the latter are known" (Theosophy, vol. iv. p. 459; cf. Buroni, Dell' Essere e del Conoscere, pp. 65 sqq.). Buroni is entirely wrong when he writes a chapter to prove that Being is in itself universal, and does not become such by virtue of the mind (Ibid., pp. 46, 47). Indeed, he is not able to bring forward a single passage from Rosmini in support of this view.

25.

essence of

realized

ference as

the iden

But if the beings which we affirm agree only The in being beings, and differ in other respects, are being is not these respects in which they differ themselves in the difso many entities or forms of being? Assuredly: well as in if they were not entities, they would not be at tity of real all. Hence the essence of beings is realized in that wherein they differ as well as that wherein they agree. Even in these differences, in those modes in which they are, is found the identical essence of being.

26.

being.

derived

not from the identity of but the essence

of being

an and the ob- city of

multipli

realiza

But how can this identical essence of being Corollaries be realized in so many different beings, and merely in that which they have in common, also in that which is peculiar to each? For answer to this question we must appeal to servation, and, instead of concluding à priori how tions. the thing might be or ought to be, satisfy ourselves of how it is. Now, this philosophical observation plainly tells us that every real being, as well as every difference between real beings, is always a realization of the essence of being

diffusing itself universally on all cognizable things. This reflection has special force as applied to the idea of being. In fact, ideal being is in the highest degree simple, essentially one, the principle of unity in all things, and, hence, not only singular in itself, but also the source of all true unity and singularity" (New Essay, vol. iii. § 1474; compare citation under § 17). Rosmini defines universality. thus: "By universality we mean that quality which the mind discovers in an entity conceived by it, by which quality that entity can exist in an infinite number of individuals, always remaining identical." Setting out from this definition, he concludes:

"First, that precategorical absolute being cannot, properly speaking, be said to be universal, because it does not exist in an infinite number of modes, but only in the three categoric modes (cf. below, under § 166).

"Second, that universality is something different from identity, since the former can exist without the latter. Thus, absolute being, in so far as it is ideal, is single, and therefore not universal, and its realization is not merely possible, but actual.

"Third, that being, intuited without the terms that complete it, is that which has the greatest universality, that in which, as in its native seat, universality resides, in which exists first universality, that from which all universality flows to every other entity.

"Fourth, that, nevertheless, the universality which flows from initial being, or being separated by the act of the mind from its terms, to other conceivable entities, appears in two shapes" (Theosophy, vol. v. p. 95, n.). The two kinds of universality here referred to are the generic and the relational. The former belongs to all forms or ideas, the latter to matter considered in itself.

Elsewhere Rosmini says, "This word universal expresses a relation of manifesting being to the things manifested, and this relation is discovered only by the reflection of the philosopher, who has advanced far enough to confront manifesting being with the things manifested, and to bring out the fact that the former is the means whereby

the latter are known" (Theosophy, vol. iv. p. 459; cf. Buroni, Dell' Essere e del Conoscere, pp. 65 sqq.). Buroni is entirely wrong when he writes a chapter to prove that Being is in itself universal, and does not become such by virtue of the mind (Ibid., pp. 46, 47). Indeed, he is not able to bring forward a single passage from Rosmini in support of this view.

25.

essence of

realized

ference as

the iden

But if the beings which we affirm agree only The in being beings, and differ in other respects, are being is not these respects in which they differ themselves in the dif so many entities or forms of being? Assuredly: well as in if they were not entities, they would not be at tity of real all. Hence the essence of beings is realized in that wherein they differ as well as that wherein they agree. Even in these differences, in those modes in which they are, is found the identical essence of being.

being.

26.

derived

identity of

but the essence

of being

an and the ob- city of its

multipli.

realiza

But how can this identical essence of being Corollaries be realized in so many different beings, and not from the merely in that which they have in common, also in that which is peculiar to each? For answer to this question we must appeal to servation, and, instead of concluding à priori how tions. the thing might be or ought to be, satisfy ourselves of how it is. Now, this philosophical observation plainly tells us that every real being, as well as every difference between real beings, is always a realization of the essence of being

previously known to us.

The essence of being

is identical; its realizations are many and various. Hence

I. The essence of being has various grades and modes of realization.

II. None of these finite grades or modes of realization exhausts the essence of being, which may, therefore, always be realized in other grades and modes-whether ad infinitum, we will not now inquire.

III. The different grades and modes in which the essence of being is realized are all limited; for it is with these alone that we are dealing, and these limitations constitute their difference. Now, these limitations which occur in real beings are so far from belonging to the essence of being that they are non-beings. Hence the essence of being is realized in the various beings, in so far as they are beings, not in so far as they are non-beings. This realization is limited, and, in so far as it is limited, its identity with the known essence of being ceases.

IV. The essence of being, therefore, is capable of a higher or lower realization; but, in so far as it is realized, it is entirely (not totally) realized, for the reason that it is one and indivisible; just as the entire essence of wine is as truly in a single drop as in a whole butt. This implies that we require the whole of the essence of being in order to know even a small part of real being, just as we require the whole of the essence of wine in order to know even a drop of wine.

27.

These observations enable us to conclude that Quantity

belongs to

zation, not

must to the

essence, of

must being.

quantity is something belonging to the realization, the realiand not to the essence, of being. We further observe that it is to quantity we have recourse in order to explain the limitations, the different modes, grades, differences of being, number, etc., all of which belong, not to the essence of being, but to the laws of its realization.

In these three sections the author takes up the question how pure simple being, the constitutive object of intelligence (see below, under §§ 35, 36), comes to be determined into real things. This, as we see at a glance, is the old and much-vexed problem of the One and the Many, which caused so much trouble to early Greek thinkers. The career of this problem is one of the most curious in the whole history of philosophy. As very often happens in such cases, it presented itself most clearly to the first person to whom it occurred, viz., Parmenides. The thinkers. previous to him had found no difficulty in assuming a simple substance and making it determine itself. Even Herakleitos made his One, fire, enter into the process of its own determination, and thus arrived at his famous dictum: "All things pass and nothing remains (Távrа XwρEi kai ovdiv μéve)." He identified being with nothing, and made War the father of all things (πόλεμος πάντων Tarp) (vid. Bywater, Heracliti Ephesii Fragmenta, p. 18, no. xliv.); but how this identity in diversity came about, or where the War came from, he did not stop to inquire. Parmenides, severely criticizing the followers of Herakleitos, whom he calls

See Schuster, Heraklit von Ephesus (Acta Soc. Philolog. Lipsiensis, vol. iii. pp. 1-398), pp. 36 sq., and compare my translation of the Fragments of Parmenides, Journal of Speculative Philosophy, vol. iv. no. 1 (1870).