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merely resuscitated Scholasticism, to reserve their judgment until they are sure they have a full and complete comprehension of the system. It is difficult to comprehend : this ought to be frankly admitted. This difficulty, however, is due, not so much to the system itself, as to the fact that much of the terminology in which it is expressed has, in recent centuries, been so wrested from its proper use and meaning as to be now almost incapable of conveying truth. This is especially true with regard to such terms as subject, object, intuition, perception, intelligence, feeling, etc., which in the mouths of most modern thinkers have little or no intelligible meaning For years I found it very difficult to enter into Rosmini's thought, and I feel quite sure that no one, without a most careful study of his terms, will be much more fortunate than I was. view to facilitating this study, I have included in my notes as many definitions as possible, and have placed an index of them at the end of the volume.

As the whole of the work, with the exception of the translation of the Sistema and a few parts of the Bibliography, was written in a remote village of the Piedmontese Alps, where I had access to few books beyond that portion of my own library which I had been able to transport thither, a few quotations and references had to be taken at second hand. For any inaccuracy that may occur in these I must crave the reader's indulgence.

In conclusion, I beg to return my most sincere

With a

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thanks to the members of the Rosminian Order for numerous acts of kindness and courtesy displayed to me in the course of my researches into the life and philosophy of their Founder, and to say that, though they have encouraged me in the publication of this work, they are in no way responsible for any opinion expressed by me in reference either to the doctrines of Rosmini or to the views and purposes of those who have attacked these doctrines. I am informed, on good authority, that they intend soon to publish an English translation of Rosmini's first important work, the New Essay on the Origin of Ideas. I have further to thank my friend, Dr. J. BurnsGibson, for reading over the proofs of the work.


February 27, 1882.



$ 16. Being in general is known by intuition. Two great classes of

human cognitions.-Intuition and perception


$ 17. Order of the two classes.-Universality ; its nature


§ 18. Being in general and particular being. By intuition we know the

essence of being.–Being has two modes. Aristotle and the Ger-

man school criticized for confounding the two. Kant. Hegelian

Logic ...


§ 19. When I affirm a particular real being, what do I know more than

before? The cause of affirmation is a feeling. The formula for

affirmative cognitions.—Real being. Intellective perception sees

passivity on its obverse side as activity

§ 20. What this formula presupposes. It is feeling that constitutes the

reality of being.Subject and object. The ancient meaning differs

from the modern ...

§ 21. In what sense the essence of being is universal.-Principle and term

§ 22. Examination of the objections to the identification of reality with

feeling.–Matter. Pure reality


§ 23. Identity between the essence of being and the activity manifested in

feeling.-Ideal and real being


§ 24. This identity imperfect.-Universality..


$ 25. The essence of being is realized in the difference, as well as in the

identity of real being

§ 26. Corollaries derived from the identity of the essence of being and the

multiplicity of its realizations


§ 27. Quantity belongs to the realization, not to the essence, of being.–

Parmenides. The One and the Many


§ 28. Ideas which make known the negation of being. All ideas of par-

ticular beings consist of positive and negative. There is but one

idea, the essence of being, and all the rest are relations of it.

- Negative and particular ideas


§ 29. In respect to quantity, the essence of being and beings perceived by

us are different, not identical.-- Contingency ...


$ 30. The identity between the essence of being and real beings exists

between them only in so far as they are known


$ 31. It is only as known that real being identifies itself with ideal being.

Perception not less true on that account. -Universality not derived

from things


§ 32. Why we think we do not know the ground of things.—The intellect

knows things in an absolute mode. Passion and action. Intel

lective perception


§ 33. Why being, as a means of cognition, is called ideal. - Rosmini's
system not idealism.

Means sub quo

$ 34. The essence of being is self-intelligible and forms the intelligibility

of all other things. The idea of being is the light of reason, is

inborn, and is the form of intelligence.—The idea of being not

derived from external sensation, feeling of our own existence,

reflection or the act of perception. It is, therefore, innate. Mean-

ing of innate


§ 35. Meaning of the word form. Two senses of the word form. In

which of the two senses is the idca of being used? Object and Sub-



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ject and their relation. Kant's forms not objective, but subjective.
– Form of cognition. Criticism of Kant's Table of Categories.

The modal categories—necessary, actual, possible

§ 36. All intelligence is reducible to thinking being as realized in a cer.

tain manner, with certain limits.—Though the soul is finite, its

means of cognizing is infinite

$ 37. In what sense ideal being is said to be possible.--Ideal being, being

in itself, and being as object

§ 38. How possible and ideal beings are said to be many.—Concept is

one ; the things conceived are many

§ 39. Ideality a mode of being incapable of being confounded with reality

$ 40. Differences between ideas and the things known by means of them

$ 41. Essence known through idea ; subsistence, through affirmation on

occasion of a feeling.--Contingent things have two inconfusible

modes of being ...

§ 42. How in perception we unite ideal being with feeling.-Rosmini's

Theory of Cognition

$ 43. Objection to calling intellective perception a judgment. Answer.

The objection does not touch the fact, but only the propriety of

the term.—Difference between Rosmini and Kant. Reid

§ 44. Is this affirmation a judgment ? No judgment is possible without

the union of its terms. —The elements of a judgment are com-

bined by nature

§ 45. In intellective perception, it is not intelligence, but nature, that

unites the terms of the judgment. This judgment produces its

own subject.-Kant's errors

§ 46. The term judgment does not express the nature of affirmation, but a

subsequent reflection analyzes it.—The terms of a judgment are

perceived as one

$ 47. Reflection, in analyzing a judgment, distinguishes, but does not sepa-

rate, its elements. Subject and predicate do not exist prior to

the judgment, but are formed in the act of judgment. —Direct

and reflexive cognition

$ 48. Difference between primitive affirmations and other judgments.

The nature of the primitive judgment further illustrated.—The

predicate is contained in the concept of the subject

$ 49. The primitive judgment may also be called the primitive synthesis.

-Perception spontaneous, abstraction voluntary

$ 50. Convertibility of the terms of the primitive judgment.-Ancient

mode of expressing judgments

$ 51. Solution of the problem of the origin of ideas. —The Light of


$ 52. New Essay and Restoration of Philosophy.-Logic the link be-

tween Ideology and Metaphysics

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