Several nations have presented useful technical papers to the Con- ! ference of the Committee on Disarmament on chemical weapons, and many of these have concentrated on the definition of agents which should be banned. My Government believes that there is in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament now a basis for general agreement on how to define those agents to be banned under any chemical weapons treaty.

Our objective now should be to secure a comprehensive and verifiable prohibition of the production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons. The United Kingdom on 12 August submitted a draft convention 19 which tries to bring together the good work done since the conclusion of the biological weapons Convention in 1972 20 and incorporates many features from earlier East European 21 and Japanese drafts.22 We hope it will give further impetus to the negotiations, with a view to real progress in 1977.

The United Kingdom draft convention, while comprehensive in its coverage, is phased in application. In the first stage, signatories would provide information on their stocks of chemical weapon agents and production facilities, and would stop further production. In the second phase, which would take place when an agreed minimum number of States had ratified the convention, the undertaking provisionally accepted on signature would become permanent and verification provisions to ensure that the convention was being observed by parties would come into force. These would include the setting up of a consultative committee to arrange for verification, inspection and the exchange of information. In the third stage existing stockpiles of chemical weapon agents would be destroyed or converted to peaceful use. We believe that the provisions in our draft represent the minimum level of verification which a chemical weapon agreement of this type would require. Shortly after we had submitted this draft convention, the United States and the Soviet Union resumed their bilateral discussions on chemical weapons initiated in 1974. We hope this, too, will contribute to progress in 1977.

At this point I might remind the Committee that in 1972 the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament successfully concluded a Convention on biological weapons to which 69 nations are now party. I urge those States which are not yet parties to adhere to the Convention and thus increase its effectiveness.

I now turn to my third main topic: world military expenditure. There is growing international concern at the high level of global military spending which includes an increase in the transfer of conventional weapons.

Many nations still consider that their security is threatened by others. That is why nations seek to deter aggression by providing themselves with the means of defence. And that in turn has led to a rising demand for more and better armaments. It is only too clear that weapons have become more complex and more expensive. In this respect there is a strong though unpredictable connexion between work in pure and in applied science; for example, the theoretical work of eminent physicists led to the conception of the atomic bomb. We do well to remember that conventional weapons are in daily use in conflicts throughout the world. Moreover, competitive acquisition of weapons can become a source of international tension and increase the risk of outright conflict. The economic consequences of diverting scarce resources from other uses should also not be neglected. These briefly are the effects of what is often called "the arms race".

The total value of global arms transfers, in constant 1973 dollar terms, increased by 60 per cent between 1965 and 1974. In that period, the level of arms imports by developed countries remained relatively constant at about $2 billion each year. By contrast, arms imports by developing countries doubled to reach over $6 billion. The rapid surge in arms deliveries to South-East Asia and the Middle East has accounted for virtually the whole of this increase, and as the SecretaryGeneral pointed out in the introduction to his report on the work of the Organization:

The arms build-up in many particularly sensitive areas of the world has continued.23

The growth in quantity has been accompanied by a demand for even more advanced weapons systems.

This is another case where we must be realistic as well as idealistic. For many years to come nations will see external threats, and seek to arm themselves to deter aggression. Some can rely, at least partly, on the weapons of more powerful allies. But many, notably the nonaligned countries, are not in that position. If we are to tackle this problem we must begin from an awareness of the relationship between local and regional tensions and the acquisition of armaments.

The Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency suggested in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on 29 July this year certain principles which might govern the supply and the acquisition of arms.24 We believe they deserve very serious consideration by arms exporters and importers alike; and many countries, including Britain, are both.

Some would argue that the first move lies with the arms suppliers, and there may indeed be scope for all of significant quantities of arms suppliers to agree to certain limits on the types of arms they are

23

General Assembly Official Records: Thirty-first Session, Supplement No. 1A (A/31/1/Add. 1), p. 5.

24 Ante, pp. 497–501.

prepared to export. We believe that arms importers should be associated with any such arrangements, and this may prove to be most practicable on a regional basis.

Certain Latin American States made an encouraging start in this direction in the Declaration of Ayacucho, which asserts the principle of collective restraint.25 In Europe, the negotiations in Vienna on mutual and balanced force reductions provide an opportunity to bring greater stability to an area where forces are heavily concentrated and where the consequences of conflict would be disastrous for all. We should like to see further groups of countries examining the possibilities of regional arms limitation, and suppliers playing their part also. The rise in conventional arms transfers is only one aspect of growing military expenditure in many parts of the world. The SecretaryGeneral's Group of Experts on Military Budgets has now reported to the Assembly on how the military budgets of the various countries might be fairly compared. This work will now have to be tested in practice, and I hope that with the necessary measure of international co-operation it will prove to be a sound basis for progress towards international agreement on reducing military expenditure throughout the world.26

Nations continue to believe that they need weapons for self-defence and that, indeed, their possession acts as a deterrent and keeps the peace. But it is an uneasy peace in many parts of the world and we should feel much safer-and consume less of our scarce resources-if it depended upon a far lower level of armaments. This, in my view, is what should be a product of real détente, a determination to take practical measures to reduce the burden of military expenditure. It should be our aim to move from deterrence based on massive armaments to a position of mutual trust and a lower level of armaments which would in time eliminate threats to the security of us all.

