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Statement by the Japanese Representative (Ogiso) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Comprehensive Test Ban [Extract], March 9, 19761

There is no need to stress that the most urgent issue at present in the field of nuclear disarmament is the realization of a comprehensive test ban. Although the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963 about a nuclear test ban already exists, the nuclear-weapon States which are not yet Parties to the Treaty ought still to be urged to accede to it and in this way protect the atmosphere completely from radioactive contamination. Therefore, we urge again the nuclear-weapon States which have not yet become Parties to the Partial Test Ban Treaty to accede to the Treaty and assume the treaty obligation not to conduct nuclear tests in the atmosphere. In this context, it is with much regret that we note the atmospheric nuclear test conducted by the People's Republic of China in January this year; and we appeal to that country to discontinue atmospheric nuclear tests as early as possible.

As nuclear tests in the atmosphere, outer space and under water are already banned by the Partial Test Ban Treaty, the realization of a comprehensive test ban of nuclear weapons in the form of an international instrument would only require the conclusion of a treaty banning nuclear tests underground, which is the remaining environment. In concluding a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests, two major problems are cited-namely, (1) verification and (2) how to deal with peaceful nuclear explosions. So I shall now address myself to these two problems.

As to the first problem as a result of discussions over many years on an underground nuclear weapon test ban, it has become clear that one of the greatest obstacles to the conclusion of the treaty is the difference between the super-Powers about verification. So we have stressed time and again that, if a comprehensive test ban of nuclear weapons cannot be expected in the near future because of the differences of position on verification, both the United States and the Soviet Union should show their sincerity towards this question by banning underground nuclear weapon tests from wherever verification is possible, and at the earliest possible date, as an intermediate measure leading to a comprehensive test ban. As a concrete measure along these lines, we have suggested the banning of underground nuclear explosions above a certain level which can be detected and identified by present seismological means, and then the gradual lowering of the threshold of underground nuclear tests, which would eventually lead to a comprehensive test ban. In this respect, my delegation regards

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as highly important the experts' meeting on the questions of a comprehensive test ban which is proposed by Sweden to take place, hopefully, in April this year. For this reason, my country intends to send a qualified expert in order to contribute to the discussions and make the meeting, when it takes place, more significant. As to the items to be discussed at the meeting, the confirmation of the categories and capabilities of the verification means-namely, to what extent underground tests can be detected and identified by what kind of verification means will be among the most important items as at the previous meeting.

Next, I shall touch upon the second problem that hinders the conclusion of a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon testsnamely, how to deal with peaceful nuclear explosions with particular emphasis upon the problem of preventing nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes from being used for military purposes. The importance of this problem is clear from the statement made by Ambassador Martin of the United States on 29 July last year:

If PNES were to be accommodated under a CTB, a verification system would have to be devised capable of providing adequate assurance to all States that no weapon-related benefits were being acquired from PNE activities (CCD/ P.V. 676, p. 17).3

Also, resolution 3484 A (XXX) adopted last year at the United Nations General Assembly takes note of the importance of this question, and states in its operative paragraphs 8 and 9 as follows:

8. Requests the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to keep under review. . . the arms control implications of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, including the possibility that such explosions could be misused to circumvent any ban on the testing of nuclear weapons;

9. Stresses the need to ensure, particularly in the context of a comprehensive test ban, that any testing or application of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes does not contribute to the testing or refinement of the nuclear weapon arsenals of nuclear-weapon States or to the acquisition of nuclear explosive capability by other States;

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As indicated in operative paragraph 9 which I have just quoted, the problem arising from peaceful nuclear explosions has two aspects, in which (1) the nuclear-weapon States acquire the weapon-related benefits and (2) non-nuclear-weapon States acquire these weaponrelated benefits. While the latter is also related to the question of nonproliferation, the question of a comprehensive test ban cannot be solved unless the answers are found to these two problems. Accordingly, we should discuss from the specialists' point of view whether verification means can be found to enable us to ascertain that no use for military purposes has occurred in these two cases, and also other problems related to this point.

It is also necessary to discuss such items as the establishment of a régime which would make available the benefits deriving from nuclear

'Ibid., 1975, p. 293. Ibid., pp. 803–806.

explosions for peaceful purposes pursuant to article V of the NPT,5 and the control on peaceful nuclear explosions conducted by the nuclear-weapon States. As many of these items are at present being studied in depth by IAEA, it would be appropriate to request the presence and explanations on these matters from the representative of IAEA, when the experts' meeting is held.

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The conclusion of the Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests, signed between the United States of America and the Soviet Union in 1974, was a new development in the field of a comprehensive test ban of nuclear weapons. Though various questions may be raised about the Treaty, it is in fact an intermediate measure leading to the sort of comprehensive test ban we have been advocating, and it should be valued as such. On the other hand, while only a few weeks are left before 31 March, which is the day the Treaty is supposed to enter into force, we much regret that there is very little prospect of its entry into force by that date. Accordingly, we would ask both the United States of America and the Soviet Union to make further efforts with a view to bringing the negotiations to a successful conclusion as early as possible, and furthermore, to strive to achieve a comprehensive test ban using this Treaty as a foothold.

