actual institutional involvement on the part of the Bolivian Government when Arce Gomez was the Minister of Interior. We have successfully investigated that case and do not yet have convictions, we do have indictments. But another step, which I believe is a positive step, is that Arce Gomez is being held in Argentina without bail for return to the United States and prosecution.

We had the recent case in south Florida where a number of officials, including four government officials from Cuba, were indicted for drug trafficking activities. We have successfully prosecuted some of the individuals involved, but the four Cuban Government officials have not shown up for trial.

Mr. RANGEL. Who would your counterpart be in the State Department to coordinate your overseas operations in narcotics?

Mr. MULLEN. Dominick DiCarlo, Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics Matters.

Mr. RANGEL. Where you have agents, if it did involve foreign government officials, you operate through Assistant Secretary DiCarlo? Is that it?

Mr. MULLEN. No, we do coordinate with them. The State Department effort involves mainly the crop eradication and crop substitution programs and encouraging other governments to take forceful action.

DEA is operational and is involved in investigative activities.

Mr. RANGEL. Yes, but when your investigation leads to some foreign public official, I assume that you stop your investigation, and discuss this matter with somebody involved with the Secretary of State.

Mr. MULLEN. We would coordinate with State.

Mr. RANGEL. That is my point. And that person that you would coordinate with would be Assistant Secretary Dominick DiCarlo?

Mr. MULLEN. He would be aware of it, but we may go to a higher level, or to the State Department desk covering that particular area. For instance to the Latin American desk official in charge of that operation.

Mr. RANGEL. Well, have you had any experience where this matter had to get on the agenda of the Secretary of State?

Mr. MULLEN. I am advised that not the Secretary of State, but perhaps at the Assistant Secretary of State level. With regard to Arce Gomez, Assistant Secretary of State Andrews became involved.

Mr. RANGEL. Are you satisfied with the strength of the number of drug enforcement agents that we have in drug-producing countries?

Mr. MULLEN. To say I was fully satisfied would not be accurate. For example, we need more agents in Bolivia. I recently visited Bolivia, and became acutely aware of that, and we are now sending four more agents there. While I am satisfied with the total number we have overseas, we have to constantly move them to where they can be most effective and most useful.

Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Mullen, I have a series of more specific questions which I am going to submit to you, none of which I hope will be drafted to get confidential information on ongoing cases, but I the think committee is going to have to know what DEA is, in

1

charge of, as opposed to the FBI and Coast Guard and Customs, and also a better understanding of its effectiveness.

And the only measuring rods that we have is who has been arrested, who has been convicted, who are these people, and how can we go back to local and State government, and say, "There was a major conviction in your city, in your State, and the reason for this is because of our support of DEA's effort.'

By the same token, I will be sending questions and see how far I could go in getting answers that do not violate your responsibility the State Department of how deeply involved are other countries, other public officials in other countries, and whether or not our existing-and whether we are giving assistance to these countries, economic or military assistance to countries that may fall short of some of the committee members' belief is cooperation.

So, rather than take up the time of the committee with this exchange, I will submit those questions to you.

Mr. MULLEN. Thank you.

Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Gilman.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Mullen, in the past, we have always looked to DEA for the kind of outstanding work that it has been performing in the international arena in major drug-producing areas, and have come away with a feeling that DEA has been doing an outstanding job out there in battlefield, and we hope they continue to do it.

And of course, our primary responsibility and function as a select committee is to find ways in which we can make our national and international efforts even more effective. We hope that you will be frank with us in pointing out areas of need, and where we can be of help to the agency and to the national strategy.

Now, having said that, can I ask you, what has been your responsibility as the Acting Director, in helping to formulate a new strategy for interdicting and reducing drug trafficking and drug abuse in our Nation?

Have you had an active role and been a participant in formulating strategy and policy?

Mr. MULLEN. We have had a very active role. I am often asked, by nature of the investigative effort, whether our efforts should be directed at interdiction, domestic investigations, overseas investigations or intelligence gathering. With regard to DEA, you have to say all of the above.

