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§ 16. Being in general is known by intuition. Two great classes of

human cognitions.-- Intuition and perception


§ 17. Order of the two classes.—Universality ; its nature


§ 18. Being in general and particular being. By intuition we know the

essence of being.-- Being has two modes. Aristotle and the Ger-

man school criticized for confounding the two. Kant. Hegelian



§ 19. When I affirm a particular real being, what do I know more than

before? The cause of affirmation is a feeling. The formula for

affirmative cognitions.— Real being. Intellective perception sees

passivity on its obverse side as activity


§ 20. What this formula presupposes. It is feeling that constitutes the

reality of being.–Subject and object. The ancient meaning differs

from the modern

§ 21. In what sense the essence of being is universal.-Principle and term 64

§ 22. Examination of the objections to the identification of reality with

feeling.–Matter. Pure reality


§ 23. Identity between the essence of being and the activity manifested in

feeling.--Ideal and real being


§ 24. This identity imperfect.-Universality ...


§ 25. The essence of being is realized in the difference, as well as in the

identity of real being


§ 26. Corollaries derived from the identity of the essence of being and the

multiplicity of its realizations


$ 27. Quantity belongs to the realization, not to the essence, of being.--

Parmenides. The One and the Many


§ 28. Ideas which make known the negation of being. All ideas of par-

ticular beings consist of positive and negative. There is but one

idea, the essence of being, and all the rest are relations of it.

-Negative and particular ideas


§ 29. In respect to quantity, the essence of being and beings perceived by

us are different, not identical. -- Contingency ...


§ 30. The identity between the essence of being and real beings exists

between them only in so far as they are known


$ 31. It is only as known that real being identifies itself with ideal being.

Perception not less true on that account.—Universality not derived

from things


§ 32. Why we think we do not know the ground of things.—The intellect

knows things in an absolute mode. Passion and action. Intel-

lective perception


§ 33. Why being, as a means of cognition, is called ideal. - Rosmini's

system not idealism. Means sub quo

$ 34. The essence of being is self-intelligible and forms the intelligibility

of all other things. The idea of being is the light of reason, is

inborn, and is the form of intelligence.—The idea of being not

derived from external sensation, feeling of our own existence,

reflection or the act of perception. It is, therefore, innate. Mean-

ing of innate


§ 35. Meaning of the word form. Two senses of the word form. In

which of the two senses is the idea of being used? Object and Sub-





ject and their relation. Kant's forms not objective, but subjective.
- Form of cognition. Criticism of Kant's Table of Categories.
The modal categoriesnecessary, actual, possible


§ 36. All intelligence is reducible to thinking ing as realized in a cer.

tain manner, with certain limits. — Though the soul is finite, its

means of cognizing is infinite


§ 37. In what sense ideal being is said to be possible.--Ideal being, being

in itself, and being as object


§ 38. How possible and ideal beings are said to be many.—Concept is

one ; the things conceived are many


§ 39. Ideality a mode of being incapable of being confounded with reality IIO

$ 40. Differences between ideas and the things known by means of them

$ 41. Essence known through idea ; subsistence, through affirmation on

occasion of a feeling. --Contingent things have two inconfusible

modes of being ...

§ 42. How in perception we unite ideal being with feeling.–Rosmini's

Theory of Cognition


$ 43. Objection to calling intellective perception a judgment. Answer.

The objection does not touch the fact, but only the propriety of

the term.-Difference between Rosmini and Kant. Reid


§ 44. Is this affirmation a judgment? No judgment is possible without

the union of its terms.—The elements of a judgment are com-

bined by nature


$ 45. In intellective perception, it is not intelligence, but nature, that

unites the terms of the judgment. This judgment produces its

own subject.-Kant's errors


§ 46. The term judgment does not express the nature of affirmation, but a

subsequent reflection analyzes it.—The terms of a judgment are

perceived as one


$ 47. Reflection, in analyzing a judgment, distinguishes, but does not sepa-

rate, its elements. Subject and predicate do not exist prior to

the judgment, but are formed in the act of judgment.—Direct

and reflexive cognition


§ 48. Difference between primitive affirmations and other judgments.

