He shows that all Kant's synthetical judgments à priori are really analytic, and that the only truly synthetic judgment à priori is that wherein we predicate being of sensation, or, in other words, form to ourselves the concept of a reality. In order to form this judgment, the only à priori element requisite is the simple notion of being or existence, the essence of objectivity. Rosmini, accordingly, concludes that, since no reality can be known until being is predicated of it, being must be manifested to the mind without the necessity of a judgment, and prior to all reality; in other words, prior to all sense-experience.

The usually recognized order of cognition, as we find it in all the old logics, as well as most of the more recent ones, is this (cf. New Essay, vol. i. § 227, n.)—

These three classifications, of which the first is that of Aldrich, the second that of Kant, and the third that of Jevons, are virtually the same. Rosmini, holding that all concepts are results of primitive judgments in which terms of being are simply apprehended, would substitute for this classification the following:-(1) Intuition of being; (2) Judgment, involving perception of the real and conception; (3) Inference.* According to this theory, judgment, perception, and conception are only three aspects of the same act. In his very friendly criticism of Reid, speaking of the view which holds that "simple apprehension, or the pure idea of the thing, precedes the judgment respecting its real existence," he says, "On the one hand, it seems as if this proposition must be true; for how can I judge that a being, of which I have not the idea, exists? The idea of being, or simple apprehension, would seem, therefore, when we look at the matter from this side, necessarily to precede the operation of the judgment which * Cf. under § 14.

we make regarding its real existence. But, on the other hand, experience is entirely at variance with such a view, and assures us that we first form the concrete idea of the being really existing, and afterwards draw from it the abstract idea, which is separate from the persuasion of its real existence, and is what is called simple apprehension of the being. And, in fact, do we think a possible horse, without having first perceived some horse with our senses?

“This knot of the question was not clearly seen either by Reid or by his adversaries, and for this reason each party was able to confute the other, without being able to maintain its own position. Reid confounded two questions in one; for it is one thing to ask, Can the mind form a judgment of the existence of external things without possessing beforehand some universal idea? another to inquire, Does the judgment, affirming the existence of external things, require to be preceded by simple apprehension, or by the ideas of the things themselves? The adversaries of Reid answered this second question in the affirmative, and, in doing so, they were wrong. Now Reid, in opposing them, was not content with showing that the judgment affirming the existence of external things does not require to be preceded by the simple apprehension of the things themselves, which would have been sufficient to overthrow their system; . . but he undertook to prove that, prior to all ideas, we form a primitive judgment, which is inexplicable and mysterious. This reply. . . led from the second of the questions above proposed to the first, and decided that the judgment affirming the existence of external things can be made, not only without the ideas of the things themselves, but also without the pre-existence of any universal idea in our minds. Now, it was this gratuitous extension of the original question that hurt Reid. . . . In fact, it is sufficiently evident that no judgment can be formed by one who possesses no universal idea, and therefore the proposition which Reid undertook to defend . . . was exaggerated and untenable. . . . It was not easy to find a satisfactory reply to the terrible objection, How can I judge that that of

which I have no idea really exists? In order to answer this objection, there was no other way but this: to excogitate a system in which the object judged possible should be the effect of the judgment itself, that is, in which the object should exist only in virtue of the judgment made with reference to it. All the difficulty, therefore, consisted in finding a judgment which should give existence to its own object, or to the idea of the thing concerning which the judgment was made, or, which is the same thing, should produce in us the specific ideas of things. . . .

"Now, passing in review all the kinds of judgment which we make with reference to things, we see clearly that, so long as the judgment relates to some quality of the thing, the thing must necessarily exist in our mind previous to the judgment and to the quality which, in that judgment, we attribute to it. When, on the contrary, the judgment relates to the existence of the thing itself, then the thing judged of does not exist in our thought previous to the act of judgment, but in virtue of it, since so long as we do not think the thing as existing-that is, as having an existence either possible or real-it is nothing; it is not an object of our thought or an idea. The judgment, therefore, regarding the existence of things differs from all other judgments in this, that it produces its own objects, and thereby shows that it possesses an energy of its own a creative energy, so to speak, which deserves the most profound meditation on the part of the philosopher. This object, which did not exist before the judgment made regarding it, comes into existence in virtue of it, and therefore, at most, contemporaneously with it. Such judgment, therefore, is a peculiar faculty of our understanding, which thinks a thing as actually existing. . . .

"Three questions might be asked with regard to this faculty: (1) How does it begin to think a thing as actually existing? (2) Where does it obtain the universal idea of

* Rosmini quotes the following passage to show that St. Thomas held a view similar to this :-" Prima ejus [intellectûs] actio per speciem est formatio sui objecti, quo formato, intelligit: simul tamen tempore ipse format et formatum est, et simul intelligit" (De Natura Verbi Intellectus).

existence necessary for such thinking? and (3) How does it restrict the idea of existence, which is universal, to a determinate thing, and so think this determinate object, rather than that, as existing? To the first and third of these questions it is easy to reply with the help of experience. We are excited to think an existing object by sensations, and it is likewise these sensations that determine this object existing in our thought. . . . The difficulty, therefore, all consists in knowing whence we derive the idea of existence, which is necessary to the first of all our judgments, to that judgment whereby we know that something external exists. This is the great problem of Ideology" (New Essay, vol. i. §§ 121–126).

It is plain from this passage wherein the great difference between Kantianism and Rosminianism lies. Both Kant and Rosmini proposed to themselves the same question, How are synthetic judgments à priori possible? And both answered virtually in the same way: Through the existence in the mind of a form or forms prior to all judgments. Here the parallelism ceases. Kant mistook for synthetic judgments à priori, judgments which are at once analytic and, as far as their terms are concerned, à posteriori. He thus arrived at a series of categories, which had three cardinal defects: (1) it had no unity or necessary completeness; (2) it was entirely subjective, and hence could not account. for objectivity or for the existence of concepts; and (3) it gave merely the terms of the judgment, but could not account for the copula. Rosmini, on the contrary, having discovered the only judgment which is really synthetic à priori, arrived, by analyzing it, at a single form, which is at once one and primitive, objective, and, with the aid of sensation, capable of accounting for all parts of the judgment (cf. under § 35).

Is this

affirmation a judgment?

44.

It is plain that, so long as the two elements of the affirmation in question-that is, the essence of

ment

as whatever The without put of its

is possible

two

the union

terms.

being and the felt activity-are considered separately, they do not present the elements necessary for the formation of a judgment: hence the objection. But if the objection were valid in this instance, would it not be valid against every judgment equally? In fact, there is not and No judgcannot be any judgment whatsoever so long the terms of the judgment remain separate. judgment is formed only when they are together. It is sufficient, therefore, that the terms be such as will form a judgment when they are united; and it is of no consequence what they are before union. We must, therefore, examine whether, in the present instance, the terms which before union were incapable of forming a judgment become by union thus capable. This is not inconceivable. And it is precisely what happens. But before proving this, let us attend to some other considerations.

An attentive consideration of the sources of knowledge shows us that not only are its elements given to us, but that they are also combined by nature and independently of our wills or action. Indeed, it is nature that forms all those combinations whose analyses by reflection we call judgments. I cannot say, "This horse is black," until after I have seen, perceived, the horse as black. In the perception the combination of black with horse was already made, and the judgment merely analyzes it. In this sense, all judgments, without exception, are analytic.