7. QUESTION: What is the significance of India's refusal to commit itself formally in writing not to use plutonium from U.S.-supplied fuel for nuclear explosions?

(a) Given this refusal, to what extent can the U.S. rely on India's formal, written commitment to use this plutonium only for recycling as fuel in the U.S.-supplied Tarapur reactors?

(b) What is the significance of the provision in the U.S. nuclear agreement with India permitting India to remove from IAEA safeguards plutonium that originates from U.S.-supplied fuel, so long as an identical amount of unsafeguarded is placed under IAEA safeguards? When and how would this be done and who would monitor against diversions? Would it be possible to exchange weapons-grade plutonium metal or oxide that is under safeguards for unreprocessed plutonium in spent fuel rods that is outside of safeguards?

ANSWER: (a) The intent of our Agreement for Cooperation with India, and the Ray-Sethna exchange of letters, is to preclude the use of plutonium from the Tarapur reactors for any purpose other than in the Tarapur reactors without our agreement. In turn, we have made clear that the U.S. will not agree to the use of that plutonium for so-called "peaceful nuclear explosions." The Ray-Sethna exchange of letters confirmed the following mutual understanding:

The special nuclear material that has been, or is hereafter made available for, or used, or produced in the Tarapur Atomic Power Station located at Tarapur will be devoted exclusively to the needs of that station unless our two governments hereafter specifically agree that such material be used for other purposes.

(b) The provision of the bilateral Agreement for Cooperation which permits the substitution of unsafeguarded material is a common one in a number of our agreements, and the U.S. itself has taken advantage of comparable provisions on several occasions. However, before India could utilize the provision, procedures would need to be worked out with the IAEA for the actual placing of such materials under safeguards. This should provide ample protection against diversion. In all past cases in which this or similar provisions have been utilized in other agreements, the IAEA has required that the material substituted be in the same form, quantity and isotopic composition as the material substituted for. Thus, it would not be possible to substitute unsafeguarded plutonium contained in spent fuel for safeguarded plutonium which had already been separated.

8. QUESTION: Has your agency considered leasing fuel rather than selling it? In this way the plutonium produced would remain the property of the United States and its eventual reprocessing would be carried out in the United States. Why has this approach not been considered for the more controversial export licenses?

ANSWER: Yes. ACDA has the question of leasing currently under active consideration. It should be pointed out, however, that this is a complex issue with many ramifications which require careful investigation. To cite but two of these factors:

-The storage or reprocessing of other countries' fuel in the U.S. would be an obvious gain from the perspective of non-proliferation, but could raise serious questions as to whether the U.S. really wishes to take on the burden of coping with other countries' spent fuel with the attendant problems of storage, transportation, high-level waste disposal, environmental considerations, etc.

-The U.S. now only sells toll enrichment services and not fuel per se. How the U.S. can require that fuel be leased, rather than enrichment services provided, when we do not own the uranium, poses an obvious problem.

Testimony of Secretary of State Kissinger Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations [Extract], March 16, 19761

VLADIVOSTOK AGREEMENT

Mr. Secretary, you stated that "At Vladivostok in 1974, President Ford reached agreement on the outline of a comprehensive agreement putting an equal ceiling on strategic forces on both sides for a 10-year period. The issues that remain in completing that agreement are soluble."? Do you think we are making any real progress?

Secretary KISSINGER. Well, the status of the negotiations is that we have put a proposal to the Soviet Union and we are awaiting their response and, therefore, I cannot give you a clear-cut answer until we have their response.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you.

GERMAN/BRAZILIAN ARRANGEMENT FOR FULL NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE

3

You also say, "The United States will never stand for violation of a solemn treaty or agreement." In my opinion the most dangerous thing that has happened, since World War II from the standpoint

1Foreign Policy Choices for the Seventies and Eighties: Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Ninety-fourth Congress, First and Second Sessions, on Foreign Policy Choices for the Seventies and Eighties. October 22, November 19, December 3, 1975; January 28, February 25 and March 16, 1976, vol. II, pp. 495-498.

2

Ibid., p. 476. For the Vladivostok agreement, see Documents on Disarmament, 1974, pp. 746 ff.

477.

Foreign Policy Choices for the Seventies and Eighties: Hearings

p.

of our own security, is the arrangement that the Germans have made with the Brazilians, giving them a full nuclear fuel cycle, which as we know means a technical capability to make nuclear weapons. Was there no violation of any agreement or treaty in that unfortunate development?

Secretary KISSINGER. No, there is no violation of a treaty or an agreement. It is a question of national policy or public policy.

Senator SYMINGTON. I remember, you told us in the committee that we had done our best to stop it. But, later on, in a public statement, the Chancellor of Germany said he had not had any criticism from anybody, at any time. I would hope you will tell him that if he is interested in us putting up these billions to defend his country, he had better start telling the truth.

Secretary KISSINGER. Well, I am glad to see that other countries have communication problems between their departments.

Senator SYMINGTON. Was that what it was, a communication problem?

Secretary KISSINGER. I do not know, but we certainly made our view clear to the Foreign Minister, which he confirmed.