No one has questioned the expertise and the ability and professionalism of the DEA agents and the agency as a whole. It has been a problem with perhaps not enough personnel, but we are trying to remedy that now.

DEA is a member of the Attorney General's Cabinet Council on Legal Policy and the subworking group on drug supply reduction. Mr. Monastero, the Assistant Administrator of Operations, represents us on that committee.

I, personally, attend the sessions of Dr. Carlton Turner's White House Working Group, where I have input on policy.

Mr. GILMAN. How frequently do you meet with them?
Mr. MULLEN. Once a month.

Mr. GILMAN. Is that truly a policy-formulating group? Is this a group that plans national and international strategy?

Mr. MULLEN. I believe that it is. All of the agencies involved in any way in the drug trafficking effort attend these meetings. We provide information regarding our current activities and Dr. Turner has direct access to the President. I am sure that it is truly a policy formulation group.

Mr. GILMAN. Have you found that there is an immediate response to some of your needs as a result of your working with the Cabinet Council on Legal Policy?

Mr. MULLEN. If you mean immediate needs with regard to personnel and equipment, normally I would go through the Department of Justice and through the Attorney General.

Mr. GILMAN. Where do you see some major need to revise policy. Has the responsiveness been quick and effective?

Mr. MULLEN. I believe that it has. I would have to have specific examples to comment specifically. But before I would put forth a proposal on a major policy initiative, I would consult with Judge Webster and with the Attorney General to make sure it is consistent with departmental policy.

Mr. GILMAN. Have you made some recommendations with regard to policy?

Mr. MULLEN. Yes, I have made recommendations.

Mr. GILMAN. Have they been fulfilled? Have they been pursued? Mr. MULLEN. Yes, I believe they have.

For example, I believe that the overseas initiatives are important. We have to work with foreign governments with regard to crop eradication and crop control. However, I believe that these answers are several years down the road, and that we should stress the efforts that we can control. That is what I was alluding to in my opening statement; and that is, domestic enforcement and education. And I believe that my philosophy in that area as a matter of policy is being considered at the highest levels.

Mr. GILMAN. Would you like to see a shift to more emphasis on domestic control than on the international effort?

Mr. MULLEN. I don't know if it would constitute a shift. Because we can control where we place agents and the cases which are prosecuted in the United States, we should emphasize our domestic enforcement efforts. And we are going to pursue this prosecutive policy.

Sometimes we have difficulty, for various reasons, in gaining the cooperation of a foreign government with regard to the drug effort. It takes time. We have to consider their national priorities and internal problems. So, I believe we should stress that which we can immediately control and influence, and that is, the education, the rehabilitation, and the domestic enforcement effort.

Mr. GILMAN. Well, I would hope that in making that statement that you are not giving up the effort to try to convince foreign nations to reduce their production of illicit narcotics.

Mr. MULLEN. Absolutely not. In fact, we have to continue to emphasize that. I think it has been emphasized by the Attorney General's recent trips to Southeast Asia, Southwest Asia, and Europe, as well as to Latin America.

No, I am not saying we should dispense with those programs. They are vital. One of the five facets of the Federal strategy is overseas cooperation. But, what I am saying is, that the answer is a

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little way down the road. We shouldn't look for that solution to

morrow.

Mr. GILMAN. But that would be a much more effective response if we can convince a producing area to reduce or eliminate its supply, rather than to disperse thousands of agents across our country trying to interdict it once it hits our own Nation. Isn't that so?

Mr. MULLEN. Absolutely. If we could eliminate the supply and the demand.

Mr. GILMAN. Well, of course, to eliminate the supply, then we have to concentrate on those foreign nations that are producing. Mr. MULLEN. And we are doing that.

Mr. GILMAN. Well, let me ask you, we are supposed to be concentrating on some of those foreign nations. Why is there such a divergence in the way you assign personnel overseas?

For example, I note that in the major producing areas, that the number of our agents that have been assigned to Pakistan, and Mexico have not been in direct proportion to the amount of narcotics coming out of some of those areas.

