transfer of conventional arms and submit it to the General Assembly at its thirty-second session. The third amendment is in operative paragraph 4. In the second line add after the words "an item entitled 'Question of the . . ."" the words "production and". Paragraph 4 will then read: Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-second session an item entitled "Question of the production and international transfer of conventional arms." I should like to be permitted to add some explanation to those changes. I think that the first change in paragraph 2 of the preambular paragraph will not need any explanation; I think it is selfexplanatory. As to the second revision, as I had explained in my introductory statement in connexion with A/C.1/31/L.20, the Secretary-General is requested to make a factual study and the result of that study will be considered at the next session of the General Assembly, but what steps should be taken as a result of the consideration at the next General Assembly or in future sessions, will be entirely open and will not prejudge the position to be taken by any delegation. So in order to make it clear that that is the initial step, we have added the words: "to make as an initial step". The last change, to add the word "production" in paragraph 4, is the result of a consideration of the proposal-the proposed amendment-submitted by the representative of Pakistan, and as I said in my introductory statement, although the views of Member States are requested on the question of international transfer at this meeting, and the SecretaryGeneral is requested to make a factual study of the international transfer of conventional arms, this is not intended to prejudge the outcome of these studies and the views to be communicated by Member States, and it is not my intention to exclude from the discussion to take place in the next session, the phases of production of conventional arms, in case the views along that line are submitted by the Member States, in accordance with operative paragraph 1. That is the short explanation which I wished to make in connexion with the amendment which I have just introduced, and with that revision I hope that the representative of Pakistan will not press his amendment to the vote. Statement by the Pakistani Representative (Khan) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: International Transfer of Conventional Arms, December 2, 19761 Pakistan shares the concern which has been expressed in this Committee about the proliferation of conventional arms, increasing destructive capacity all over the world. We are prepared to examine this question, both in a regional as well as in more general context. 1A/C.1/31/PV.49, pp. 16-17. Such an examination, however, has to be objective in nature. It must take into account all factors which contribute to the proliferation of conventional arms and devise equitable and realistic measures to check this phenomenon. In our view, draft resolution A/C.1/31/L.20,2 introduced by the representative of Japan, lacked balance, insofar as its primary objective appears to be to focus attention only on the acquisition of conventional arms by the developing countries of the third world. It must be remembered that the major proportion of the world's expenditure on conventional armaments is still incurred by a handful of industrialized States and other large countries. By comparison, the expenditure of most small and medium-sized States on armaments is a minimal part of global military expenditure. It is therefore necessary to examine, not only the transfer in arms, but also the trade in arms, including indigenous production of arms. by various countries, a restraint on the export or transfer of arms alone would do nothing to prevent those States which are capable of producing conventional weapons from expanding their armaments and developing their weapons. On the other hand, we feel that an estoppel on the transfer of arms would gravely endanger the security of the smaller and weaker States which by and large do not have the capacity to produce arms indigenously for their security against external threat. It was for these considerations that my delegation had put forward the amendments in document A/C.1/31/L.36 to the draft resolution. In our view we should address ourselves not merely to the question of international transfer of conventional arms but to the broader question of production as well as the international transfer of such arms. We have had consultations with the co-sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/31/L.20. We are gratified by the changes they have introduced in the draft resolution. These do not, however, fully meet our point of view. None the less, in a spirit of understanding my delegation will not press the amendments in A/C.1/31/L.36 to a vote. Statement by the Soviet Representative (Issraelyan) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, December 2, 19761 In connexion with the vote on draft resolution A/C.1/31/L.25,2 the Soviet delegation would like to state the following. The Soviet Union attaches crucial importance to the successful solution of the problem of limiting strategic nuclear weapons and of their reduction. The conclusion in recent years between the Soviet Union and the United States of agreements for the prevention of nuclear war and the limitation of strategic weapons and their testing are of crucial importance as a means of reducing the threat of nuclear war and curtailing the arms race. We appreciate the fact that steps have already been taken in the area of preventing nuclear war. However, the Soviet Union is ready to go even further and to step up efforts to conclude a new agreement with the United States on the limitation of strategic offensive weapons on the basis of the well-known Vladivostok Agreement, which oriented both States towards a limitation of these weapons not only quantitatively but also qualitatively, as well as towards their further limitation. The readiness to step up these efforts was once more reaffirmed in the statement made by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Brezhnev, just a few days ago. The Soviet delegation notes with satisfaction the great interest manifested by delegations of many countries to the General Assembly regarding the Soviet-United States strategic arms limitation