that first operative principle of a being, the principle whence flow its actions and passions [ú0n], and hence its diverse states; that these actions, passions, and diverse states are virtually contained in that principle, that is to say, in that virtue, activity, or potency of it which is the efficient cause of the being. We said, moreover, that these actions, passions, and states may be conceived as forming different groups, although it may not be demonstrable à priori that every such group is possible, that is, reducible to a first act, a first virtue, a first substantial principle. In order to determine à priori which of these groups could be virtually comprised in a first substantial principle, would require nothing short of a complete knowledge of the intrinsic order of being. The intrinsic order of being, however, is not known immediately by man, but has to be gleaned from observation and experience. Hence, when observation and experience reveal to man the existence of a group of activities united in a single substantial principle, he is justified in concluding that such substantial principle may exist, because ab esse ad posse datur consecutio.

"Now, internal observation is what attests to man. that he is a single principle, sentient and intelligent at the same time; for every man can say to himself, 'This I, who feel, am the same I who understand, and if I were not the same, I should not know that I felt, or be able to reason concerning my sensations.' On the other hand, it involves no contradiction to suppose that the sensitive activity should have the same principle as the intellective activity, when we consider that many actions may start from one principle, . . . just as many lines may start from one point.

"But it must be admitted, nevertheless, that, after all these concessions, there remains a very serious objection to be overcome. We have said that, in order to constitute a sentient principle, we must conceive a primitive term of sense [aio0nróv] virtually comprehending all the special actions of feeling that such principle can ever perform; and in man this primitive and fundamental sensum is his own body, sensible in space. We have said, moreover, that,

in order to constitute an intelligent principle, there is necessary a first object of intelligence [vonróv], virtually comprehending all that is ever to be understood, and in man this object of intelligence is universal being. Now, if the sentient principle is constituted by the corporeal felt term, and the intelligent principle by intelligible being, we shall be obliged to say that the corporeal extended and intelligible being are identical, or else that they constitute two different principles and not one.

"In order to reply to this most grave objection, we must observe that in every felt (term of feeling) there is an entity, because every act, of whatever nature, is an entity. But in felt entity there is altogether wanting the intelligible light, in other words, cognizability, as is seen from the fact that the expression felt entity is not understood entity. To say felt instead of understood, in this case, is to exclude cognizability from feeling. On the other hand, intelligence has for its object understood entity, since the intelligent principle does nothing but understand, and everything that it understands is, of necessity, entity. Hence the term of the sentient principle and that of the intelligent principle are both entity. There is, therefore, identity in their terms.

"But in what, then, are they distinguished? They are distinguished by the difference of the manner in which the same entity adheres to the same principle. The truth is, this entity communicates itself to the sentient principle in its felt mode, which I call also reality and activity, whereas it communicates itself to the intelligent principle in its understood mode, which I call also ideality, intelligibility, cognizability, light, etc.

"With these explanations, we see clearly how the sentient principle and the intelligent principle may compenetrate each other so as to form one and the same principle of operation, inasmuch as both the principles have the same term, although to one of these it adheres in one mode and communicates itself in one form, while to the other it adheres in another mode and communicates itself in another form. There are two principles, therefore, if we consider the form in which the entity communicates itself;

there is only one, if we consider the entity itself which is communicated, apart from its forms. We may say that the principles are two, provided we recognize that in man they are not first principles; but there is above them a first single principle to which they are subordinated and united, which first principle has reference to entity itself, and not to the forms of entity; and this is the principle which synthesizes, both in the theoretic order, where it manifests itself as reason, and in the practical order, where it appears as will. Hence this intellective principle, in so far as it is superior, is the point from which the two activities, that is, the sensitive and the intellective, start, and is called the rational principle. From what has been said, it appears that the human soul is a single substantial subject. It is a subject, because it is a first principle of action, endowed with feeling, and it is a substance, because this principle is conceived by the mind as existing in itself, and not in another anterior to it in the order of feeling and understanding" (Psychology, vol. i. §§ 174–181).

From what was said above, under $$ 30, 31, it might be inferred that there was no other link between ideal and real being than that formed by the unity of the sentient and intelligent subject that cognizes the one by means of the other. This, however, is very far from being Rosmini's doctrine.

"We find," he says, "that although the ideal and real are so very different, nevertheless they have an identical element, viz. being. The same, identical being occurs in both, only under different conditions and different forms. One form under which being presents itself is ideality, or cognizability, or objectivity-terms which mean substantially the same thing; another form in which it appears is reality, sensibility, activity—which are likewise terms substantially meaning the same thing. Thus, while there is a very great difference in the form, there is perfect identity in the content, which is being itself. This, in so far as it is purely cognizable, is ideal; in so far as it is sensible, it is real. The sensible rendered cognizable, that is, the union of the two, is what produces intellective perception and

the cognition of the real" (On the Purposes of the Author, § 60, sub fin.).

It must be admitted that it is extremely difficult to seize exactly Rosmini's theory of cognition, and of the relation of the individual human subject to the universe of things. From one point of view, it seems as if each man gave being to things, that is, created them; from another, it seems as if the universe existed independently of all human thought. How these two doctrines can be simultaneously true, seems a puzzle. In order to solve it, we must distinguish absolute from relative existence, rò anλws εἶναι from τὸ πρός τι εἶναι. The world exists absolutely as subject and object, that is, as real and ideal, independently of any finite intelligence; but it does not exist for any man until he makes it exist for himself by his own act. Human intelligence is a rendering relative of what was before absolute, and, in this sense, all human knowledge may be said to be relative. It is relative only to the subject. It does not in the least follow from this that it thereby ceases to be absolute. A man does not cease to be a man because he enters into the relation of husband or father. Indeed, knowledge could not be relative unless it were likewise absolute. The important point is that man, in knowing, does not in any way alter the objects of knowledge. Hence his knowledge, though relative with respect to the subject, is absolute with respect to the object (cf. under § 43).

43.

to calling

tive per

judgment.

The following objection might here be ad- Objection vanced:"When we affirm a being, we make a intellecjudgment. Now, in order to make a judgment, ception a we must know the two terms of the judgment— the subject and the predicate. But in the case we are supposing, one of the terms, feeling or reality, is not known. Therefore the supposed judgment is impossible." The only effect of this

Answer: The objection does not touch the fact, but only the propriety of the term.

objection, when well considered, would be to make us deny the name of judgment to that act whereby we affirm, and, by affirming, know real beings. Now, even if we were to refuse the name of judgment to this affirmation, this would not in any way interfere with the correctness of our theory, which rests on observation. Even if we admit that the objection is well taken, it remains always a fact that to know that a being subsists is to make an internal affirmation that that being subsists, and, therefore, in either case our analysis of this affirmation and the consequences derived from it remain unimpeached. Still, in order entirely to satisfy our objectors, let us consider the new question. May the internal affirmation whereby we know that a being subsists be called a judgment?

It is here that Rosmini most clearly parts company with Kant. This philosopher, as every one knows, derives his categories from the various forms of judgment as recognized in the formal logic of the Aristotelians. In every one of these, the terms of the judgment, viz., subject and predicate, are recognized as already formed, and the only question is in regard to their relations. As these relations are numerous, Kant drew from them a long list of categories, which he set down as primitive forms of the understanding. Rosmini, setting aside all Kant's judgments, as secondary and dependent upon a primitive one, went behind them to that one, and, analyzing it, found that the understanding had but one primitive form, which was objective, whereas all the others were secondary and subjective (cf. under § 35). Accordingly, he does not ask, "How is the judgment, 7 + 5 = 12, possible?" but "How do we ever manage to think 7 or 5?" (see above, under § 14).