small number of words arises not only from the omission of definitions, but, above all, from the omission of analysis. Hegel, who is so contemptuous of the learning of the ages, which fine spirits have now declared too vulgar, has introduced into philosophy his concept of becoming, borrowing it bodily from the vulgar. He has not taken the least trouble to rectify or purify it, but has placed it, in all its roughness, bulk, and confusion, as the corner-stone of his edifice. Had he applied a little philosophical analysis to it, he would have seen that becoming, as the vulgar conceive it, does not exist in nature save phenomenally. But our philosopher, while he imagines that he is soaring aloft as an eagle, is deceived by the most ordinary prejudices, and contents himself with wrapping them up in obscure verbiage. Becoming, therefore, as we have said, does not exist in the sense of being a point in which one being annuls itself and another begins; but whatever instant we choose to assign, in that instant being either is or is not, and of that which is, we cannot say that it is not yet. Thus, in creation, which Hegel professes to admit,* between the existence and non-existence of the world there was no middle step. Nor is creation a beginning: it is a positing of being in all its completeness. In creation, therefore, there is not a something which becomes, and, even in the created world, becoming belongs to the changing modes of real being, not to being itself; and even of these modes, every one at every instant either is or is not. At all events, it is another mistake thus to apply to substantial being that which may only, in a certain sense, be predicated of its modes and determinations; and Hegel applies becoming to being, in such a way that, not content with making being itself become [i.e. enter into the process of its own determination], and become whatever he chooses, he tries to make it becoming itself. But even with respect to the modes and determinations of being, it cannot . . . be asserted that * "Die tiefere Anschauung ist dagegen diese, dass Gott die Welt aus Nichts erschaffen habe" (Enclyclop., pt. i. § 128. Cf. Siebeck, Die Lehre des Aristoteles von der Ewigkeit der Welt, in Untersuchungen zur Philosophie der Griechen, pp. 137-189; Bernays, Die unter Philon's Werken stehende Schrift über die Unzerstörbarkeit des Weltalls). there is any true continuity of transition other than phenomenal, or that one state succeeds another immediately. To be sure, there is continuity; but this means no more than that the successive states of a being which develops itself -for example, a plant-are so little different from each other that our powers of observation are not equal to distinguishing them, and that, therefore, we imagine there is continuity. As we have elsewhere demonstrated, the concept of continuity in motion is a confused concept, concealing an absurdity.* Hegel, therefore, adopts, as the basis of his system and of his new logic, a most vulgar concept, phenomenal in its origin, confused and carrying within it an absurdity. One can easily conceive that a philosopher, who sets out with propositions so equivocal, arbitrary, confused, erroneous, and absurd, may very easily, especially if he is gifted with great power of abstraction, such as we find generally in Germans, draw from them the strangest consequences and create a species of fantastic universe, calculated to surprise untrained and confident young minds, and thus to form a kind of school, as we find the philosopher of Stuttgard has done; but any man, whose sense has been educated in a manly way, and who does not allow himself to be hoodwinked by a blind (though, it may be, sometimes generous) enthusiasm, weighs the grounds, and penetrates to the bottom, of every new doctrine, and thus does not fall into such nets. The celebrity of this man is explicable. It is one of those numerous celebrities which blossom in university halls, one of those crowns woven by the hands of unsophisticated youth" (Logic, §§ 40-52). We have quoted this long passage for three reasons: first, because it shows the wide gulf which separates the philosophy of Rosmini from the romantic idealism of Germany; second, because it affords an excellent example of his method of dealing with subtle questions; and, third, *See New Essay, vol. ii. §§ 814, 815; Psychology, vol. ii. §§ 1210-1223. Rosmini denies all continuity in any transient act, that is, any act involving movement. His arguments, some of which are identical with those of Zeno, if not altogether convincing, are, at least, very acute and deserving of careful consideration. because it shows how serviceable his first principle is in clearing up the entanglements of subjectivism. A very instructive parallel might be drawn between the above criticism of Hegel's system and that pronounced by Trendelenburg, which is also very able. Aim of reasoning and nature of convic tion. 54. The aim of reasoning is certainty, and certainty is a firm persuasion in accordance with known truth. Elsewhere Rosmini defines certainty as "a firm and reasonable persuasion conformable to truth," and then proceeds: "I may have present to my spirit a true opinion, and yet doubt of its truth: in that case, I have no certainty. It is not, therefore, enough that a thing should be true, in order that it should be true for me. In order that it may be true for me, I must have a motive which produces in me a firm persuasion, and produces it reasonably; that is, by means of a reason which convinces me that my opinion and belief are true and indubitable. Although it is a fact that logical truth has no existence in itself, outside of all subsistence, nevertheless, it exists in itself outside of the human intellect, and this justifies the distinction between true in itself and true for man. A thing becomes true for man by means of the certainty which he has of its truth. either the firm conviction which we have of the truth of a 55. office of Logic, therefore, has two offices: (1) to defend Twofold the existence of truth in general and the validity Logic. of reason in particular; (2) to teach men to use their power of reasoning so as to arrive at complete possession and conviction of truth-to attain certainty. Logic, therefore, may be divided into two parts: (1) defence of truth, and (2) means of arriving at truth and certitude. 56. truth? the form telligence. Truth is a quality of knowledge. Knowledge What is is true when that which is known is. Let us reflect closely upon this definition of truth. If the thing which is known is, it is true; therefore the truth of a thing is, in the last analysis, its being. Known being, therefore, is the truth of knowledge. Truth is But the form of intelligence is being, as ideology of our inshows us. Hence the form of intelligence is truth. The first truth, therefore, is possessed by the human spirit through its very nature. This very simple deduction disposes of those sceptics who deny all truth, as well as of those who, without expressly denying the existence of certain truths, nevertheless declare that all truth is unattainable by man. The above definition of truth differs slightly from that adopted by Aristotle, according to whom truth, and, of course, also falsehood, are qualities of judgments. The difference, however, is really not essential, inasmuch as all knowledge, properly so called, is the result of judgments. Aristotle, moreover, admits that the knowledge of indivisibles a knowledge which would correspond to Rosmini's intuition-cannot possibly be false (see under § 47; and cf. Aristotle, De Animâ, iii. 6, 1; 430 a, 27 sq.: De Interp., 1. ; 16 a, 12 sqq. Metaph., ix. 10; 1051 b, 3 sq.). That being and truth are equivalent terms is a favourite doctrine with Rosmini, and would seem follow from the theory that being is at once the form of mind and of cognition. "It is essential to cognition," he says, "that it should be the truth or true. Whence it follows that the formal cause of cognition, that which imparts to it the essence of cognition, must be the truth itself, since to be true means simply to have the truth in it. If, therefore, ideal being is the formal cause of cognition, and this being is the truth, it follows that it is also the supreme criterion, since that which essentially is has no need to recur to anything else in order to be so, and there is nothing anterior to essence. The criterion of truth, therefore, reduced to a proposition will be this: That which the human spirit apprehends is true if it is conformable to being, and false if it is not so. "But even independently of this demonstration, we may show in another way that being is the truth. For what is truth? This question contains its own answer. By asking what IS, we imply that when we say what it is, we shall have answered the question. But being is precisely that which is, and which essentially is, because it is being. If that which IS IS that which IS, then that which is is the truth; therefore, being is the truth. In fact, being cannot not-be; if it could, it would not be being: hence being necessarily is. But being is in all the things that are, and in all that is affirmed of them; hence being is the truth essential, necessary and universal. Hence, again, being is the criterion of the truth and the supreme criterion, |