sensations in us, since this sensible body is what is to be judged to exist; second, that we should have the idea of existence, that universal which we apply to said body when we say 'exist'-a universal which does not come from the senses; third and last, that we should perform an act in which we consider the action of the body upon us from the side of the operating principle, and that we should regard this principle as existing in itself, and different from ourselves. By so doing we place it in the class of existing things and close the judgment: That which strikes my senses exists. Now, from this analysis of perception it is plain that three distinct faculties concur and cooperate in it: first, the faculty of feeling the sensible; second, the faculty which possesses the idea of existence, or which intuites being, which again supplies the predicate of the judgment; and, lastly, the faculty which unites. the predicate to the subject and thus puts into the judgment the copula, or the form of the judgment itself. By whatever terms we choose to designate these faculties, they must always be kept distinct and never confounded” (Ibid., vol. i. § 338; cf. Psychology, vol. ii. §§ 1306 sqq.).

20.

formula

presup

poses.

This formula must be well studied and ana- What this lyzed. It presupposes that between feeling and real existence there is a necessary bond, such that there cannot be any feeling without a real being; in other words, that in some way or other the essence of being, which we previously knew only universally, is found realized in feeling. When, therefore, a mind at first cognizant only of the essence of being, without knowing that a being exists, receives, experiences, observes a feeling, it immediately affirms that the being of which it previously knew only the essence, also exists. Feeling, therefore, is that which constitutes the It is feel

ing that constitutes the reality of beings.

reality of beings. But here springs up a crowd of objections.

This section brings out, in a most distinct manner, the point in which Rosmini's system differs from all other systems, viz., in making the matter of thought (the real) subjective, and its form (the ideal) objective. In this it exactly reverses the common view of the position of subject and object. By so doing, it avoids Kant's difficulty, and cuts off the possibility of scepticism. If the matter of thought is purely subjective, and its form absolutely intelligible, not in spite of, but by reason of, its objectivity, then, of course, all question as to the reality of an external world, and how the gulf between the mind and it is to be bridged over, ceases. Externality itself becomes a mere mode of presentation-the mode wherein the subject, by means of its ideal object, re-presents its extra-subjective sensations to itself, or, in other words, objectifies them.

In regard to the ancient, as compared with the modern, use of the terms subject and object, the following note is of some importance :-" Subject and object, two terms so frequently employed by philosophers, may both be traced back to Aristotle. According to him, úπoкεíμɛvov has two principal meanings: first, that of which something is predicated in a proposition (grammatical subject); second, the substance which in nature lies, so to speak, at the bottom of actions. In both senses úπoкείμEVOν was translated subjectum by the Latins (cf. Boethius in Categor. cap. 5). Object is almost the Greek avTIKEίμEvov, although the latter, as being more general, is usually rendered into Latin-for instance, by Boethius-by oppositum (cf. Categor. 10; 11 b, 16: De Animâ, i. 1, 7; 402 b, 15: ii. 4, 1; 415 a, 20: ii. 11, 12; 424 a, 11). Thus, throughout the Middle Age, as well as in the works of Descartes and Spinoza, subject has the meaning of substrate substance. Spinoza, in his Principia Philosophia Cartesiana, p. 11, edit. Paul [vol. i. p. 29, edit. Bruder], says, 'Omnis res cui inest immediate, ut in subjecto... aliqua proprietas cujus realis idea in nobis est, vocatur