The nature of the primitive judgment further illustrated. —The

predicate is contained in the concept of the subject


§ 49. The primitive judgment may also be called the primitive synthesis.

- Perception spontaneous, abstraction voluntary


$ 50. Convertibility of the terms of the primitive judgment.-Ancient

mode of expressing judgments


§ 51. Solution of the problem of the origin of ideas.—The Light of


$ 52. New Essay and Restoration of Philosophy.—Logic the link be.

tween Ideology and Metaphysics


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2. Logic.

$ 53. Logic. -Aristotelian and Hegelian Logic
$ 54. Aim of reasoning and nature of conviction.-Certainty and its con-






$ 55. Twofold office of Logic


$ 56. What is truth? Truth is the form of our intelligence.-Truth and

being synonymous terms. Criticism


$ 57. Confirmation of the same doctrine.- Meaning of truth


§ 58. Transcendental scepticism objects to the doctrine that the mind by

its nature possesses the first truth. Reply. In the case of uni.

versal being, illusion is impossible. Two kinds of being. Proof

of the impossibility of the first illusion.—No concept illusory 163

§ 59. The impossibility of the second illusion proved


$ 60. Transition from observation to the proof that observation is a valid

source of knowledge. Meaning of abstract ...


$ 61. Error impossible in ideas generic and specific. Ideas the exemplary

truths of things ...


$ 62. There can be no error without a judgment.--Aristotle cited


§ 63. There are judgments absolutely free error.- Nouns and verbs 169

$ 64. Such are the judgments expressing what is contained in an idea.

What are principles ? Meaning of absurd.—Principle of con-

tradiction. Aristotle cited


§ 65. Primitive judgments affirming that what is felt exists are free from

The child affirms being only, not its modes.—No doubt

respecting feeling as such. Individuum vagum


§ 66. In perception we add the essence of being to the felt activity, but

we never confound the two.—Perception distinguished from sen-

sation. Theories of Reid and Hamilton


§ 67. Judgments respecting the mode of perceived beings. Condition of

their validity. Three possibilities with regard to this condition.

We may be deceived in determining the modes of perceived

being ; but we are not necessarily so.—Origin of error ... 180

$ 68. We have a faculty for affirming exactly what we feel, and this

faculty is only another function of the faculty whereby we affirm

being apart from its modes. Deception arises, not from this

faculty, but from the faculty of error which I allow to disturb it.

-St. Thomas on faith ...


§ 69. The error possible in the perception of real being. Perception is

followed by reflection, which tries to determine the exact mode

of the perceived being. Error begins with reflection and keeps

pace with the complication and extent of it.-Nature of reflec-

tion ...


$ 70. Perception infallible. Reflection may be rendered so by Logic. -

Province of Logic

$ 71. Error is always voluntary. Reflection does not, save accidentally,

produce error. The faculty of persuasion does not always de-

pend, as it ought, on that of reasoning. Hence error. Various

causes that produce persuasion, in spite of reasoning. Error,

though always voluntary, is not always culpable.-Occasional

causes of error


$72. Three kinds of remedies gainst error, corresponding to three





$ 73. Sophistic. - Various kinds of Sophisms


$ 74. More on perception. Analysis of corporeal sensations. Law of




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intellectual attention. The necessary nexus of objects does not
enter into perception.-Sensation, sensitive perception and in-
tellective perception distinguished. Perception limited to its

object. Object and term ..

$ 75. Source of Fichte's error, confusion between feeling and perception.

Perception separates, reflection distinguishes, its object from

others.-Refutation of Fichte's system. Distinction between

knowledge and consciousness. Nature of the Ego

$ 76. Schelling's error in asserting that the finite cannot be perceived

without the infinite. Origin of this error, confusion between

intellective perception and reasoning

$ 77. How reason finds the limits, contingency, etc., of perceived beings.

