This is not a potentiality but an act [ivépyea], an act essential to the spirit. It is the intellect, in so far as it goes to constitute an element of human nature. But if ideal being, naturally present to the human spirit, acquires a relation with the real world through sensations, then the intellect intuites being furnished with some determination, and toward this new act it is in a state of potentiality. This is what is called the potentiality of the intellect" (Anthropology, § 510). Cf. St. Thomas: "Intellectus dupliciter considerari potest. Uno modo secundum quod intellectus est apprensivus entis et veri universalis, alio modo secundum quod est quædam res et particularis potentia, habens determinatum actum" (Sum. Theol., i. q. 82, art. 4). 145. that pre selves we try to de When we try to deduce the powers of the Questions mind from its essence, we are inevitably met by sent themsuch grave ontological questions as these: How when can the unity of essence be reconciled with the duce the multiplicity of powers? How can succession of powers of powers consist with permanence or immutability of essence? How can the same essence have a variety of accidental states? etc., etc. Rosmini, in his Psychology (vol. ii. §§ 735-740, 854-909) and Theosophy (vol. v. pp. 257-259), devotes considerable space to the consideration of these questions. It will not be difficult to divine the answers, if we remember that difference of act is determined by difference of term, and that the terms of intellective activity are all given. It is entirely indifferent to light what it illuminates. the soul from its essence. Three classes of laws to which the soul is subject in its operations: (1) psycho- 146. Wonderful are the laws according to which the soul operates, whether immediately or mediately through its various powers. And, inasmuch as the soul is one and rational, it follows that all those faculties which we call human, as well as the laws of their operation, must emanate from the rational principle in its relations to its two terms. And thus we obtain three classes of laws-the psychological, the ontological, and the cosmological. The psychological laws are those which proceed from the nature of the soul itself as an active principle; the ontological, those that are imposed upon the soul by its higher, intellective term, which is being; and the cosmological, those that are imposed upon it by its lower term, the sensible world. The supreme ontological law is the principle of cogni. tion. Cosmo. logical laws are either laws of motion or laws of harmony. 147. The supreme ontological law is the principle of cognition, which is thus expressed :-The term of thought is being. It is incredible how fruitful and wonderful this law is in its applications. 148. Of the cosmological laws, some preside over the motion which the sensible term imparts to the human soul; others determine the quality of this motion. The former are called laws of motion; the latter, laws of harmony. 149. classes of those Two mind psycho Finally, the psychological laws, that is, laws which spring from the force of the itself, are divided into two classes, corresponding laws, cor to the ontological and cosmological laws. logical responding to the ontological and logical. All these laws are considered by Rosmini in various cosmochapters of his Psychology. From all it appears that the individual subject stands in a double relation to being. As ideal, being is presented to the subject as object; as real, it is presented to it as extra-subject. For the individual mind, therefore, the world of being is not divided into inner and outer in such a way that the former is subjective, the latter objective, but thus : The Infinite, when united to its own proper and necessary principle, the Absolute, is God. 150. and last Psycho discover of the human, soul. Finally, Psychology attempts to discover the The third destiny of the human soul. But it cannot accom- aim of plish this discovery by the mere use of natural logy is to reason or the mere examination of human nature. the destiny It may, indeed, by this examination, show whither human nature tends; but it fails to grasp that plus, which the free grace and munificence of the Infinite Being who created it holds in store for it. All, therefore, that we are able to arrive at through The soul naturally the examination of human nature is this: The tends to first part of that nature is intelligence, and intelli- perfection, its own which con sists in the full vision of truth, full exercise of virtue, and full attainment of happiness. These three goods are but aspects of one and the same good. gence is made for truth. The second part is will, and will is made for virtue. By his will man adheres to the truth, loves it in all things, and thus loves all things according to their truth. But this love, which seeks to satisfy itself in beings according to truth, desires complete possession of that which it loves, and which is its good, because it loves it. There is, therefore, a third part in human nature, and this is feeling, in the broadest sense of the term. Feeling is a tendency to enjoy. The will, therefore, which adheres to truth and is thereby virtuous, the will which loves all beings according to truth, desires that all beings should be given it to enjoy, since through enjoyment it completes its knowledge and its love of them. This is what is meant by the phrase, "seeking for happiness." From this we gather that the soul naturally tends to, and is destined for, perfection. This perfection consists in the full vision of truth, the full exercise of virtue, and the full attainment of felicity, a threefold end, a threefold destiny, which, nevertheless, forms a perfect unity, since no one of these three elements can exist in a complete form without the other two. The truth is not seen in its inmost recesses except by him who loves and enjoys it; no one fully loves the truth in the beings wherein it is actualized, unless he sees and enjoys it; no one has complete enjoyment of it or is happy, if he has not complete love for it and is virtuous, if he has not complete vision of it and is not wise. Each of these three goods implies the other two; they are but three forms of one and the same good. "In so far as man is an animal subject endowed with a corporeal sense, he is capable of adapting to himself and of enjoying only particular goods, that is, corporeal ones; but, in so far as he is an intellectual subject, he perceives all kinds of goods and enjoys all the kinds of good perceived by him. His intellect may even attain the absolute good, and, therefore, this alone can entirely and completely appease it. This is the supreme good of intelligences, in the enjoyment of which consists what is properly called beatitude or happiness-terms which in common parlance are entirely refused both to the blind momentary pleasure of animal life and to all perfection of sensitive things' (Principles of Moral Science, pp. 51, 52). In a note to this passage the author says, “Sensists, of necessity, confound happiness with pleasure, and measure degrees of happiness by pleasure; but they err. Happiness is certainly enjoyment, but not every enjoyment is happiness. Happiness is the enjoyment of the highest good. Now, between the enjoyment of the highest good and that of any other good there is a difference, not of degree, but of kind—an infinite difference, with no middle term to unite one extreme with the other." 151. tradition free man doubts But, if human nature, when examined, shows Religious that this is its destiny, how is this destiny to be alone can reached? Here human reason stands dumb and from the in confusion, seeing that in the present life there which is not a single condition of man that fully corre- the sad sponds to that end to which he aspires. On the of the preone hand, the nature of the human powers, when and man's carefully studied, and the incessant cravings of the arise from spectacle sent life, higher destinies must |