substantia.' Hence subjective being (esse subjectivorum) is now used in Germany with a sense exactly contrary to that in which it was used by William of Occam in the fourteenth century. In the works of that philosopher it means something in nature lying outside of the mind and not formed merely by thought, whereas objective being (esse objectivorum) is explained as 'ipsum cognosci adeoque esse quoddam fictum' (Sententiæ, Bk. i. dist. 2, quæst. 8). From this will further be clear what is meant by realitas objectiva in Descartes, e.g. Meditations, iii. In Germany, owing chiefly to the influence of Kant and Fichte, the use of these words has been exactly inverted. Subject means that which knows; object, on the contrary, is a thing, in so far as it subjected to thought, but as preserving its own nature free from the opinions of the knower. Hence subjective is what depends upon the different states of the knower; objective, what is based upon the constant nature of the thing itself" (Trendelenburg, Elementa Logices Aristotelea, p. 54, n.). It will be seen from this that Rosmini uses the two terms partly in the ancient, partly in the modern sense, but rather in the former than in the latter. Subject, according to him, is "a sentient individual, in so far as it contains within itself a supreme active principle." "Intellective subject is a subject that intuites ideal being." "Human subject is a subject, the principle at once of animality and intelligence" (Anthropology, § 767). Object of thought, on the contrary, is defined as "a thing present to us in itself. A thing in itself [Ding an sich] means a thing in its existence; and, since to exist and to be present are different from to act, the object of thought is essentially a thing different from us as thinking beings. The truth of this is shown when I think myself. In that act, I, the subject, become the object of my own thought. At the same time, in thinking of myself, I consider myself in so far as I exist and no farther. The essential character, therefore, of thought is, that it terminates in an object, that is, in a thing different from the thinking subject, as such" (New Essay, vol. iii. § 1093). According to Rosmini, nothing can be an object of the mind but pure being and its modifications,

that is, ideas (see note under § 18), which the mind is enabled to form by using its feelings to determine pure being. These ideas every mind forms relatively to itself, but does not form absolutely (see under § 42). Ideas, as logical possibilities, are eternal, necessary, and independent of any finite subject (cf. § 35).

In what sense the

essence of being is universal.

2 J.

The first objection that presents itself is, that the intuitive knowledge of being, which precedes every affirmation of real being, relates to a universal being, while all affirmed being is particular. The answer to this is, that the essence of the being which is known intuitively, is not universal, but that the word universal, which is joined to it as an attribute, expresses the mode in which it is cognized hence, when we affirm that that essence is realized, we do not affirm this realization of the mode in which the essence is known, but of the essence itself.

As to the nature of universality, see citations under SS 17, 24. The phrase, "the essence of being is realized," presents some difficulties, and has even caused differences of opinion among Rosmini's disciples. In order to understand its meaning fully, we must bear in mind that, in Rosmini's view, all being involves a principle and a term. Term, in his language, bears the same relation to end that principle does to beginning (see under §§ 15, 18, 22). When, therefore, he says that the essence of being is realized, he merely means that the principle of being must necessarily have a 'term. This principle is given to us by intuition; when we find the terms in feeling, we recognize them as such, and call them realizations of the essence of being. "It is easy," he says, "to see that what is wanting to

the perfection of the being naturally intuited by us is its terms. We conceive this activity which is called being; but we do not see where it issues, in what it terminates; just as if we knew that a certain man was working, without knowing the term of his action-whether, for example, he was making a statue, a picture, or something else. Not knowing, therefore, by nature, wherein that activity which we conceive and call being terminates, we come to find:

"First, that the intuition of this activity cannot by itself impart to us the knowledge of any real thing, because real things are so many terms of that activity which is called being.

66

Second, that the being naturally intuited by us is indeterminate, which means devoid of terms; universal, inasmuch as it is capable of receiving all those terms which it has not; possible or in potentiality, inasmuch as it has not a terminated or absolute act, but only a principle of act. In a word, . . . that which we see by nature is the first activity of being, without its terms, by means of which alone it natures itself and forms a real subsistence.

"Third, that if this being, evolving itself more manifestly before our minds, should put forth its own activity and so terminate and complete itself, we should see God. . . .

Fourth, and finally, that the other activity presented to us by feeling, inasmuch as it does not issue from being itself, the form of our intelligence, but comes from elsewhere, is seen as essentially separate and distinct from it; but that, nevertheless, this activity is judged by means of it, and known to be dependent on it, known as a term of it, partial, contingent, and inconfusible with it" (New Essay, vol. iii. §§ 1177, 1178; cf. Buroni, Dell' Essere e del Conoscere, §§ 175, 176, where the author, with some reason, objects to the phrase, "ideal being realizes itself").

F