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in which the idea of being could be supposed to be given to us after our coming into existence are impossible, it follows that the idea of being is innate or unproduced. Q. E. D." (New Essay, vol. ii. §§ 467, 468).

Rosmini's assertion that the idea of being is innate has caused much misunderstanding and opposition in various quarters; but both proceed from want of attention to his explanations. By "innate," Rosmini does not mean innate in the subject and forming a part, or modification, or attribute of it, but innate as form, object, presence. "We must carefully attend," he says, "so as not to confound two things that are altogether distinct. It is one thing when we say, 'a being present to the mind,' another, when we say, 'a modification of the mind.' Were it otherwise, this being which we see would be nothing else than ourselves modified, a mere subjective entity. . . . The intuition of being gives us these two truths respecting it: first, that it is a being present to the mind-objective, and not a being having an independent subsistence of its own; second, that it is not a mere modification of the mind. What do

we mean when we say, 'a being present to the mind'? We mean a being which has its existence in the mind, in such a way that, if we should suppose that there was not some mind to which it was present, it would not be at all, for the reason that its mode of being is intelligibility itself, outside the mind, not in the mind. By means of it we know, not the act of existence in itself, but the act of existence in the mind. . . . In the second place, . . . (being) is not a mere modification of the mind or of the subject which has the intuition of it. This truth manifests itself, as soon as we attentively consider universal being itself. In the thought of being, we see that the being thought by us is the object of the mind, and, what is more, likewise the objectivity of all the terms of the mind. . . . It is, therefore, in its essence, distinct from the subject, and from all that can belong to the subject. It is the light of the subject, and superior to it. The subject is receptive with respect to it, while it is essentially received in a mode peculiar to itself. The subject is compelled to see it more

than the open eye is compelled to see the rays of the sun which it has before it and which strike its retina. Being is immutable; it is what is: the subject is mutable. Being imposes laws and actualizes the subject by rendering it intelligent; and since it cannot be said, in any proper sense, that the subject suffers from the object (because the presence of the latter merely gives it its mode and compels it to rouse a new activity in itself), what takes place in the subject must not be called passion (ñáloç) but increase of act.* . . . Attentive observation, therefore, directed to this being, which naturally shines before our minds, leads us to conclude that it is an object essentially different from the subject which intuites it; that, at the same time, it is not thought by us as furnished with any other existence save that alone whereby it shines before our minds; and hence that, if all mind were removed, this being would no longer be conceivable, which is the reason why it is called an ideal being (ente)" (New Essay, vol. iii. §§ 1440–1442). This last observation respecting the removal of all mind furnishes Rosmini, as we shall see, with his strongest proof for the necessary existence of God (§ 179).

Meaning of the word form.

Two

35.

But the word form, having different significations, requires explanation. It is used, generally speaking, to mean that which imparts to a being an original constitutive act, which makes it to be what it is. Thus the essence of being, knowable in and through itself, is said to be the form of the intelligent soul, because it is that which imparts to the soul the act whereby it is intelligent. But here we must distinguish two

* Cf. the remarkable passage in Aristotle: “Ovê čσti d' áπλoûv ovdè tò πάσχειν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν φθορά τις ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐναντίου, τὸ δὲ σωτηρία μᾶλλον τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος καὶ ὁμοίου οὕτως ὡς δύναμις ἔχει πρὸς ἐντελέχειαν ” (De An., ii. 5, 5; 417 b, 2, sqq.; also Ibid., iii. 4, 2, 3; 429 a, 13, sqq.).

