beings, whereby they do not necessarily exist in themselves, or in their real or moral form " (Theosophy, vol. i. § 427). The prin- lopment of cause, and contains the reason why all peoples believe that God exists. 103. With the principle of cause, we run through the whole series of second causes; but finding them all contingent, we are not able to stop with them. Reflection does not rest until it has arrived at a first cause, in whose essence subsistence is included, and this cause is God. The principle of cause, which thus unfolds until it reaches its last operation, was called by us the principle of integration. All men, from a necessity which belongs to intelligent reflection, use the principle of integration with great rapidity, run through the second causes in a body, and, by an irresistible rational instinct, arrive at the knowledge of God. For this reason the existence of God has been admitted in all times and by all the peoples of the world (cf. Logic, §§ 680–684). This is true, and yet the proof of the existence of God derived from the supposed necessity of positing a first cause is an extremely fallacious one. The argument takes this form. If there be no first cause, there must be an infinite succession of caused causes; in other words, an infinite number of successive causés. But infinite number is a contradiction in terms, that is, an absurdity. Therefore there must be a first cause. The whole force of the argument lies in the unthinkability of an infinite number actually realized. It is quite true that an infinite number is unthinkable, because all number, from its very nature, is finite. But number altogether is but an intellective mode. of grouping, and does not lie in things themselves. It may, therefore, be admitted that in finite time it is impos- 104. principles tion are in the to the first Reflection is guided by other principles be- All other sides these; but, in the last analysis, all its ope- of reflec rations reduce themselves to comparing a known reducible object with ideal being, in order to see how far, and in what mode, it partakes of the essence of and unibeing, and how far it falls short of that essence. Hence all reflection is by itself an instrument of truth, having truth as its type and as the measure intuited by of all things. versal essence of being naturally Us. 105. of the art ing. The validity of human reasoning being thus Purposes demonstrated, Logic undertakes to teach the art of reasonof it. The first purpose of the art of reasoning is the avoidance of error, and the second, the attainment, by means of reasoning, of the end proposed. 106. errors in We avoid errors when we proceed so that the How mind affirms nothing gratuitously, and that the reasoning faculty of conviction is always guided by reason, ed. are avoid Des cartes' four rules of method. in such a way that what we say to ourselves is reached by way of pure reasoning, without the interference of the will. And here Descartes' four rules of method find their application. These four rules, expressed in succinct and comprehensive language, are: "(1) To accept nothing as true which is not clearly known to be such, from its presenting itself to the mind so clearly and distinctly as to give no occasion for doubt; (2) to divide, as far as possible, every problem into its natural parts; (3) to arrange one's thoughts in due order, advancing gradually from the more simple and easy to the more complex and difficult, and to suppose a definite order, for the sake of orderly progress in research, even when none such is furnished naturally by the subject under consideration; (4) by exhaustive enumerations and complete revisions, to take care that nothing be overlooked" (Discours de la Méthode, Part II.). Rosmini lays down six rules or norms, which he reduces to these two precepts The same "(1) Never affirm anything you do not know, or in a mode different from that in which you know it. applies to denying. "(2) Affirm with your inner thought all that you know, but affirm it in the mode in which you know it, without addition or subtraction. The same applies to denying" (Logic, § 168). Three aims of reasoning. Hence three methods apodeictic, heuristic, and didactic. 107. The aims proposed by reasoning are three: first, to demonstrate and defend truth: second, to discover new truth, and, third, to teach the truth to others. Hence the three methods, the apodeictic, the heuristic or inventive, and the didactic, each of which has its special rules. Rosmini devotes a considerable portion of his Logic to an examination and classification of these rules (Book ii. § iv. pp. 305-473, §§ 749-1038). He has also left a very valuable work, treating of the didactic method as applied to education. The title of it is, On the Supreme Principle of Method, and on Some of its Applications, for the Benefit of Human Education. This work, which is almost unknown outside of Italy, contains many excellent thoughts on education. 108. of the to which forms of are re ducible. The apodeictic method uses various forms of Artifice argumentation, but they may all be reduced to syllogism, that of the syllogism. The artifice of the the various syllogism consists in showing that the proposi- argument tion to be demonstrated is already contained in another proposition, either evident or, at least, certain. The syllogism is composed of three propositions, the last of which is called the conclusion or thesis, and the other two the premises. The one of the two premises implicitly contains the conclusion, and the other proves that it really contains it. The proposition which we wish to show to be contained in the first premise must have either the same subject or the same predicate as that premise. If the subject is the same in both propositions, it is sufficient to show that the predicate of the conclusion is contained in the predicate of the proposition assumed. If the pre dicate is identical, it is sufficient to show that the subject of the conclusion is contained in the subject of the proposition assumed. In order to show that the predicate or the subject of the conclusion is contained in the predicate or subject of the proposition assumed, we take a concept which we call the middle term, and show that this is identical either with both predicates or both subjects, whence it follows directly that the two subjects or the two predicates are themselves identical, on the ground that "things which are equal to the same thing are equal to one another." Rosmini, like all truly great thinkers, sees the value of the syllogism and defends it against Hegel and other detractors. His reply to Hegel is one of the most acute and masterly pieces of philosophical criticism in existence. See Logic, §§ 1092-1098. Universal rule of the syllogism. 109. In order to see whether a syllogism is valid or otherwise, we may apply this universal rule: The middle term must have a comprehension at least equal to that of the predicate, and an extension at least equal to that of the subject, of the conclusion. From the necessity of more than one middle term arises the sorites. 110. When no one middle term can be found which may be identified with both subjects or both predicates, we may take two or more which are identical with each other, and the first of which is identical with one of the two subjects or two predicates, and the last identical with the other. Then, instead of the second premise, we have two |