subjective sensations derived from the real mode of being, makes in ideal being, which is its constitutive object. He agrees with Aristotle that ideas or forms exist in the mind. and in things, and not in a state of separateness; but he denies that they exist in mind and in things in the same mode. In the former they are objective, ideal, and, therefore, universal; in the latter, they are subjective, real, and, therefore, particular. Moreover, the intellect and the intelligible (vouç kaì voŋrá) are so far from being identical, that they belong to two absolutely distinct modes of being. He makes the same concessions and objections to St. Thomas, but further agrees with him that the principle of contradiction rests on the intuition of being. He agrees with the school of Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, that subjectivism and sensism cannot furnish a ground for truth, but denies that these are the sources from which truth ought to be expected, and affirms that it is the very form and essence of objectivism and intelligence. agrees with Kant that the form and matter of thought have to be distinguished; but he denies, first, that thought has a plurality of forms; second, that its form is subjective; and, third, that its matter is objective, before it is made so by thought itself. He maintains that the real, as purely such, is always subject (TOKEίμEVOV), while the ideal is always object (avtikeíμevov) of intelligence. He agrees with Reid that perception differs from sensation; but denies that the former is due to an inexplicable instinct in the mind. He holds that perception is due to the very nature of mind, whose term is necessarily an object. He agrees with Fichte that the Ego implies the non-Ego, but he utterly denies

*

He

* Rosmini has great respect for the sane, serious philosophy of Reid, and really owes it a great deal. Indeed, the Italians are almost the only philosophers that have done justice to Reid, whose very soberness and simplicity have exposed him to unmerited neglect in more romantic countries.

that the former creates either, and shows that the Ego is a compound, consisting of a subject and an act whereby that subject affirms itself as an object. He agrees with Schelling that there is something infinite in the mind, but denies that the mind is for that reason the Absolute. He maintains that the object of the mind is necessary, infinite, and eternal; whereas the subject is contingent, finite, and, but for its union with the object, transient. He agrees, lastly, with Hegel, that the starting-point of philosophy is being; but he denies that the ideal being, with which such start is made, produces the real and moral forms of being, that is, develops into the universe and God. He, moreover, denies that being, though immediate, is an hypothesis, and shows that it is reached through a direct intuition, a form of cognition. not liable to doubt or error, since for it phenomenon and nomenon are necessarily one.

Rosmini, having discovered the nature of ideal being and its necessary relation to intelligence, was thus able to collect, as determinations of it, all the truths of previous systems freed from their errors, and so, for the first time in the world's history, to lay a solid basis upon which true science might be built up and philosophy brought to stability and repose, after its twenty-five hundred years of weary circling, like that of the carnal spirits, driven by "the infernal hurricane, that never rests.” * Upon this basis he proceeded to build up three orders of science: first, sciences of intuition, or of the object; second, sciences of perception, or of sensible subjects; and, third, sciences of reflection, or of those subjects which, though beyond the reach of sense, may, through integration of the subjects of sense by means of the object of intelligence, be known in an idealnegative way, and in part made real by intelligence itself acting through volition. But, after all, when intelligence has

"La bufera infernal, che mai non resta Dante, Inferno, v. 31).

exhausted its powers of intuition, perception, and reflection, there will still remain an infinitude of reality, of which it has only a negative knowledge, so long as this infinitude does not reveal itself, by imparting to it some new faculty, capable of feeling an infinite reality. When this takes place, intelligence will recognize that it has at last found the necessary real subject of its necessary ideal object. This subject is God, whose reality, according to Rosmini, can be known only when He reveals Himself by imparting to the finite intelligence such an increase of objective light-the Light of Grace-as enables it to recognize, in a higher or lower degree, this infinite perfection. Thus Rosmini finds in the limitation of human intelligence a necessary place for revelation and the action of divine grace, and a formula for this revelation and action, such as is certainly not to be found in any other system of thought but his own. Whether or not we follow him in maintaining that Christianity is such a revelation of God, we must admit that he has, philosophically speaking, made a much better case for it than ever was made before. His system has, accordingly, made Christianity acceptable to many who otherwise would have rejected it. The table on the next page will show Rosmini's classification of the Sciences.

Of Rosmini's contributions to the different sciences, the most important are unquestionably those which he made to Ideology, a science toward which he stands in the same relation as Aristotle does to Formal Logic. His New Essay on the Origin of Ideas, by which he put an end to subjectivism and sensism, will take the place of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (by which, according to Hegel, an end was put to objective dogmatism, as he contemptuously calls truth *) as the second great philosophic work of the world,

Gesch. der Philosophie, vol. iii. p. 564 (edit. 1836).

h

beside and before Aristotle's Logic, by which a period was put to sophistry. Next to his contributions to Ideology, Rosmini's most important work was in Psychology, in which he showed, for the first time, the true nature of the Ego, its double relation to being and sensation, and the necessary nature of the term of the latter. His two works, Anthropology and Psychology, which deal with this subject, are acknowledged as marking an epoch in its history, even by those who are most bitterly opposed to the rest of his system. Next in importance to his contributions to Psychology are those which he made to the inferential Science of Morals, for which he discovered a rational and objective basis in the same principle which furnishes the criterion of theoretical truth, showing that right is merely truth accepted as a standard of action. Besides these, he made many and great contributions to other sciences, especially Logic, Law, Politics, Cosmology, Ontology, and Natural Theology. His great work, the Theosophy, which was intended to deal exhaustively with the last three subjects, he did not live to complete, and the same is true respecting several other great works, including one on

Being

Mathematics. Many of his writings still remain unpublished.*

From what has been said, it will be easy to understand the relation of Rosminianism to the other systems of our time. To the various sensistic systems, whether calling themselves materialistic or idealistic, it stands in the relation of a corrector and complement; to the spiritualistic systems, in the relation of a guide and foundation. It completes the former, by showing them the way out of mere subjectivity and persuasion into a world of objectivity and truth; it imparts strength and vision to the latter, by placing them upon a basis of rational insight. To the special sciences it furnishes unity and aim. Doubtless, Rosminianism will in many points undergo modification or correction, and in many more receive extensive development; but that it supplies a basis for a new and unprecedented progress in philosophy, will hardly be doubted by any one who, with sufficient knowledge of previous systems and sufficient freedom from prejudice, will give it a thorough examination.†

If such is the nature and importance of Rosmini's system, it may well be asked why, having been before the world more or less completely for half a century, it has thus far made so little impression upon it, that, outside of Italy and the circle of Rosmini's religious order, its very existence is almost unknown. The answer to this is very simple. Rosmini was an Italian and wrote in Italian; he was a Catholic priest and a very sincere one; and, worse than all, he was a staunch opponent of the narrow policy which a certain party in the Church has followed for the last fifty

See the list of his works, pp. lii.—lxviii.

If we

Some people, fond of finding brief names for things, rather discredit Rosmini's system by calling it Objective Idealism. It is one great merit of the system that, not being one-sided, it is not covered by any one name. must call it something, then, to be just, we ought to name it: Objective Idealism, Subjective Realism, and Absolute Moralism.