knowledge. When I say, "A may be B," all I mean is that my partial notion of A contains nothing incompatible with the idea B; but that, if my knowledge of A were complete, I should be able to say with certainty, "A must be B" or "A cannot" (we do not say “must not") "be B." Aristotle, with his doctrine of potentiality and actuality, placed possibility and necessity in things, that is, in real subjects, thereby introducing much confusion into one part of logic. Kant increased this confusion when he placed them in the thinking subject, as subjective conditions of thinking. The truth is, both lie in the nature of being, which, as such, is always object and never subject. What is meant by real possibility occurs when one condition of a total actuality is conceived as subsistent, and the rest as merely ideal. A proposition is then formed in which the condition conceived as subsistent is made the subject, the total actuality the predicate, and the remaining ideal conditions are vaguely expressed in the copula, e.g. "An acorn may be" (i.e. with certain ideal conditions made actual, is) "an oak." When we say, "An acorn is potentially an oak," we are saying what is not true. When we say, “An acorn is a possible oak," we are talking nonsense. A possible oak never grew from an acorn-indeed, never grew at all. (Cf. Lange, Logische Studien, pp. 30, sqq.)

All intelligence is

reducible

to thinking being as realized in a certain manner, with

certain limits.

36.

The essence of being, therefore, simply by making itself cognizable to the mind, informs it and renders it intelligent. In other words, inasmuch as every act of intelligence has entity for its object, this produces the faculty of intelligence. All intelligence is reducible to the intuition of the essences of beings, and to the thought of being (whose essence is known) realized in certain modes, with certain limits (§ 14).

The relation of the essence of being to the subject cannot be easily conceived, and Rosmini cannot characterize it otherwise than by saying that it is a relation of objectivity or cognizability. And this is not to be wondered at, for it is most evident that the relation of subject and object involved in cognition is one altogether peculiar and not to be expressed in terms of any other. The most that can be done is to bring it out into clearness and to define the elements that enter into it. It is manifest enough that, if one thing can make itself an object to another, it thereby of necessity makes that other intelligent. It is not so clear can be the form

how an essence in its very nature infinite of a finite thing, such as every intelligent being recognizes himself to be. To this Rosmini replies as follows:-" Every one of us knows that he is finite, and when he says I, he is well aware that he is affirming a reality which excludes numerous other realities of the same or of a different order, and, therefore, that he is affirming a finite thing. At the same time, the human soul, in so far as it is intellective, is united to infinite being, namely, the idea, and, under this aspect, it partakes of a certain infinitude. Indeed, ideal being, in its relation to the mind, is like an infinite space, all equally illuminated, in relation to the eye. Hence, although the real things cognized by man are always finite, because the real thing which perceives them, viz., the soul, is finite ; yet the means of cognizing the real things perceived by the sense, that is, the idea of being, is never exhausted or rendered inefficacious. . . . Now, here a difficulty presents itself. Ideal being is the form of the intellective soul; but form and matter are two elements constitutive of one nature: hence ideal being is a true constitutive element of the soul. But ideal being, as ideal, is infinite: therefore the human soul is composed of finite and infinite. I reply as follows, by distinguishing the minor premise of this syllogism:— Forms are of two kinds, subjective and objective. Subjective forms belong to the subject and constitute it; objective forms neither belong to the subject nor constitute it,* but bring the subject into act, and, therefore, may be called Being, of course, constitutes the subject an ego. Cf. under § 124.

the immediate causes of the form of the subject. At the same time, they may with equal propriety be called forms, when they are considered as the term of the act of intuition, since universal being, in so far as it is merely the term of this act, is, as it were, appropriated to the soul, without thereby ceasing to be universal in itself. And, indeed, although it is true that being in general is intuited as identical by all intellects, yet in so far as it is merely the term of one intellect, it is not the term of another, and it is in this sense that the truth possessed by man may be said to be created. Indeed, the proposition, 'The truth of the human intellect is created,' is equivalent to this other, The truth, which is eternal, has been made to become the term of a created intellect'" (Psychology, vol. i. §§ 236–238).

In what sense ideal being is said to be

possible.

37.

The essence of being we have called ideal being; its realizations, real beings. If ideal being

be considered with reference to its realizations, it may be called possible being. The word possible does not designate a quality of being, but merely expresses the fact that it may be realized. This must be carefully borne in mind, in order to preclude the notion which might arise, that the essence of being is itself a mere possibility, and nothing more. It is a true essence, not a possibility of essence. But this essence may be realized; if it is not realized, its realization is possible. This is what we mean by possible being.

As we have seen, Rosmini identifies the two terms ideal and possible, and in this he is right, from his point of view. Ideal being means being as form; but form, with reference

to realities, is a mere possibility. Hence ideal and possible both express the same relation of being to its terms or realizations. "Being," he says, "is in itself, and possibility is only a relation to reality, that is, to terms, whose nature is not known until they are perceived" (Theosophy, vol. i. § 86). As to the fact that ideal being is not nothing, see citation under § 18. It seems a flat contradiction when Rosmini says, on the one hand, that being 'is in itself,' and, on the other, that apart from a subject it would not be (see under § 34): but this is only apparent; for it must be remembered that, in Rosmini's language, to be in itself means to be as object, and certainly nothing can be as object when there is no subject.

Possible, in the logical sense, means free from contradiction. Now, being admits no contradiction" " (Psychology, vol. ii. § 1340).

38.

sible and

beings are

many.

Since real beings are many, and each of them How poshas a relation to possible being, possible being, ideal considered merely in relation to the various real said to be or realizable beings, becomes their idea, or, more correctly, their concept. For this reason we say that concepts, ideas, ideal beings, and possible beings are many, because they are as numerous as the modes in which the essence of being can be realized.

Speaking of concrete relations, Rosmini says, "Each of these is in one place, separated from every other, incommunicable to every other; for example, the pain which I feel in a finger has nothing to do with the pain which another man feels, say, in the same finger, and this on account of the limitations of place and of real subsistence which separate these two sensations. On the contrary, being (essere) or a being (ente), which reveals itself to the

*

mind as a mere possibility, is not more in one place than in another. It may be realized in many places, if it is of a nature to occupy space, and even if it is otherwise, it may be indefinitely multiplied. Suppose the mind contemplate the human body in its possibility: this possible body is always the same, in whatever place it may happen to subsist through realization, or to whatever extent it may multiply itself. Real bodies become many; the concept or idea of the body always remains one. The mind, or, as the case may be, several minds, see it as identical in all the infinite number of human bodies, which they think as subsistent. Hence the nature of real things, to which belong sensations, is opposed to the nature of the simple idea" (New Essay, vol. ii. § 427).

Ideality a mode of being incapable of being confounded with reality.

39.

Let us now inquire into the relation between ideal beings and real beings. Suppose I am in possession of ideal being; I know the essence of being, nothing more. I do not know whether the being whose essence I know be realized. This is equivalent to saying that I have not yet any feeling, or, at least, that I do not reflect upon my feeling; for if I made the reflection that I had a feeling, I should at once know a reality. But remove from my mind all knowledge of real being, and suppose that I know merely what being is, without knowing that it is realized, is the object of my mind nothing? Certainly not. In that case my mind would know nothing, whereas, as a matter of fact, it knows the essence of being. If then the object of my mind is not

* Porphyry says, “Τὰ καθ' ἑαυτὰ ἀσώματα, αὐτὸ ὁ κρεῖττον παντός ἐστι σώματος καὶ τόπου, πανταχῆ ἐστιν· οὐ διαστατῶς ἀλλ ̓ ἀμερῶς ” (Sentent., ii.).