You have requested an increase of some $869,000 and nine positions to reinforce agent strength in select European and Middle East transshipment points on Southwest Asian trafficking routes.

DEA presently has only seven agents assigned to Pakistan, and six assigned to Italy. However, you estimate that 54 percent of the heroin entering our Nation is of European and Middle East and Southwest Asian origin, the bulk of which originates in Pakistan and Italy.

Mexico and Thailand, on the other hand, are responsible for 32 and 14 percent, respectively, of the heroin supply entering our Nation. Yet, the DEA has stationed 29 agents in Mexico and 26 agents in Thailand.

How do you allocate and prioritize your overseas duty assignments? It seems to me that there is something out of proportion here.

Mr. MULLEN. We allocate agents on the basis of where the agents can be most effective. Addressing Italy first. We believe that six agents are adequate at this time, because Italy, is an industrialized nation, and has very competent law enforcement agencies. Our role in Italy is more of intelligence exchange and working on investigations with Italian authorities.

With regard to Pakistan, we have seven agents there, we are adding an eighth. With regard to source countries, we put the agents there in the numbers to the degree to which they can be effective.

Mr. GILMAN. If I might interrupt you just a moment. Forgive me, because our time is short.

Are you saying that in Italy, we can't be that effective if we put more agents in there, that their effectiveness is somewhat limited? Mr. MULLEN. We have to prioritize. If we had unlimited numbers, we may want to put a few more in Italy.

Mr. GILMAN. But you have most of the heroin-over 50 percentcoming through that gateway.

Mr. MULLEN. We must depend on Italian authorities to conduct the investigations and develop intelligence in the cases, and they are doing a good job.

Mr. GILMAN. Why must we depend completely on Italian authorities? Isn't it important that we have a presence and be involved in those efforts?

Mr. MULLEN. We are involved. But, as I have indicated, they have competent-three very competent police agencies in Italy conducting investigations. We may not find this in a less developed country.

We need the agents in the countries you mentioned: In Pakistan and some others. Of course, Latin American, Peru and Bolivia, where we do not have the sophisticated law enforcement that we have, for instance, in Italy.

If I could go on

Mr. GILMAN. Well, what about Pakistan, where you only have seven agents? That is the major producer in Asia.

Mr. MULLEN. That is correct. For many years, we were not getting the response in Pakistan.

For example, when I visited Pakistan last November, the local DEA agents there had identified 28 laboratories in the so-called tribal areas, about which nothing was being done.

We could have put two more agents in there, and identified another five laboratories, about which nothing would have been done but we weren't getting the response we wanted to have. Now that is changing, especially after the Attorney General's visit. The Pakistanis are now going in and they are destroying these laboratories. So, based upon that, the better exchange of information, and a better working relationship, we are in the process of increasing the number of people in Pakistan. We are going from seven to eight. Now, going on to Thailand, we have had a very effective operation there. The Thai authorities are very cooperative. They are conducting enforcement efforts up along Thai-Burmese border, and we find them very receptive to exchange of intelligence, so I do not want to dismantle an effective operation just because the number should be higher in some other countries.

The same could be said of Mexico. Mexico is an adjoining nation. We have extensive investigative activity involving Mexico, and we need the number of people we have there. It is, also, not a single drug country. We have, in addition to heroin, a marihuana problem with Mexico. So the numbers are adequate.

In summary, I am saying if the agents can be effective, for example, if 15 agents can be effective in Pakistan, we will put them there. We are evaluating, on a continuing basis, how many agents we need and how effective they can be.

At one point, in Bolivia, we were getting no cooperation at all under a prior government. We took every DEA agent out, because they were doing no good at all down there. In fact, their lives were in danger. Now they are back in there. We have four, and we are going to build that to eight, and even higher, if necessary.

Mr. GILMAN. Well, it would seem to me that some of the producing statistics should weigh a little more heavily with regard to the number of agents assigned, even if there may be an initial lack of cooperation. That is something that our State Department s