senses, or are already conceived by the intellect. In the latter case we have already the concept of the subject of our judgment. In the former case we have, in a certain mode, the subject itself of the judgment, that is, we have potentially that which will become the subject when the judgment is formed; but we have not the concept of it. Only when we unite the predicate to the subject, and so form the judgment, do we obtain, by means of the judgment itself, the concept of this subject. And these are the primitive judgments, which constitute our perceptions of real beings, from which again we derive concepts, or determinate ideas. . . . The judgments, therefore, whereby we form the concepts or ideas of things are primitive, that is, they are the first that we form respecting these things; they are synthetic, because we add to the subject something which is not in it, or, more correctly, we consider the subject in relation to something outside of it, that is, to an idea of our intellect; and they may also fairly be called à priori, inasmuch as, though the matter of them has to be supplied by the senses, we find the form of them only in our intellect; and in these synthetic judgments à priori consists the problem of Ideology, the first in philosophy" (New Essay, vol. i. §§ 359, 360).

The primitive judg

ment may also be called the primitive synthesis.

49.

In view of this peculiarity of the affirmation of real beings, we have given to this judgment the name of primitive synthesis, and to that faculty of the human spirit which forms it, the name of reason, which is that one power of the mind which brings into union being and feeling, and afterwards exercises reflection upon the result.

"The primitive synthesis, which already contains universalization, although still bound up with a foreign element, is not deliberate; it is performed, or at least

aided, by nature, which has put together in man a vigilant
understanding, an open eye, as it were, to see all that takes
place before it, an eye which sees being essentially. Hence
it is not very difficult to understand that, given sensations,
the process of primitive synthesis is performed by the mind.
spontaneously. . . . On the contrary, since abstraction
belongs to reflection, which is a voluntary faculty, and one
not self-moved, it is always man himself who, by his will,
causes this movement" (New Essay, vol. ii. § 513). "The
intellective faculties are reducible to two principal ones,
the intellect and the reason. The acts of the intellect be-
long purely to nature. Those presided over by art must
be counted among the acts of the reason.
The general

Reason, in

faculty of applying being is called reason. . . . We must
distinguish two principal functions of reason.
so far as it applies to feeling the idea of being, exercises
the function which is called perception. Reason, in so far as
it applies the idea of being to objects already thought,
exercises the function called reflection" (Logic, §§ 64, 67, 69).

50.

bility of

of the

We have said that, in the primitive synthesis, Convertithe feeling may be considered as the subject, and the terms being as the predicate. Nevertheless, we might, primitive with equal propriety, call the essence of being the judgment. subject, and its realization the predicate. The reason of this convertibility of subject and predicate in the primitive synthesis is, that it is an identical judgment (§§ 23-28), expressing an equation between feeling and the essence of being through the idea (the cognizability of the latter).

This statement must be accepted with considerable caution. It is by no means indifferent whether I say, Freezing is or Being freezes. The former expression, if un

usual, is, at least, sense, while the latter is nonsense, as well as at variance with Rosmini's central doctrine. What he means is, that, in perception, being adheres or is present to sensation, as much as sensation to being. This shows how much superior the ancient mode of expressing judgments was to the modern; for I can say with equal propriety and truth, “ Τῷ πήγνυσθαι ὑπάρχει τὸ εἶναι ” or “ Τῷ εἶναι ὑπάρχει TÒ THуvνolaι." With our modern way of expressing judgments, we are continually exposed to the risk of being led to imagine that one reality can be predicated of another, as has been the case with all thinkers who have quantified the predicate. Although the predicate of every logical proposition is an idea, while the subject may or may not be so, still, subject and predicate may exchange places, so long as we express their relation by a word expressive of relation (úmáрx), and not by a word expressive of independent existence, is (EOTí).

Solution of

the problem of

the origin of ideas.

51.

We have thus, then, explained the meaning of reason, light of reason, form which renders the mind intelligent, faculty of knowing. We have also solved the question concerning the origin of ideas. There is one primitive idea, that of being. By means of it the primitive judgments are formed, and real beings, as felt, are affirmed and thus known. The relations between the idea of being and real beings are the concepts or specific ideas of particular beings. These ideas form the matter of analysis, reflection, abstraction, etc.-processes which produce the various abstract entities of

reason.

The phrases, light of reason, light of the intellect, intellectual light, which play so important a part in the language

of the Schoolmen and others, may all be traced back to a metaphorical expression used by Aristotle in the fifth chapter of the third book of his De Anima. It is used to give a notion of the nature of the formative or creative moment in the separate or self-subsistent intelligence. This history of this metaphor, which gave occasion to the formative intellect (vous ToηTIKÓS) of the later Aristotelians, and the active intellect (intellectus agens) of the Arabs and Schoolmen, is one of the most interesting and curious in the whole development of philosophic terminology. As to the meaning of active intellect in the language of St. Bonaventura and St. Thomas, see Cardinal Zigliara's large work, Della Luce Intellettuale e dell' Ontologismo (Rome, 1874); the excellent little treatise of Sebastian Casara, La Luce dell' Occhio Corporeo e quella dell' Intelletto (Parabiago, 1879); and the recent work, Il Lume dell' Intelletto (Loescher, Turin, Rome, Florence, 1881).

52.

Essay and

tion of

Those who wish to pursue further the question cf. New concerning the deduction of special and general Restora ideas or concepts, and of all human knowledge, Philosophy. may consult the author's New Essay on the Origin of Ideas and Restoration of Philosophy in Italy. In these works will be found the development and application of the ideological theory here set forth.

See especially New Essay, vol. ii. §§ 474-557, and Restoration, pp. 593-636. Having thus shown that cognition presupposes three elements: (1) the universal idea of being, present to the intellect; (2) sensation, and, (3) the synthesis of the one with the other by reason; he now proceeds to consider the subsequent analysis, whereby we become conscious of the elements of this synthesis through a further act of the reason, which we call judgment. The primitive synthesis, being made by nature, which does not err, is

Logic.

always correct; the subsequent analysis, on the contrary, being made by the thinking subject itself, is liable to be false as well as true. In order that it may always be true, certain rules and principles, forming together what may be called the art of reasoning, are necessary. The science of this art is Logic, which, therefore, forms the link between Ideology and Metaphysics, drawing its principle and criterion of truth from the former, and laying down the rules whereby truth may be reached in the latter. As Rosmini says, "Logic is the doctrine of the intellectual light considered as the principle and guide of reason" (Logic, § 8; cf. below, under § 70).

2. Logic.
53.

Logic is the science of the art of reasoning.*

Rosmini elsewhere defines Logic as "the science of the art of reflecting," or "the science of the art of directing the reflection." "From this definition," he says, "we see why other sciences akin to logic have frequently been confounded with it. Some persons, deceived by the etymology of the word, have believed that logic ought to treat of reason [Móyos] under all its aspects. But the doctrine concerning the nature of reason, in the subjective sense—that is, as principle and power of reasoning-belongs to Psychology, which is the first part of Metaphysics. On the other hand, the doctrine concerning the nature of reason, in the objective sense-that is, as the objects in which the acts of the faculty terminate-belongs to Ideology and to Theosophy, which is the second part of Metaphysics. Logic, therefore, must be limited to the consideration of the exercise of reason, and especially to the art of that exercise, whereby reasonings are conducted in the best manner and to the best.

* Rosmini has left an admirable treatise on Logic, perhaps the very best that exists, in spite of certain conclusions which do not belong to the sphere of pure philosophy (see Bibliography).