the word

of the two

kinds of form. Notionally considered, that which senses of imparts to a being its original, essential act is form. different from that act itself; but sometimes it is part of the being itself and confounds itself with the act, being separable from it only mentally and through abstraction; at other times, it is something really different from the act and from the being which it informs. Thus the form of a knife is the edge of the knife, belonging to, and forming part of, the knife. On the contrary, the form of incandescent iron is fire, something altogether different from the iron, but such that, when the two are brought into contact, the one becomes the form of the other, penetrating and acting in the other's sphere of being. Now, in In which which of these two senses is ideal being the form is the idea of intelligence? Here, again, we must appeal to used? of being observation and fact, and these show us that ideal being is the form of the intelligent mind in the latter sense only, and not in the former. And, indeed, although we clearly see that we are intelligent beings only in virtue of the essence of being which stands before our minds, still, we find it impossible to believe that the essence of being is ourselves or forms part of ourselves. It is, therefore, a form different from us. That which imparts to our spirits the act of intelligence is something very different from us, notwithstanding that it is in us or present to us. But this is not enough. Even if we accept this signification of the word, it can be applied to ideal being only in a sense altogether peculiar and different from that

Object and subject, and their relation.

Kant's

forms not objective, but subjective.

which we adopt when we say of two real beings,
which act reciprocally on each other, that the one
is the form of the other. We must, therefore,
carefully observe that the mode in which the
essence of being becomes the form of our spirits
has no resemblance whatever to the mode in
which one real being, through action and reaction,
becomes the form of another. The essence of
being becomes the form of our spirits simply and
solely by making us know, by revealing to us
its own natural cognizability. Hence there is no
reaction on the part of our spirits. These are
simply receptive, and the light, the knowledge,
which they receive is what renders them intel-
ligent. The essence of being is simple, unalter-
able, incapable of being modified or confounded
or mixed with anything else.
In this way it
reveals itself, and it can reveal itself in no other.
The spirit which intuites it, no less than the act
of intuition, stands outside of it. When the mind

intuites it, it does not intuite itself. For this
reason the essence of being receives the name
of object, meaning that which is placed before the
intuiting mind, or subject. It will thus be seen
that, when we say that ideal being is the form of
the mind, we use the word form in a sense alto-
gether different from, and opposed to, that in
which Kant uses it, all Kant's forms being sub-
jective, whereas our one form is objective, and
objective in its very essence.

In regard to the meaning of the word form, Rosmini says elsewhere, "It seems that Kant took the word form

in a material sense, drawing his concept from the form of bodies. By form we mean a perfecting principle, as the ancient philosophers did. Moreover, in our case, it is the ideal object which informs the mind.* Those, therefore, who have charged us with taking one of Kant's forms as the basis of our system, have not understood that the form of which we speak differs essentially from all Kant's forms, as object differs from subject and extra-subject" (Theodicy, vol. i. § 151, n.).† "It is being which, as object, draws our spirits to that essential act which is called intellect, and which renders them capable of seeing this being afterwards, in relation with the particular modes of sensation supplied to it-a capability which is called reason. In a word, the idea of being, united to our spirits, is that which forms our intellect and our reason. It is this that renders us intelligent beings, rational animals" (New Essay, vol. ii. § 482). It follows from this that the peculiarity of mind lies in having its form as object. Being is, of course, the first and essential form of everything; but it is the object of mind alone. In other words, consciousness is the power which certain beings have of separating the universal form from their matter, and holding it up, so to speak, as an object. The being of a table is not its object.

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By the form of cognition," says Rosmini, "we mean that element whereby cognition is cognition, whereby everything cognized is cognized. . . . Moreover, this element must be known through itself, and not through some other means rendering it known. . . . Therefore, it must be known immediately, per se. Now, in every one of our cognitions, nothing is known, unless existence be known, because any known thing is simply a thing whose (possible) being and whose determinations are known. But not one of these determinations is known, unless its possible existence is known. To know these determinations is to know

* Cf. St. Thomas: "Id quo aliquid operatur, oportet esse formam ejus. Nihil enim agit nisi secundum quod est actu. Actu autem non est aliquid, nisi per id quod est forma ejus” (Summa contra Gentes, ii. 59).

In spite of this, Mamiani still insists that Rosmini's being is subjective, one of Kant's forms (Prolegomeni, p. 114, etc.).

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