object of the mind and the universal measure. Intuited being measures all particular beings, and the will feels the exigence wherein they claim to be recognized as what they are. The will must not oppose itself to the understanding, but must accept the truth cognized by it. All beings are, by nature, goods for the will; they are naturally lovable to it. But the will, being free, may place itself in opposition to this law of nature, and may substitute false for true entities, as objects of its love; it may enhance or depreciate entities for itself, and, hence, place its goods in opposition to their true being. In so doing it contradicts the truth, lies, makes war on entity, and is, therefore, unrighteous; it corrupts the natural law existing between it and real beings is, therefore, disordered and perverted. The internal lie, unrighteousness, voluntary disorder, is moral evil; the opposite is moral good.

It is unnecessary to say that the word good is used here in the sense of the Greek ȧyalóv, that which completes or perfects. Καλῶς ἀπεφήναντο τἀγαθόν, οὗ πάντ' ἐφίεται, says Aristotle, in the opening of the Nikomacheian Ethics.

What is

moral obligation?

204.

Evil must be avoided, good sought. Obligation is only the concept of moral good and evil manifesting to the soul its own necessity. Of all goods, that which presents itself with the greatest clearness and completeness to the mind is obedience

to the same.

to the Supreme Being; of all evils, disobedience Truth and entity, therefore, are the first spring and the first proclaimer of obligation. Beings, in relation to the will, have moral exigence.

205.

between

fection and

real and

Moral exigence or necessity is, therefore, widely Difference different from that exigence which the relations moral perof perfection peculiar to real and intellectual that of beings carry with them, inasmuch as the perfection of these latter is not the perfection of a will. beings. Moral perfection, on the contrary, is the perfection of a will, and is effected by will.

tual

206.

difference.

Now, will is the essence of personality, and Second person alone is the true cause of actions, and the one to which alone they can be imputed. Although, therefore, real being may be more or less perfect, still, this perfection is not imputed to real being, which is its subject and not its cause, but is merely contemplated by the intellect as a perfection of that being. The same may be said with respect to the perfections of intellectual being. They are perfections of nature, and not of

person.

207.

Hence, in connection with the perfection of Third real and intellectual beings, there is but one

difference.

exigence, which says, "In order that real or intellectual beings may be perfect, they must be so or so." On the contrary, the perfection of moral being brings with it two exigences. The one springs from being, considered in itself, and says, "Entity, truth, must be recognized by the will." The other arises from the nature of the will itself, and says, "If the will does not recognize entity and truth, it has not perfection." The first is the obligation imposed upon the person by the exigence of the beings known to it (objective exigence); the second is the exigence of the will itself, considered as a nature susceptible of perfection (subjective exigence).

Three parts of the doc

trine of the perception of being.

208.

The doctrine of the perfection of beings may be divided into three parts. The first describes the archetype of every being, that is, the condition. of the being that has reached its highest perfection. The second describes the actions whereby the perfections of beings may be produced. The third describes the means whereby the art of performing these actions may be acquired.

Nature of the object of each of these parts.

209.

The archetype of being, or ideal perfection, is the example and guide of all the arts; the actions, whereby the perfections of beings are produced, include all the arts, mechanical, liberal, intellectual,

moral; the means, which lead to these arts, constitute special education, or the school of these

arts.

B. Special Deontology.

210.

logy.

This shows the vast extent of General Deon- Vastness of Special tology. Special Deontology is vaster still, since Deontothere is one for every kind of being, and not only for natural, but also for artificial beings. And among those whose author is man, one of the first places belongs to those whose aim is to produce beautiful objects. Each of the fine arts has its own science, and all these sciences presuppose a science of the beautiful in general. This science we may term Callology. A special division of it, that which treats of the beautiful as seen in the sensible, we call Esthetics. But Callology and Esthetics belong, first of all, to General Deontology, and especially to that part of it which describes the archetypes of beings.

Rosmini has left no special treatise on Callology or Esthetics; but his various utterances upon these subjects, scattered through his different works, have been collected in two volumes under the title of Literature and the Fine Arts. According to his view, beauty is a relation of which the principle is a mind and the term an object. It is, therefore, like truth, an objective relation, not a subjective one, like the good. We may, therefore, say that the true and the beautiful are attributes of objects, while the good is an attribute of subjects. The beautiful, however, differs from the true, implying, besides truth, four other elements

unity, multitude, totality, and mental applause. Of this mental applause Rosmini says, “Approval or applause is, therefore, a natural affection excited in the intelligent subject at the sight of the identity discovered to exist between two terms, which the mind compares and which scem most different: these are the theme or idea, and the work actually executed or accomplished" (Theosophy, vol. ii. § 1135). "The beautiful most proper to human nature is that which is found realized in the world, because man himself is made up of an animated body and an intellective soul, and the latter, by nature, intuites only the idea of being, which is the universal theme, the most virtual of all and not yet beauty. The works executed in accordance with this theme man must gather from his own modifications, that is, from the finite terms of feeling. The only real accessible to man being the finite, he must draw from it the real and effectual spur of his actions, as well as his determinate ideas, and, therefore, also the archetype of that beauty upon which he can spend his admiration. . . But he demands the divine real" (Ibid. § 1139). When beauty goes beyond the measure of human imagination, it becomes sublimity, and the action it then arouses in the human soul is no longer applause, but enthusiasm. It is interesting to compare these views with those of Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, and Plutarch. See Plato, Phaidros, pp. 245 sqq., 250 sqq.; Aristotle, Poetics, cap. iv. 1448 b, 15 sqq.; Rhetoric, i. 11; 1371 b, 5 sqq.; Plotinus, Enneads, i. 6; Plutarch, Πῶς δεῖ τὸν νέον ποιημάτων ἀκούειν cap. iii. pp. 17, 18. Rosmini's whole doctrine of beauty very closely resembles that of Plotinus, down even to the view that the subject or principle of beauty is determined by its object: “ Τὸ γὰρ ὁρῶν πρὸς τὸ ὁρώμενον συγγενὲς καὶ ὅμοιον ποιησάμενον δεῖ ἐπιβάλλειν τῇ θέᾳ. Οὐ γὰρ ἂν πώποτε εἶδεν ὀφθαλμὸς ἥλιον ἡλιοειδής μὴ γεγενημένος, οὐδὲ τὸ καλὸν ἂν ἴδοι ψυχὴ μὴ καλὴ γενομένη. γενέσθω δὴ πρῶτον θεοειδὴς πᾶς, εἰ μέλλει θεάσασθαι θεόν τε καὶ καλόν” (Enneads, i. 6, 9). Goethe's paraphrase of this passage will occur to every

one:

"War' nicht das Auge sonnenhaft,

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