talks. Of course, no less than these countries we would like to see these talks successfully completed in the near future. However, in our view, draft resolution A/C.1/31/L.25 gives a distorted picture of the results of the talks between the USSR and the United States on the limitation of strategic weapons. In it an illegal attempt is made to prejudge the order, concrete orientation and possible results of these talks, which represents interference in the conduct of these talks. For these reasons, the Soviet delegation will vote against this draft resolution. Statement by the United States Representative (Black) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, December 2, 19761 As we have stated in the past, the United States welcomes the interest shown by the international community in the strategic arms limitation talks. My Government has worked seriously to contribute to the achievement of a SALT II agreement at the earliest possible date. We will vote against the draft resolution now being considered by the Committee because of our strong objections to the language of its first and second operative paragraphs. We believe these paragraphs seriously misrepresent the facts in ways which my delegation identified last year in explaining our negative vote on a similar resolution.3 3 See Documents on Disarmament, 1974, pp. 746–747. Ante, pp. 872-874. 4 1A/C.1/31/PV.49, pp. 27–30. 2 Identical with G.A. res. 31/189A, post, pp. 945-947. G.A. res. 3484C (XXX), see Documents on Disarmament, 1975, pp. 809–810. For the U.S. explanation, see ibid., pp. 744–745. Statement by the British Representative (Allen) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Denuclearization of Africa, December 2, 19761 My delegation has not obstructed the consensus on this item and if there had been a vote, we would have voted in favour of the draft resolution, although we regret that it does not do more to encourage actual negotiations by the States of the region. We note, furthermore, that in its third preambular paragraph the resolution recalls an expression, made elsewhere, of grave concern over collaboration with the South African Government: particularly in the military and nuclear fields, thereby enabling it to acquire nuclear-weapon capability. My Government is not aware that South Africa has acquired nuclearweapon capability, or that it is preparing to do so. We would strongly deplore any collaboration with South Africa in order to help it to acquire this capability. Again, we are not aware that such collaboration actually exists. The British Government's position has already been made clear, but it bears repeating. It is this: because of its general nuclear non-proliferation policy and, in particular, its opposition to apartheid, my Government would not sanction the export to South Africa of any nuclear material, equipment or technology contributing to the development of a military nuclear capability. The British Government's policy on trade with South Africa in the civil sphere was explained in the British Parliament on 4 December 1974 and in a General Assembly document circulated under the symbol A/9918. British companies are free to engage in civil trade and in business such as uranium mining in South Africa. For example, British firms conduct a trade in isotopes for medical, biological and ordinary industrial and agricultural uses, and some uranium exported from South Africa is converted into hexafluoride. We do not, however, enrich uranium for South Africa, nor have we any plans to do so. My Government has made no secret of its policies on trading with South Africa, which it is prepared to defend on their economic and political merits. This trade is confined to the civil sphere, in accordance with our international undertakings. Our position is as I have stated it today, and on that we stand. 1A/C.1/31/PV.50, pp. 18–21. * Identical with G.A. res. 31/69, post, pp. 915–916. Statement by the French Representative (Mistral) to the First My delegation has very willingly associated itself with the consensus just arrived at on draft resolution A/C.1/31/L.31, concerning the implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa. We would have voted in favour of this text if it had been put to the vote. My delegation would not have wished to explain its vote if, on the submission of this draft, the representative of Nigeria had not raised the problem of the construction by my country of the nuclear electric power station at Koberg. I should simply like to recall, on this subject, that in the general debate in the General Assembly, the representative of France, in a statement made on 5 October, gave all necessary explanations about the construction of this station. He made it clear how the French Government had ensured the absolute impossibility for South Africa to progress towards obtaining military nuclear capacity because of the functioning of the Koberg power station, and particularly towards obtaining by this means the enriched uranium or plutonium which are necessary for the manufacture of nuclear weapons. This is both materially and contractually impossible. I do not want to take up the time of the Committee by repeating this argument and these explanations, but I would hope that delegations which are interested in this matter would be good enough to acquaint themselves with the explanation we gave on this subject. 4 Statement by the FRG Representative (Schlaich) to the First The delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany has participated without any reservations in the consensus on the draft resolution concerning the implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa. I need not particularly stress that, on the basis of our adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and our membership of the International Atomic Energy Agency and our general non-proliferation policy ensuing therefrom, we do not permit the export to South Africa of nuclear material, equipment or technology which might contribute to the development of a nuclear-weapon capability by that country. The draft resolution 1 7 1 A/C.1/31/PV.50, pp. 21–22. 2 Identical with G.A. res. 31/69, post, pp. 915–916. 3 A/C.1/31/PV.48, pp. 53-55. Identical with G.A. res. 31/69, post, pp. 915-916. G A/C.1/31/PV.50, p. 22. 7 For text, see Documents on Disarmament, 1968, pp. 461-465. |