IAEA CONTROLS

Senator SYMINGTON. One point worried me. I am talking now as Chairman of the Arms Control Subcommittee of this Committee, and as Chairman of the Military Applications and National Security Subcommittee of the Joint Committee. You said in a statement before the Government Operations Committee, that the so-called controls of the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] were "adequate." Last summer I went to the IAEA with experts from this committee, the Armed Services Committee, and the Joint Committee; and we decided, after spending some days over there, that the concept of any meaningful control was a joke, and that from the standpoint of actual thrust, you might say, the IAEA was quite comparable in a different subject, to the problem we face today with the United Nations.

Would you comment on whether we can, in any way, make the controls of the IAEA meaningful and if there is any way that we could prevent a country like Libya from applying, getting all of the information available, and then as you know, under the contract or agreement that they sign for the Nonproliferation Treaty, are allowed to withdraw in 90 days?

Secretary KISSINGER. From the Nonproliferation Treaty, but not from the IAEA safeguard.

Senator SYMINGTON. Well, they can withdraw from that.

Secretary KISSINGER. Yes, but not without penalty-not without being cut off from all nuclear fuel.

Senator SYMINGTON. Do you think the penalties are meaningful?

* Documents on Disarmament, 1968, pp. 461–465.

Secretary KISSINGER. Well, Senator, you made the statement to me last week after my testimony before the Government Operations Committee and I have not seen the safeguards challenged before on technical grounds, and I have now asked my people to look into this.

I would rather study their report before I give you a final answer on it, because I had always assumed that the safeguards were adequate. Senator SYMINGTON. I appreciate that because you say something in your statement that I could not agree with more. "It is a challenge to statesmanship to see beyond the immediate economic gains for unrestrained competition in nuclear exports and to act to halt a mushrooming danger."

NUCLEAR EXPORTERS MEETING

You say in your statement "In the global dialogue among the industrial and developing worlds, the Communist nations are conspicuous by their absence, and indeed, by their irrelevance." Now, for some months we have been hearing about this classified meeting of seven countries in London.

Secretary KISSINGER. Yes.

Senator SYMINGTON. And, we seem to be having trouble about it, and the story has been leaked out to the press that one of the troubles about it is the intransigence of the Soviet Union.

In the first place, I think the fact that they

Secretary KISSINGER. Are you talking about the nuclear exporters meeting?

Senator SYMINGTON. Yes. It is not a Communist nation-it is entirely a different nation that is giving us the most trouble in preventing the people of the world from getting the truth about the incredible new danger to the world posed by proliferation of radioactive materials such as plutonium or enriched uranium.

I would not want the record to show, unless I am wrong, in which case you can correct me, that the Soviet Union is blocking the people of the world from knowing about what is going on at this meeting, which could be deciding, so to speak, whether we are going to have an Armageddon or whether we are not. Would you comment?

Secretary KISSINGER. Well, the Soviet Union has been very responsible at this nuclear exporters meeting because being a large nuclear power, they are perhaps better aware of the dangers of the unrestricted use of nuclear weapons and the spread of nuclear weapons than many other countries. At the same time I think progress has been made at the nuclear exporters meeting on many of the key issues.

The one issue that is not resolved is the complete fuel cycle, and particularly the reprocessing plant. These countries are meeting again, in June, and we are hopeful that further progress can be made. So, I would not want to leave the impression that any of the countries participating have been totally uncooperative.

FRENCH OFFER OF REPROCESSING FACILITY TO SOUTH KOREA

Senator SYMINGTON. Have the French agreed to withdraw their offer to South Korea to give a reprocessing facility?

Secretary KISSINGER. Korea decided not to proceed, so, I think the issue is moat [moot?].

Senator SYMINGTON. But, the French would not put the pressure on them. They asked us to do it; did they not?

Secretary KISSINGER. Well, we had the consultations with South Korea.

Senator SYMINGTON. I only asked that because through your entire statement, we run into this word "allies" and I think about the statement, I can protect myself against my enemies, but God protect me against my friends. I believe you, yourself, have had some experiences along those lines.

REPORTED ISRAELI NUCLEAR DEVICES

I just have one more question which has been submitted to me by a member of the press and a friend, "please ask Senator Symington to ask the question about the CIA saying Israel has 10 to 20 nuclear devices." Would you comment on that, or is the CIA an independent agency, now, from the State Department, or would you prefer not to comment?

Secretary KISSINGER. Well, I have never seen the precise statement that was made.

5

Israel had said that it would not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East, and I do not know the precise context in which this CIA statement was made.

Senator SYMINGTON. I do not either. So, I can only ask the question as it was presented.

Secretary KISSINGER. At any rate, whenever that statement was made, they were acting as an independent agency.

Senator SYMINGTON. One more question.

PUBLIC INFORMATION CONCERNING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

When do you think we are going to get some information to the people of this country and of the other countries so that they will understand what is going on in this effort to control proliferation that has been going on in London?

Are we the ones holding it up?

"Ibid., 1975, p. 729.