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due to Kant, although, as Rosmini shows, it was previously made by Genovesi (1712–1769). That it was “ancient and, in Italy, well known," does not seem correct. (See New Essay, vol. i. $ 328 n.).

what sense

I 23 When this sensitive principle pronounces it- In what self, it uses the word I or Ego. I, therefore, is sense the a word which expresses the soul, but expresses the soul, it in so far as it utters itself. It does not there- and in fore express the soul purely, but the soul invested it is called

the prinwith certain relations to itself—the soul in a state ciple and

subject of of development. If we desire, therefore, to form Psycho

logy. a clear conception of the soul, pure and simple, we must carefully consider what the Ego contains,

nd then remove from it all that part which is known to have been added and acquired by the operations of the soul itself.

It is the Ego as thus despoiled that is the principle and subject of Psychology

See above, under $ 75. This is a most important distinction, and one which is, even to the present day, systematically and almost universally overlooked. The Ego is a selfaffirmed subject. Now, all affirmation belongs to the science of Logic. Hence the Ego, as such, is not the subject of Psychology, nor does any act of the Ego involving an affirmation form part of that subject. Aristotle saw this very plainly, and from his treatise on the Soul excluded everything involving the recognition of true objectivity. On the contrary, Herbert Spencer, who, as we have seen, does not understand the nature of the distinction between sensation and intelligence, introduces into his Psychology all the processes of reasoning. This is exactly the same

thing as making Biology a branch of Inorganic Chemistry ; for there is certainly as much difference between objectified and unobjectified sensation, as there is between animate and inanimate matter. It is not necessary to say that the soul's relation (objectively considered) to objectivity in general falls within the domain proper of Psychology.

I 24

Complete definition of the human soul.

Proceeding in this way, we find, with the aid of Ideology, a more complete definition of the human soul, which may be thus expressed :—The human soul is an intellective and sensitive subject or principle, having by nature the intuition of being and a feeling whose term is extended, besides certain activities consequent upon intelligence and sensitivity

It is instructive to compare this definition with that of Aristotle, which for so many hundred years held possession of the philosophical world. According to that philosopher, “The soul is the first active form* of a physical body having life in potentiality, and a body is such when it is organized”. (« Ψυχή έστιν εντελέχεια η πρώτη σώματος φυσικού δύναμις ζωήν έχοντος. Τοιούτο δε δ αν η όρyavikóv." De Anima, ii. I, 5; 411 b, 26 sq.) It will be

. seen at a glance that, while this is the definition of the soul as the principle of life, Rosmini's definition refers to the soul as the principle of cognition. But the two are by no means so distinct as at first sight might seem. This will appear if we note how the former was understood by the Schoolmen, and what by them seen to involve. St. Thomas

* On the meaning of évted éxela, see Trendelenburg, Aristot. De An., Lib. III., p. 295, sqq.; Biese, Die Philosophie des Aristoteles, vol. i. pp. 355, 452, 479 sqq.; ii. 129, 207 sq., 214 sq.; Bonitz, Aristot. Metaphys., pp. 387 sq. (1047 a, 30); Zeller, Philosophie der Griechen, vol. ii. pt. ii. p. 480; Teichmüller, Aristotelische Forschungen, iii. PP. 55 $99., 119 599., etc., etc.

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translates it thus: “Anima est actus corporis physici potentia vitam habentis," and adds : "Comparatur igitur anima ad corpus, sicut forma ad materiem.” Hence it is a standing principle with all orthodox Thomists that the soul is the substantial form of the body.* And when they say "the soul,” they mean the intellective part of it, the νούς or ψυχή νοητική, that which Aristotle calls the place of forms (τόπος ειδών) and the form of forms (είδος ειδών). St. Thomas, in the conclusio of the article above cited, says, “Since the intellective principle is that whereby man is originally intelligent, whether it be called intellect or intellective soul, it must be united to the human body as form.” † And this is correct, for the first active form of the human body, as such, must be intelligence. This is easily shown. The human body, as such, is the correlate term of the unity of human sensation, and must, therefore, be determined by the same form as that unity. But the unity of human sensation is intelligence. Since the unity of sensation must be something that is aware of all sensations, and since one sensation cannot be aware of another, the unity of sensation cannot be itself sensation. But that which is aware of all sensations without being itself a sensation, is intelligence. Hence, intelligence is the unity of human sensation, and consequently the unity or substantial form of the body, which is the correlate term of such sensation. Hence Aristotle's definition, as correctly interpreted by the Schoolmen, involves Rosmini's. The above reasoning may seem somewhat scholastic and wire-drawn; but it is the sober truth.