Schelling saw dimly, but could not express the fact that the mind,

prior to all reasonings, must have something complete and uni-

versal.--Refutation of Pantheism. Albertus Magnus on the

active intcllect

§ 78. Defence of the laws of perception and reasoning against the objec-

tions of sceptics. In external sensation we feel within us a force

which is not ourselves. This enables us to affirm that a being

exists without confounding it with ourselves. -Objects of per-

ception. Intellective imagination. Subject and extra-subject ..

§ 79. Perception is the bridge between us and the external world, and

the difficulties of idealism arise from considering the world apart

from perception.—Meaning of external world

$ 80. Perception yields the important ontological truth that beings, in so

far as agents, may exist in each other without intermingling.--

Definitions of body, force. Perception of our own bodies and of

external bodies

$ 81. Our perception of ourselves is posterior to our perception of the

external world.—Intellective perception of the Ego

§ 82. Reflection would be unable to compare perceived beings together,

if it had not universal being, by means of which it knows the

mode and quantity of its realization in those beings, and, hence,

if they belong or not to the same species. Principle of the dis-

cernibility of individuals.Individual and idea of individual

§ 83. Origin of the ideas of numbers

$ 84. Difference of the mode of realization constitutes difference of

species ; difference in quantity or actuality constitutes accidental

differences.—Origin of Species. Reality ; two kinds of it.

Various kinds of real form

$ 85. When may we say that the Ego and the non-Ego mutually limit

each other ?- Affirmation does not include negation

$ 86. The mind rises to the infinite neither in the primal perception, nor

in the reflection which compares the Ego and the non-Ego, but in

that which considers the limitation, contingency, and relativity of

either. ---Max Müller on the manner in which the infinite is per-


§ 87. The supreme principle of all our reasoning

$ 88. The principle of substance one of the conditions of real being falling

under perception.—Modes of our idea of substance. Herbert

Spencer on the substance of mind ...












§ 89. We cannot perceive sensations pure, but only as modifications of



§ 90. Does perception take place directly or through reasoning ?-

Cognition and recognition


§ 91. Process by which reflection translates the perception of ourselves.

- The Ego a substance and a feeling


§ 92. Perception does not take place blindly. -How sensation acts upon



§ 93. Perception is governed by the principle of substance. -Difference

between substance and cause

$ 94. Substance and accident


$ 95. Why the child, which has not perceived itself, is compelled by the

principle of substance to attribute its own sensations to bodies ... 236

§ 96. It does not follow that the principle of substance is fallacious.

The errors we commit in referring accidents to the wrong sub-

stance may be corrected.-Subject as distinguished from extra-



$ 97. The principle of substance is the intuition of the essence of being,

the first and universal truth.-Rosmini's idea of substance not



$ 98. One of the conditions of reflection is the principle of cause. —Prin-

ciple of cause dependent on principle of contradiction, and this

on the principle of cognition


$ 99. Various orders of reflection. Reflection of the first order discovers

the different limitations and mutual dependence of real beings. —

Dependence the result of reflection


§ 100. Notions of cause and effect. --Refutation of scepticism with refer-

ence to the universality and necessity of cause


§ 101. The principle of cause is merely an application of the idea of being

to a perceived being, so as to see whether the latter has or has

not in itself subsistence.- Hypotheses. All causes either

physical or metaphysical


$ 102. What is contingent being ?--Concept of necessity


$ 103. The principle of integration is a development of the principle of

cause, and contains the reason why all peoples believe that

God exists.— The argument for the existence of God derived

from the impossibility of thinking an infinite number is entirely



§ 104. All other principles of reflection are reducible in the same

way to the first universal truth, the essence of being naturally

intuited by us


$ 105. Purposes of the art of reasoning


$ 106. How errors in reasoning are avoided. -Descartes' four rules of

method. Rosmini's six norms

$ 107. Three aims of reasoning. Hence three methods—apodeictic,

heuristic, and didactic


§ 108. Artifice of the syllogism, to which the various forms of argument

are reducible.- Defence of the syllogism against Hegel


$ 109. Universal rule of the syllogism


§ 110. From the necessity of more than one middle term arises the Sorites 250

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