Philosophy conducts from the certainty that things seem to the certainty that they are; in other words, from subjective persuasion to objective conviction. If being and knowing were the same, as Parmenides and Hegel allege, there would be no place for philosophy, inasmuch as there would be no distinction between an hallucination and a true cognition. It is curious that Tennyson, in the later editions. of In Memoriam, has altered seems to is in the lines (cxiii. 6): "And what I am beheld again What seems, and no man understands." SCIENCES OF INTUITION. (Ideology and Logic.) * Rosmini defines intuition as "the (receptive) act of the soul, whereby it receives the communication of intelligible or ideal being," and adds, "This act is called intelligence by Aristotle, who says that 'intelligence is of indivisibles,' calling indivisibles the essences of things which are seen in ideas. Hence, in the language of the Schoolmen, cognitio simplicis intelligentiæ means the same thing as cognition of possibles. For this reason it is clear that Kant perverted the language of philosophy, when he usurped the word intuition to mean sense perception. In making this alteration in the meaning of the word, he gave proof of the sensism which lies at the basis of his system, attributing to sense the act which specially belongs to intelligence" (Psychology, vol. i. § 53). Kant defines intuition thus: "Through the medium of sensibility objects are given to us, and it alone furnishes us with intuitions." † It is against this doctrine, than which nothing can be more false, that Rosmini's system is specially directed. Rosmini most emphatically denies that objects are given to us through the senses. Intelligence alone has an object: the *This is not strictly correct. Aristotle merely says, “Ἡ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἀδιαιρέτων νόησις ἐν τούτοις περὶ ἃ οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ψεύδος” (De An., iii. 6, 1). † Kritik der rein. Vern., Die transcend. Esthetik, § 1. Ideology and Logic. senses have only terms.* When he says that "to have before the mind the essence of things, without any affirmation on the part of the subject, is called to intuite" (Logic, § 320), he agrees exactly with St. Thomas, who says, Intelligere dicit nihil aliud quam simplicem INTUITUM intellectus in id quod sibi est præsens intelligible" (Sent., dist. iii. art. 5, q. 5). 1. Ideology. IO. Ideology undertakes to investigate the nature of human knowledge; Logic, to show that the nature of this knowledge is such as not to admit the possibility of error. Hence error must be looked for elsewhere than in the nature of knowledge. Error is not knowledge. Ideology forms the subject of Rosmini's earliest important work, the New Essay on the Origin of Ideas, as well as of the voluminous treatise, The Restoration of Philosophy in Italy, the treatise on The Idea, forming the second half of the fourth volume of the Theosophy, and the polemical work, Aristotle Explained and Examined (see Bibliography). As Ideology is presupposed in every science, it is frequently touched upon in every one of Rosmini's works. "Ideology," he says, "treats of being, the object of the mind; Psychology, of the soul, which is the principle of human feeling. These, therefore, are the two sciences which furnish the rudiments of all the others. All the others, in the last analysis, resolve themselves into these two" (Psychology, vol. i. § 46). As Rosmini's chief philosophical merits lie in the direction of Ideology, it will be necessary here to point out what he did for that science, as well as what that science, as developed by him, docs for philosophy. * See under §§ 15, 18, 74. Aristotle, in the first chapter of the first book of his Psychology, calls attention, in concise terms, to a fundamental difficulty incident to all philosophical research. "It is difficult," he says, "to determine whether we ought first to investigate the different parts of the soul or their functions, the intellective principle or intelligence, the sensitive principle or sensation. And even if we begin with the functions, there remains still another perplexity, whether we ought not to investigate the terms of the principles before the principles themselves, the intelligible before the intellective principle, and the sensible before the sensitive principle." * In other words, if we consider merely intelligence and its conditions, it is difficult to know whether philosophy ought to begin with a theory of cognition, with logic, or with metaphysics. With whichever of the three we set out, we soon find that we have presupposed the other two. As Hegel puts it, "A beginning, in so far as it is an immediate, makes an assumption, or, rather, is itself an assumption."