To sum up, my Government attaches the highest priority to international efforts to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons, including the strengthening of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. We consider that there is now a good opportunity for progress towards the prohibition of chemical weapons and the destruction of existing stockpiles. We wish to see a reduction of global military spending and the halting of the vast build-up of conventional weapons throughout the world.

It is my belief that, given the political will to work together for these objectives, we can achieve progress in the limitation and control of arms by the end of the Disarmament Decade.

Mexican Draft Resolution Submitted to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, November 3, 19761

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 3264 (XXIX) of 9 December 19742 and 3475 (XXX) of 11 December 1975,3

Reiterating its conviction that the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of action to influence the environment and climate for military and other hostile purposes would contribute to the cause of strengthening peace and averting the threat of war,

Convinced also that such a convention should not affect the use of environmental modification techniques for peaceful purposes, which should contribute to the preservation and improvement of the environment for the benefit of present and future generations,

Taking into account the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament as it relates to this question,*

Noting with satisfaction the progress achieved in the preparation of the text of a draft convention on the matter,

1. Requests the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, without prejudice to the priorities established in its programme of work, to continue negotiations on the text of a draft convention on the prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques, bearing in mind the proposals and suggestions which have been submitted as well as the relevant discussion by the General Assembly, with a view to reaching agreement as early as possible on a text which would be widely acceptable to Members of the United Nations, and to submit a report on the results achieved to the General Assembly at its thirty-second session;

2. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament all documents relating to the discussion of this question by the General Assembly at its thirty-first session; 3. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-second session an item entitled "Convention on the prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques".

1 A/C.1/31/L.4, Nov. 3, 1976. One of two draft res. to be submitted under agenda item 45, this draft res. was originally sponsored by Argentina, Mexico, Panama, and Peru, and subsequently by 7 other Latin American states (Dominican Rep., Ecuador, Grenada, Haiti, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela) plus Cyprus and Mauritius. It was introduced by Mexico on Nov. 9 (post, pp. 767–770), and revised and resubmitted on Dec. 2 (post, pp. 892–893). The First Committee, however, decided to drop the Mexican draft res. (post, p. 924, n. 1) and adopted instead a competing Finnish draft (infra).

3

Documents on Disarmament, 1974, pp. 816–818.

* Ibid., 1975, pp. 788-789.

General Assembly Official Records: Thirty-first Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/31/27), vol. I, pp. 61 ff.

Finnish Draft Resolution Submitted to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, November 4, 1976

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 3264 (XXIX) and 3475 (XXX), Determined to avert the potential dangers of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques,

Noting with satisfaction that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has completed and transmitted to the General As sembly, in the report of its 1976 session, the text of a draft Convention on the prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques,

Convinced that the Convention will contribute to the realization of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

1. Commends the Convention on the prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques, the text of which is annexed to the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (A/31/27);"

2. Requests the Secretary-General, as depositary of the Convention, to open it for signature and ratification at the earliest possible date;

3. Expresses its hope for the widest possible adherence to the Convention.

Interview of ACDA Director Iklé by U.S. News & World Report: Nuclear Policy, November 8, 19761

Q. Mr. Iklé, can any country that has nuclear reactors produce nuclear weapons?

A. Not any country. Know-how is needed to build a reprocessing plant and then to fabricate the plutonium into weapons. Not all countries with reactors have that knowledge.

"A/C.1/31/L.5, Nov. 4, 1976. This draft res. was one of two draft res. to be submitted under agenda item 45 in the First Committee. It was sponsored by Canada, Denmark, Finland, GDR, Hungary, Japan, Mongolia, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, U.K., and Zaire. Introduced by Finland on Nov. 5, it was subsequently revised three times and gained a total of 30 sponsors (see post, pp. 861862) before its adoption by the First Committee. The G.A. adopted the thrice-revised version as res. 31/72 on Dec. 10 (post, pp. 924–930).

Documents on Disarmament, 1974, pp. 814-816.

"Ibid., 1975, pp.788-789.

8 General Assembly Official Records: Thirty-first Session, Supplement No. 27, vol. I.

9 Ante, pp. 577-588.

1 Reprinted with permission of U.S. News & World Report, Inc., from U.S. News & World Report, November 8, 1976, pp. 69–70.