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enable users to manufacture atomic bombs. We have contracts in force at present for plants of this type, in particular with Pakistan. So how may this decision affect contracts of this kind?

Answer: Signed contracts remain signed. France does not go back on her signature. This morning's Higher Council for Foreign Nuclear Policy did not examine individual cases. It made a decision in principle on a concrete point-reprocessing, reprocessing plants—and this decision is exactly in line with the declaration adopted on October 11 whereby we decided not to contribute to nuclear proliferation.

Question: Don't you have the impression that in this matter we are complying with the United States, which has been calling for a decision of this kind since the election campaign?

Answer: Your question is interesting, since this may indeed be what our decision looks like. But it only looks like that. What is happening is that over the past two years or so the world scientific community has realized that irradiated fuel reprocessing plants could lead to the bomb-notably after the explosion in India in 1974, and especially after the starting up of the French and British reprocessing plants, which are industrial plants of a kind that had not been built before. The possibilities of extracting military plutonium from the products of these reprocessing plants then suddenly occurred to people. And it is with this risk in mind that the responsible scientific community and responsible politicians have recognized that it was becoming dangerous to transfer reprocessing plants.

Question: The Americans called very loudly for this in October, before the elections.

Answer: The fact that the Americans called for it does not alter the fact that we too had become aware of this risk, and we have decided independently to conduct our own policy in this field.

Question: Do you not find that France is making big efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation, whereas certain countries, such as our German neighbors, are not making the same efforts and are ready to sell; they have in fact already negotiated with South Africa and Brazil?

Answer: Germany has indeed negotiated a contract with Brazil that is understood to provide for a small reprocessing plant and also an enrichment plant. There is no certainty that Germany will be able to carry on with that contract.

Question: We are going to sell, or have already sold, nuclear power stations with the guarantee that the buyers can operate them correctly. Shall we continue on this track in view of the new decision?

Answer: Quite obviously, since we are guaranteeing the buyer's fuel supplies and fuel services. This means that once fuel has been irradi2 Ante, p. 669.

ated we are prepared to reprocess it, but always on the condition that we return the waste to the country of origin. We have no intention of turning France into a nuclear dustbin. We reprocess, then send back the reprocessed product.

Question: And we keep the guarantees of the Vienna Agency? 3

Answer: Under the guarantees of the Vienna Agency, of course. All these operations are carried out in that framework.

General Assembly Resolution 31/189: General and Complete Disarmament, December 21, 19761

A 2

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 2602 A (XXIV) of 16 December 1969 relating to the initiation of bilateral negotiations between the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the limitation of offensive and defensive strategic nuclearweapon systems,3

Reaffirming its resolutions 2932 B (XXVII) of 29 November 1972. 3184 A and C (XXVIII) of 18 December 1973,5 3261 C (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, and 3484 C (XXX) of 12 December 1975,7

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Pt. A was submitted to the First Committee by Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Nigeria, Peru, and Sweden on Nov. 24, and introduced by Mexico on Nov. 30. The res. was adopted by the G.A. by a vote of 107 to 10, with 11 abstentions, as follows:

In favor-Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burma, Burundi, Canada, Central African Rep., Chad, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Dominican Rep., Ecuador, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia. Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Rep., Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, São Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal. Sierra Leone, Singapore, Spain Sri Lanka. Sudan, Surinam, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Rep., Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Rep. of Cameroon, United Rep. of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela. Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.

Against-Bulgaria, Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, GDR, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Ukranian SSR, U.S., USSR.

Abstaining-Belgium, France, FRG, Greece, Israel, Italy, Lao People's Democratic Rep., Luxembourg, Malawi, Turkey, U.K.

Both the Soviet Union (ante pp. 895-896) and the United States explained their votes (ante, p. 896).

3 Documents on Disarmament, 1969, pp. 710-711.

Ibid., 1972, pp. 839-840.

5 Ibid., 1973, pp. 901-902, 903–904.

Ibid., 1974, pp. 801-803.

'Ibid., 1975, pp. 809–810.

Bearing in mind that the above-mentioned Governments agreed on 21 June 1973 to make serious efforts to work out and sign in 1974 the agreement on more complete measures on the limitation of strategic offensive arms called for in the interim agreement of 26 May 1972, and that on the same occasion they expressed their intention to carry out the subsequent reduction of such arms,

Conscious of the fact that the interim agreement referred to above will expire next year,

Noting that, as a result of the discussions held at the highest level in November 1974 also between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, both sides reaffirmed their intention to conclude an agreement on the limitation of strategic offensive arms to last until 31 December 1985 inclusive,10

Noting also that at the same meeting it was agreed to set ceilings both on the strategic offensive nuclear delivery vehicles as well as on such of those vehicles as may be equipped with multiple independently targetable warheads, and that both sides stated that favourable prospects existed for completing the work on the new agreement in 1975 and stressed that it would include provisions for further negotiations beginning no later than 1980-1981 on the question of further limitations and possible reductions of strategic arms in the period after 1985,