† If we begin with logic, we find that we have presupposed the main truths both of the theory of cognition and of metaphysics. Without the former, the nature of the form of concepts would be unintelligible; without the latter, the nature of their content. In regard to the former, Jaesche, the editor of Kant's Logic, says, "Kant never thought of trying to find a ground for the logical proposition of identity and contradiction, or of deducing the logical forms of judgments. He accepted and used the principle of contradiction as a proposition carrying its own evidence with it, and requiring no deduction from a higher principle. . . . Whether, however, the logical propositions of identity and contradiction, absolutely and in themselves, admit and require * σε Χαλεπὸν διορίσαι . . . πότερον τὰ μόρια χρὴ ζητεῖν πρότερον ἢ τὰ ἔργα αὐτῶν, οἷον τὸ νοεῖν ἢ τὸν νοῦν, καὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἢ τὸ αἰσθητικόν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. εἰ δὲ τὰ ἔργα πρότερον, πάλιν ἄν τις απορήσειεν εἰ τὰ ἀντικεί μενα πρότερα τούτων ζητητέον, οἷον τὸ αἰσθητὸν τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ καὶ τὸ νοητὸν TOD VONTIKOD" (De An., i. 1, 6, 7; 402 b, 10 sqq.). When Belger (Hermes, xiii. p. 32) proposes to read in the last sentence αἰσθάνεσθαι for αἰσθητικοῦ, and voeîv for voηTIKOû, he only shows that he does not understand the passage. Encyclopadie, Einleitung, § 1, ad fin. a deduction from a higher principle, is another question, which leads to the important inquiry whether there is at all any absolutely first principle of all cognition and science. . . . But since, on the other hand, these highest principles of knowledge, considered as principles, with equal necessity presuppose the logical form, the result is a circle, which cannot, indeed, be resolved for science, but may be explained."* In regard to the dependence of logic upon metaphysics, Trendelenburg says, "Thought, with its forms, will hardly be known without an examination of the reciprocal action between it and the nature of its objects."† If, on the other hand, we begin with a theory of knowledge, we find that it involves both logic and metaphysics. As F. A. Lange says, “The theory of cognition is based upon logic, metaphysics, and psychology, and, therefore, has no unifying principle. It will appear farther on that this science is resolvable into a (Kantian) purely a priori search for the postulates which cognition presupposes, and the psychological theory of cognition, which is of a purely empirical nature. Both branches of the science presuppose an accurate investigation of the logical forms." Again, if we set out with metaphysics, we plainly presuppose logic, and, therefore, also a theory of cognition. Zeller is perfectly correct when he says, "Logic, as scientific methodology, must precede all investigation of the real; and this is true with regard not only to all those sciences which deal with particular branches of the real (nature or the human spirit), but even to metaphysics and the most general portion of them, viz. ontology. Even ontology will never be successfully treated until we come to an understanding in regard to the mode of its treatment; that is, until we know whether it is to be handled in an à priori or in an à posteriori manner, by reflection upon something given or by dialectic construction."§ It is thus plain that science, and *Imm. Kant's Logik, Vorrede, pp. 7, 8, edit. Kirchmann. + Logische Untersuchungen, vol. i. p. 17. Logische Studien, p. I, note. § Ueber Bedeutung und Aufgabe der Erkenntnisstheorie. Vortrag (Heidelberg, 1862), p. 8. An admirable discourse! Ein akademischer especially philosophy, have, as regards their method, been from the first involved in a vicious circle, which, at best, might be explained in some mystical, ontological way, but out of which it has seemed impossible to get. Wherever science has begun, it has always had to assume something, which had to be demonstrated by a process dependent upon that assumption. Under these circumstances we need hardly wonder if scepticism with regard to the validity of all knowledge has appeared at many times and under many forms. Science, from the days of Aristotle to our own, has been moving, for the most part, in a circle of correlates, not one of which contains any self-evident truth, but each of which appeals for support to the others. Rosmini's great and chief merit in philosophy was that he found a way out of this vicious circle-found, by mere observation, and without assuming the truth of the method of that observation, a luminous point in thought, which clearly shone with its own light and defied all attempts not only to find, but even to seek for, an origin or ground outside of and beyond it. This luminous point was ideal being, at once the form of thought, the principle of truth, and the essence of objectivity. By means of this discovery he was able to lay the basis of a new science, which not only takes precedence of all others, but upon which all others, including logic itself, depend for their truth and their principles. This is the Science of Ideology, to have discovered and elaborated which is a merit not inferior to that of the father of logic. If finding an irrefragable basis for all truth is the greatest of scientific merits, then that merit unquestionably belongs to Rosmini. "Ideology," says Rosmini, "is the science of the intellective light, whereby man renders intelligible to himself the sensible things from which he draws the sum total of knowledge. Of course, Ideology neither creates nor invents this light, which is found in the idea, or rather is the idea itself; neither does it impart the intuition of it, for the power to do this belongs solely to the creator and framer of human nature; but it does transport this light from the order of intuition into the order of scientific reflection, and thus forms the science of it. |