Now, on the basis of the views which I have presented concerning an underground weapon test ban, and in the earnest expectation that the Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests -as I now call it, the threshold Treaty-will be ratified and enter into force as scheduled, I would like to suggest a measure for concluding a multilateral agreement on banning underground nuclear weapon tests, starting from the threshold Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union. For I consider that the threshold Treaty is not complete in itself in our efforts to solve the question of a comprehensive test ban, and that it is essential to conclude a multilateral treaty on an underground nuclear weapon test ban which will include all States among them, all nuclear-weapon States-as Parties. The measure which my country would like to suggest is that this Committee should be given two tasks, namely, (1) to examine the possibility of expanding the threshold Treaty into a multilateral agreement, and simultaneously (2) to try to lower the threshold of 150 kilotons provided for in the threshold Treaty. As to the first stage of developing the threshold Treaty into a multilateral one, there would be no basic difficulty now that the United States and the Soviet Union have concluded the bilateral threshold Treaty. In this case, we may be able to adopt most of the text of the threshold Treaty in the new multilateral treaty. As to verification, which is the main point of concern, this multilateral treaty would adopt in principle the provisions of article II of the threshold Treaty, and the detailed substance as provided for in the Protocol to the Treaty can be left likewise to the additional

"Ibid., 1968, pp. 461-465.

The treaty and its protocol are printed ibid., 1974, pp. 225–227, 228–229.

protocol to this multilateral treaty. In elaborating provisions on the implementation of the details, if some tangible results are to be obtained at the experts' meeting which is scheduled to take place this year, we should consider using such results fully. Also, taking into consideration that this new treaty will be a multilateral one, it would be desirable to establish a verification committee consisting of a few States including the nuclear-weapon States, and for the nuclearweapon States to exchange through this committee such data or information as provided for in the Protocol to the threshold Treaty. Alternatively, the implementation of the details as provided for in the Protocol to the threshold Treaty may be left to a separate agreement or agreements to be concluded among the nuclear-weapon States as in the case of the Protocol to the threshold Treaty. In either case, it is desirable to establish a verification committee consisting of the nuclear-weapon States and a few non-nuclear-weapon States, and to arrange for Parties to this multilateral treaty to be informed of any violation or doubts about the violation of the treaty obligations through this verification committee. In both cases, if agreement is to be reached to establish a verification committee, the Committee on Disarmament should discuss and decide on its composition, mandate and other related matters.

As to the next question of peaceful nuclear explosions, I need not reiterate that it is necessary to ensure that these peaceful nuclear explosions should not be used for military purposes. The fact that the negotiations between the United States of America and the Soviet Union initiated on the basis of article III of the threshold Treaty are protracted indicates that this is not an easy question to solve. However, we would like to emphasize that the fact that this question remains unsettled should not be made to serve as an excuse for delaying the bringing into force of the underground weapons test ban. From this viewpoint, and in order to bring the negotiations between the two super-Powers to an early and successful end, studies should be made among others on the possibility of authorizing all PNEs exclusively under international observation or of banning PNES over the threshold tentatively for a given period, for instance five years.

The remaining problem is that of lowering the threshold over which weapon tests are banned. Taking into account the concern that the threshold of 150 kilotons set out in the threshold Treaty may be too high, it would be necessary to conduct a serious technical examination and comparison of the yields down to which explosions can be detected and identified. In all events, the treaty text should be flexible enough to allow the gradual reduction of the threshold. If we continue negotiations and reduce gradually the threshold in accordance with the provision on the continuation of negotiations upon the conclusion of the multilateral treaty limiting underground weapon tests on the one hand, and if we negotiate simultaneously the conclusion of the agreement on peaceful nuclear explosions on the other hand, it will

become eventually possible to realize a treaty banning all underground nuclear weapon tests. I believe that the non-nuclear-weapon States will be able to make remarkable contributions in this process and also to play a prominent role in the operation of the treaty, such as ensuring a justifiable settlement in case the issue of a violation or the doubts of a violation of the treaty obligations are raised. Furthermore, I believe that the Committee on Disarmament is the most suitable and appropriate organ in which to conclude such a multilateral treaty. I also believe that, by achieving these results, this Committee will be able to revive its functions and help dispel the criticism of international public opinion directed against the recent stagnation of its activities. I strongly urge the members of this Committee and the nuclear-weapon States in particular to recognize the importance of realizing a comprehensive test ban, and to consider seriously the suggestions which I have made now.

It may be pointed out that some nuclear-weapon States are presumably not ready to participate in the negotiations on such a multilateral treaty. Nevertheless, I feel that we should persistently call upon these nuclear-weapon States to participate in the negotiations, and that we should renew our efforts in order to bring about a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests in such a form and with such contents that these nuclear-weapon States would feel able to accede to it at a later stage as is expected in the case of the Partial Test Ban Treaty. In this context, my delegation believes that the idea of making the participation from the beginning of all nuclear-weapon States a precondition for reaching an agreement on a CTB will be criticized as being an excuse for protracting its realization; and, therefore, we cannot agree with this idea.

Statement by the Soviet Representative (Roshchin) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, March 9, 1976 1

Today, we should like to touch upon certain proposals by the USSR in the field of disarmament, in the light of the decisions taken in this field at the Twenty-fifth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which finished its work a few days ago.

In the decisions and material of the Congress, it is confirmed that the main orientation of the foreign policy of the Soviet State is the struggle for the affirmation of the principles of peaceful co-existence, for a lasting peace and for the lessening and, eventually, the elimination of the danger of a new world war. In the decisions of the Congress, it is emphasized that the natural way to achieve these objectives is not balancing on the brink of war, but negotiations on controversial issues not confrontation, but peaceful co-operation. One of the main

1CCD/PV.692, pp. 23–28.

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