11

Noting further the information submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America,1 Reiterating its opinion that disarmament negotiations move very slowly in comparison to the obvious perils posed by the enormous arsenals of nuclear weapons,

1. Regrets the absence of positive results during the last three years of the bilateral negotiations between the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the limitation of their strategic nuclear-weapon systems;

2. Expresses its concern for the very high ceilings of nuclear arms set for themselves by both States, for the total absence of qualitative limitations of such arms, for the protracted time-table contemplated for the negotiation of further limitations and possible reductions of the nuclear arsenals and for the situation thus created;

3. Urges anew the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America to broaden the scope and accelerate the pace of their strategic nuclear arms limitation talks, and stresses once again the necessity and urgency of reaching agreement on important qualitative limitations and substantial reductions of their strategic nuclearweapon systems as a positive step towards nuclear disarmament:

Ibid., 1973, pp. 271–273. 'Ibid., 1972, pp. 202–204.

10 Ibid., 1974, pp. 746-747.

"Ref. is to A/31/125 containing a letter from U.S. and Soviet Representatives transmitting text of the treaty on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. For treaty text, see ante, pp. 328–332.

4. Reiterates its previous invitation to both Governments to keep the General Assembly informed in good time of the progress and results of their negotiations.

B 12

The General Assembly,

Mindful that the continuation of the arms race endangers international peace and security and also diverts vast resources urgently needed for economic and social development,

Convinced that peace can be secured through the implementation of disarmament measures, particularly of nuclear disarmament, conducive to the realization of the final objective, namely, general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

Reaffirming that disarmament is one of the essential objectives of the United Nations,

Bearing in mind that the Fifth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Colombo from 16 to 19 August 1976, called for a special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and made specific suggestions in this regard in its declaration and resolution on disarmament,13

1. Decides to convene a special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, to be held in New York in May/June 1978;

2. Further decides to establish a Preparatory Committee for the Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament, composed of fifty-four Member States appointed by the President of the Assembly on the basis of equitable geographical distribution, with the mandate of examining all relevant questions relating to the special session, including its agenda, and to submit to the Assembly at its thirty-second session appropriate recommendations thereon;

3. Invites all Member States to communicate to the Secretary-General their views on the agenda and all other relevant questions relating to the special session of the General Assembly not later than 15 April 1977;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit the replies of Member States pursuant to paragraph 3 above to the Preparatory Committee and to render it all necessary assistance, including the provision of essential background information, relevant documents and summary records;

5. Requests the Preparatory Committee to meet for a short organizational session not longer than one week, before 31 March 1977, inter alia to set the dates for its substantive sessions;

6. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-second session an item entitled: "Special session of the General Assembly de

12 Pt. B was submitted to the First Committee by 42 states on Nov. 8 and subsequently sponsored by 31 more. Introduced by Sri Lanka on Nov. 21, it was adopted by consensus by both the First Committee and the G.A.

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voted to disarmament: report of the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament”.

The General Assembly,

C 14

Bearing in mind the need to allay the legitimate concern of the States of the world with regard to ensuring lasting security for their peoples,

Deeply concerned at the continuation of the arms race, in particular the nuclear arms race and the threat to mankind due to the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons,

Convinced that only nuclear disarmament resulting in the complete elimination of nuclear weapons will assure perfect security in the nuclear era,

Recognizing that the independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of non-nuclear-weapon States need to be safeguarded against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Considering that, until nuclear disarmament is achieved on a universal basis, it is imperative for the international community to devise effective measures to ensure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons from any quarter,

Recalling its resolution 3261 G (XXIX) of 9 December 1974,15 inwhich it recommended that Member States should consider in all appropriate forums, without loss of time, the question of strengthening the security of non-nuclear-weapon States,

14 Pt. C was introduced in the First Committee by Pakistan. It was sponsored also by Iran, Kuwait, Morocco, Nicaragua, and Panama. In the First Committee, explanations of vote were made by France (ante, pp. 905-906) and the United States (ante, p. 906). Pt. C was adopted by the G.A. by a vote of 95 to 0, with 33 abstentions, as follows:

In favor-Afghanistan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burma, Burundi, Central African Rep., Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Dominican Rep., Ecuador, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Rep., Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Rep., Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Surinam, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Rep.. Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Rep. of Cameroon, United Rep. of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Zaire, Zambia. Against-None.

Abstaining-Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bhutan, Bulgaria, Byelorussian SSR, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, France, FRG, GDR, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Mongolia, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Sweden, U.K., Ukrainian SSR, U.S., USSR, Yugoslavia.

15 Documents on Disarmament, 1974, p. 809.

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