It is worth while here to call attention to a definition of the soul which was given in ancient times, and agrees in several essential points with Rosmini's. It is that of Porphyry, who in the eighteenth of his Sentences ('Apopua apòc vontá) says, “The soul is an essence, unextended,

Zigliara, Summa Philosophica, vol. ii. p. 138, says, “Anima humana unitur corpori nostro ut vera ejus forma substantialis."

† "Cum principium intellectivum sit quo primo intelligit homo, sive vocetur intellectus, sive anima intellectiva, necesse est ipsum uniri corpori humano ut formam ” (Sum. Theol. i., q. 76, art. 4).

immaterial, imperishable, endowed with essential, selfderived life, possessing being.' This, of course, is a definition of the soul as separated from its sensible term, the body, and, as such, is very remarkable: first, because it identifies the soul with life, as Rosmini does (see $ 125, 2); and second, because it attributes to it the possession of being, which, according to Rosmini, is the essential form of intelligence. Whether Porphyry saw all that this attribution involves, may be regarded as doubtful; but when one remembers that the whole of mediæval philosophy had its origin in a single sentence of the Eisagôge of this philosopher,f one will not pronounce very dogmatically upon the limits of his insight. Certain it is that very many of his utterances coincide, in a most remarkable way, with those of Rosimini, and seem to be based upon the same principles.

I 25.

Hence are

From this definition, which expresses the esdeduced the other sence of the soul, may be deduced its properties, properties of the the most important of which are these two-simhuman soul.

plicity and immortality. Simplicity.

The simplicity of the soul is shown by the facts that it is a single principle, and that it is unconditioned by space.

That it is a single principle, is evident; for it is the same principle which feels and understands. That it is unconditioned by space, is shown from this, that the act of feeling excludes extension through the opposition by which it distinguishes itself from the felt extended, as well as by the fact that it receives its form from the idea, which is altogether free from space and time. The immortality of the soul is proved from Immor

* «Η ψυχή ουσία αμεγέθης, άϋλος, άφθαρτος, εν ζωή παρ' εαυτής εχούση το ζην, κεκτημένη το είναι. Cf. my translation of these Sentences in the Journal of Speculative Fhilosophy, vol. iii. Another rendering is possible.

† See Hauréau, De la Philosophie Scolastique, vol. i. cp. iv. ; cf. Ueberweg's Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie (American translation), vol. i. P. 365 sq. The sentence allu 'ed to refers to the nature of genera and species. See Berlin edition of Aristotle, vol. iv. p. I a. 8-13.

tality. these considerations : First, the soul is the principle which gives life to the body. Now, the soul, being that which gives life, is itself life. For this reason it cannot cease to be life, unless it be annihilated. Hence, of itself it cannot die; it is through itself immortal. Second, the form of the intelligent soul is the eternal and immutable idea. It is true that the soul, being in its nature contingent, might be annihilated; but this could be done only by God, who alone has the power to create, and hence, also, to annihilate. Now, God annihilates nothing that he has created, annihilation being contrary to his attributes, as is shown by Natural Theology.

“Since the body is the proximate cause of our sensations, and these are facts which happen in us without our agency, while we are merely passive subjects, it follows of necessity that we are not body. And since that which the word we expresses is the feeling and thinking subject, therefore this subject is a substance entirely different from corporeal substance" (New Essay, vol. ii. $ 668). It follows directly that, if the soul is incorporeal, it is simple. By simple is not meant that which is without distinction or determination, but that which is entitatively and per se one. The following table of the various significations of simple is taken from a work of considerable merit recently published (p. 232) 3

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