions. From March 15, 1982 through May 16, 1983 the Vice President's task force has produced 1,292 arrests, 288 cocaine seizures, totaling nearly 4,200 pounds; 500 marihuana seizures totaling over 1.5 million pounds; 8 methaqualone seizures totaling over 157,000 dosage units; and at sea, 69 vehicles, 29 aircraft and 154 vessels, with a total value over $14 million. The true impact of these seizure numbers, however, is more dramatically measured by the tremendous uplifting in the spirits of the people of south Florida. Every elected official from south FloriIda with whom I have talked has never failed to mention the thanks his or her constituents have expressed for the Federal effort there. The people seem to have breathed a collective sigh of relief at being awakened from a horrifying nightmare, but the nightmare was real and the same threat still exists and always will. It is for that reason that south Florida will continue to be dealt with as a unique situation. One fact which emerged from the effort in south Florida that cannot be ignored is that all of the Federal agencies which participated there worked together as a cohesive unit. There was none of that in-fighting between Customs and DEA that had been reported in the past. All of the men and women to whom I spoke who participated there had a tremendous sense of fulfillment. The south Florida task force was an experiment that unquestionably worked, and the spirit of cooperation which existed there has continued in the working relationships among our agencies. In my opinion, cooperation among all of the Federal agencies involved with the overall narcotics effort has never been better. In August 1982 President Reagan released his overall Federal strategy for prevention of drug abuse and drug trafficking, which drew on this interagency cooperation. This strategy has a heavy emphasis on education and prevention programs, in an effort to reduce the size of the drug use population, especially among our Nation's youth. The drug law enforcement portion of the Federal strategy was prepared with significant input from the Customs Service. The strategy incorporated the recommendations of the report of the Working Group on Drug Supply Reduction to the Attorney General and the Cabinet Council on Legal Policy. The membership of the working group included Customs Service personnel. In addition, Mr. Corcoran, the Assistant Commissioner, Office of Enforcement, chaired the interdiction task force, which reported to the working group. I agree very strongly with the recommendations of the Federal strategy with regard to the interdiction of narcotics at the border. In fact, several of the recommendations have already been implemented. The President's strategy called for the development and implementation of Federal initiatives to meet several objectives regarding border interdiction. I would like to stop for a moment on four of the President's objectives and the Custom Service's accomplishments in each of these. The four objectives are developing policies and procedures for use of military assistance, now possible under the exception to posse comitatus, with emphasis on integrating requirements for drug smuggling information into military operational and training activities; two, increasing effectiveness of intercepting drugs smuggled by air and sea; three, increasing the effectiveness of interdiction at ports of entry; and four, improving follow-up investigations of interdiction seizures and arrests to enhance the quality of drug smuggling intelligence and prosecution. In December 1981 Congress enacted legislation which clarified the posse comitatus statute to allow the participation of the military in certain drug interdiction efforts. In conjunction with the President's objective in this area, and with tremendous cooperation from several congressional committees, most notably the House Subcommittee on Information, Justice and Agriculture, and the Senate and House Appropriations Committees, the Customs Service has been able to avail itself of a tremendous wealth of military resources. The Department of Defense has been especially supportive and has loaned to the Customs Service Navy E2-C Hawkeyes or, as we call them, mini-AWACS, which are used to spot low flying aircraft; Marine OV-10's, or Broncos, which are used as tracker aircraft; and of particular importance, Army Cobra and Blackhawk helicopters for use as interdiction aircraft. The Air Force has also provided excellent radar coverage from its SEEK radar balloon at Cujo Key and plans to provide us with information from an additional balloon in the Bahamas. Mr. Chairman, I cannot overstate how valuable this assistance from the Department of Defense has been. For the record, I want to thank Secretary Weinberger for his assistance. Together, this equipment has provided us with the punch necessary to keep air smugglers out of Florida, to make the smugglers' efforts extremely difficult and far more hazardous. If they still choose to run the gauntlet of this military arsenal, they greatly increase the risk of their being caught. I mentioned before that the helicopters were of particular importance. Prior to the arrival of the Cobra helicopters, customs officers were required to take the same tremendous risks as the drug smugglers by landing their chase aircraft on backroads, on grass levees, or on deserted airfields. By some miracle no customs officer was killed. However, many planes were totally destroyed. One crash in particular, in Cleveland, Tenn., came out after a lights-out chase across the South. The smugglers had landed at a closed airfield, and their accomplices had driven a car into the middle of the blacked-out runway. The customs officer followed in his plane, flying still with lights out, landed behind the smuggler and did not see the car until it was too late to avoid a crash. Somehow, the officers escaped the wreckage, amid aviation fuel spilled all over the runway. Today, the risks are still great, although they are not nearly as high as before. The Cobra and Blackhawk helicopters give us the speed to keep up with the smugglers' aircraft and the ability to land immediately beside it. We are sometimes even able to arrest the surprised smugglers while they are still sitting in the plane. I am glad to say that since we have been using these helicopters, when we have managed to be able to follow a plane all the way in, we have not yet lost a pilot, neither the customs pilot to any injury or the smuggling pilot to ultimate prison. If we were to look for a measure of success in the military application in drug interdiction, the tremendous reduction of risk to customs officers must be considered. The more traditional statistical measures of success are also evident as well. In fact, just last |