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to express them either to himself or others, if he is questioned about them.

The mind, the persuasions of such a man lack something, namely, the development of reflection ; nevertheless, he possesses truth and a persuasion of the truth, strong enough to produce repose of spirit. He may even enjoy repose of mind, if, by refusing attention to his inner questionings, he succeed in stifling them. He is then in the same condition as if the questions had not been put.


Philo. sophy the restorer of repose of intellect.

But the mind of such a man, that is, his faculty of demonstration, considered with reference to itself, and not with reference to persuasion and quiet of spirit, or to the possession of truth and certitude, has not satisfied its own demands, and, hence, has not found repose. Philosophy is what restores scientific repose of intellect.


Difference between demonstration and persuasion.

There is, therefore, a popular knowing, sufficient for the purposes of ordinary life, and there is a philosophical knowing, calculated to satisfy the demands of the faculty of demonstration. The latter is the work of reflection, carried forward to the discovery of ultimate grounds.

Rosmini devotes a considerable number of pages in his New Essay to clearing up the distinction between direct, popular, and philosophical cognition. Direct cognition," he says, “consists of intellective perceptions and the ideas which detach themselves from perceptions. Reflection, set in motion by language, then comes forward, and its first steps are those whereby it marks the relations, immediate or almost immediate, of the things perceived and apprehended. This first operation of reflection does not yet analyze the single perceptions and ideas of things. It leaves them entire * as they were when it first acquired them, merely contemplating them together. It is still a synthetic operation of which all persons are capable. Hence, it forms a large part, not to say the whole, of common or popular science. Philosophical science, on the contrary, begins with the analysis of simple objects. When things perceived submit themselves to analysis, they acquire a singular light, which is what ennobles the wisdom of the wise. This analysis may be considered the starting-point of philosophy. Setting out from it, phi

, losophy proceeds to confirm those great relations between beings (esseri) which the great mass of mankind have already observed, and, we might almost say, intuitively noted. Hence, popular science occupies an intermediate position between direct science on the one hand, and philosophical science on the other. It springs from a first reflection, whereas philosophical science requires a second reflection. The first strong reflection of popular cognition adds no new matter to cognition, but merely discovers new immediate relations in it. The reflections which follow bring out other relations between the preceding cognitions. If direct cognition enjoys immunity from error, the case is very different with popular cognition, which is already partly the fruit of reflection, not to say also partly of imagination. Philosophical cognition, moreover, is, of all the forms of cognition, the most liable to error, being the offspring of a more remote reflection ” ($S 1264–1267). Rosmini's distinction between the three kinds of knowing is almost exactly the same as that which Aristotle draws between perception (aro)nois), experience (èutreepía), and

* Evyrexuuéva, as Aristotle says : see Physica, i. 1, 184 a, 21 sq.


theory (réyun) or science (inlothun).* To Aristotle's distinction between theory and science, viz. that the former deals with production or becoming, the latter with being («« “ο αν εν άπασιν εν ενώ εκείνοις το αυτό, τέχνης αρχή και επιστήμης, εαν μεν περί την γένεσιν, τέχνης, εάν δε περί το όν, ĚTLOTÍuns.Anal. Post., ii. 19, 100 a, 7, seq.), Rosmini has nothing corresponding. The distinction between special sciences and philosophy comes very near it. St. Thomas, of course, follows Aristotle, as do the Scholastics generally. Kant's distinction between experience (Erfahrung), understanding, and reason † is equivalent to the one made by Aristotle, since Kant's experience corresponds to Aristotle's perception. Even Hegel's distinction of the stages of knowing into consciousness, self-consciousness, and reason is not essentially different, & although under the term reason are included religion, which, according to Rosmini, is, as such, no part of philosophy at all ($ 151), and absolute knowing, which he would attribute only to God (Theosophy, i. $ 11). It is needless to say that Rosmini totally rejects Hegel's process, as well as the identification of reason and spirit (Geist) which results from it § (Theosophy, vol. iv. p. 459).

Rosmini has treated, at great length, of the nature of persuasion, the difference between it and certainty, truth, and conviction, and the part which the will plays in it (Logic, $S 136 sq., 1099 sq.; New Essay, $S 1335 sq., 1044 sq.).

He treats also, at considerable length, of the nature of mental satisfaction (appagamento). We distinguish," he says, "satisfaction from persuasion, considering persuasion as an effect or state which remains in a man every time he adheres and assents to any truth, but which does not necessarily take away his curiosity to discover a further ground, whereas satisfaction is a more universal effect or state of the mind, causing it to search no further, and leaving it without the thought that there is anything further to search into. . . . Satisfaction may be absolute or relative" (Logic, § 1161). "Absolute satisfaction arises when these two extremes are realized : (1) That the mind shall have succeeded in knowing the ultimate grounds of things, so that no further research remains possible; (2) That it shall be conscious of having thus succeeded. If it did not recognize as ultimate grounds those which it has discovered, even though they really were such, it would still feel as if it ought to continue its search and therefore would not be satisfied” ($ 1162). Inasmuch as absolute ultimate grounds are inaccessible to man on account of the limitations of his nature, he must content himself with grounds that are ultimate with respect to these (see note to $ 2). “For satisfaction of mind, therefore, it is necessary, First, that a man consciously, and therefore reflectively, succeed in reaching the ultimate formal ground; Second, that being unable to find the last real ground, he make allowance for his impotence and resign himself to the necessity of the limit imposed on him by nature” (Logic, $ 1168). But as such satisfaction is only relative, it follows that this is the only form of mental satisfaction possible in this life.

* Metaph., i. ; cf. the commentaries of Schwegler and Bonitz. Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Einleitung. # Phænomenlogie des Geistes, throughout. § Phan. des Geistes, pp. 327, 599.




their consequences.

In endeavouring to discover these grounds, a The first man must set out from the intellectual condition put by in which he finds himself ($ 4). And the first sophy, and question he puts to himself takes this form : “I imagine I know many things, but what is my knowing itself?

? May I not be deceived ? Why may not all that I think I know be a delusion?"

These questions lead him to the discovery of Ideology and Logic, which, as having ideas for their object, are Sciences of Intuition.

Rosmini distinguishes between regressive philosophy, which, "by way of reflection, conducts the mind to find the principle from which the science of being is derived ; progressive philosophy, or Theosophy, which is that same science of being, derived from its principle; and mediate philosophy, which furnishes the conditions, formal (Logic) as well as material (Psychology), of the passage of the mind from regressive philosophy (Ideology) to progressive philosophy (Theosophy)(Theosophy, i. § 16). Schelling made the same distinction between regressive and progressive philosophy. This whole subject is treated at considerable length in the New Essay, vol. i. Preliminary, $$ 31-35.

The starting-point of the man who begins to philosophize is one of four starting-points which are frequently confounded, but which Rosmini distinguishes with care. These are—(1) man's starting-point when he first begins to develop ; (2) the starting-point of the human spirit; (3) the starting-point of the man who begins to philosophize ; and (4) the starting-point of philosophy as science, or of the system of human cognition. The first he considers to be external sensation ; the second, the notion of being ; the third, the point of mental growth which the man has reached ; and the fourth, " that luminous point from which all other cognitions derive their clearness of certainty and truth, viz., the idea of being” (New Essay, vol. i. Preliminary, $ 5; more at length vol. iii. SS 1468-1472). In regard to the third of these starting-points, which is the one that at present concerns us, he says, When a man begins to philosophize, he is already developed. . . . Now he cannot set out from any other point than that at which he is. To do anything else is impossible for him. Condillac and Bonnet, in their discourses, pretend to transport themselves to the first beginning of cognition and imagine a statue with one sense. But in doing so, no matter whether well or ill, they take an immense leap ; they seek to cross an abyss in trying to forget, all at once, the intellectual condition in which they are, in order to watch, as spectators of another nature, the effect of the first sensations which a man feels. The time for that is past for them, for ever past” (New Essay, vol. iii. § 1471).

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