ter of the globe. And there will be growing dangers of accidents, blackmail and nuclear terrorism.

Unless current trends are altered rapidly, the likelihood of nuclear devastation could grow steadily in the years ahead. We must look to the roots of the problem. Since the 1973 energy crisis and drastic rise in oil prices, both developed and developing nations have seen in nuclear energy a means both of lowering the cost of electricity and of reducing reliance upon imported petroleum. In an age of growing nationalism some see the acquisition and expansion of nuclear power as symbols of enhanced national prestige. And, let us be frank, as a means to provide themselves a future option to acquire nuclear weapons.

A nation that acquires the potential for a nuclear weapons capability must accept the consequences of its action. It is bound to trigger offsetting actions by its neighbours and stimulate broader proliferation, thereby accelerating a process that ultimately will undermine its own. security. And it is disingenuous to label as "peaceful" nuclear devices which obviously are capable of massive military destruction.

Time is of the essence. In no area of international concern does the future of this planet depend more directly upon what this generation can do or fails to do. We must move on three broad fronts:

First, international safeguards must be strengthened and strictly enforced. The supply and use of nuclear materials associated with civilian nuclear energy programmes must be carefully safeguarded so that they will not be diverted. The physical security of nuclear materials must be increased. The International Atomic Energy Agency must receive the full support of all nations in making its safeguards effective. Any violator of these safeguards must face immediate and drastic penalties.

Second, adherence to safeguards, while of prime importance, is no guarantee against future proliferation. We must continue our efforts to forge international restraints against the acquisition or transfer of reprocessing facilities and of enrichment facilities which produce highly enriched uranium.

Third, we must recognize that one of the principal incentives for seeking sensitive reprocessing and enrichment technology is the fear that essential nonsensitive materials will not be made available on a reliable basis. Nations that show their sense of international responsibility by accepting effective restraints have a right to expect reliable and economical supply of peaceful nuclear reactors and associated nonsensitive fuel. The United States, as a principal supplier of these items, is prepared to be responsive in this regard.

In the near future President Ford will announce a comprehensive American program for international action on non-proliferation that reconciles global aspirations for assured nuclear supply with global requirements for nuclear control. In that way we hope that

the atom can be seen once again as a boon and not as a menace to mankind.2

Press Conference Remarks by Secretary of State Kissinger [Extracts], October 2, 19761

The problem of peace has, in our age, an unprecedented character. Throughout history it would have been inconceivable that any nation could accumulate too much power for effective political use. As late as the end of World War II, every increment of additional power would have been militarily useful.

Today we live in a period in which a nuclear war would mean destruction for all parties and in which the relative advantage of one side against the other pales compared to the destruction that is involved, which could well be the end of civilized life as we understand it. Therefore the traditional power politics, the accumulation of marginal advantages, the posturing vis-a-vis opponents, has to be carried out today, if at all, with a sense of responsibility and a degree of circumspection that is unparalleled. And every President will, sooner or later, be driven to the conviction which was first enunciated by President Eisenhower: There is no alternative to peace. Therefore the problem of how to control nuclear arms, how to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, must be a paramount concern of American policy. And tough rhetoric is no substitute for the perception of this overriding necessity.

To be sure, we have to make certain that the desire for peace does not lead other countries to try to seek unilateral advantages. And we have to be able to combine a concern with our values and our interests, and those of our allies, with a readiness to seek honorable solutions with adversaries. Where to strike this balance is one of the problems with which policymakers have to deal and which will no doubt come up in our discussions.

Mr. Greenberg: There is one area of the foreign policy in which you might have a special knowledge or interest, and that is the arms sales abroad. The Democratic candidate for President has not been alone in deploring the size of American arms shipments abroad, on the theory that they will actually ignite wars and we will be drawn

2 Post, pp. 703-716.

1 Department of State Bulletin, Nov. 1, 1976, pp. 541-542, 549–550. The press conference was held in Hilton Head, South Carolina.

into them. Do you see any of that sort of danger in the amount of armaments this country is shipping to various nations abroad?

Secretary Kissinger: One has to analyze where the arms are going before one can judge whether they will ignite wars and, secondly, whether the United States will be drawn into those wars if they are ignited.

Many of the figures that are being used are vastly inflated. I see references, for example, to $7.5 billion of arms to Saudi Arabia. Of that $7.5 billion, the overwhelming part of it is going for construction by the Corps of Engineers, and it is not going for weapons. And it is technically in the military budget, but it is to build cantonments for the Saudi Army and has nothing to do, as such, with the arms

race.

Another percentage goes to Iran. Now Iran has pursued a policy that has been very parallel to ours in the Middle East. It has not joined the embargo. It has declared that it wouldn't join the embargo. It has sold oil even to Israel during this period.

Countries that threaten it are countries like the Soviet Union and countries armed by the Soviet Union, such as Iraq. And therefore I cannot foresee nor has Iran ever transferred arms to another country. So it is difficult to foresee any war that Iran would start that would draw us in. And to the extent that Iran is capable of protecting itself, we are less likely to be drawn in than we would be if it were defenseless.

On the other hand, I do agree that we should look at the question of arms sales more systematically, and we have created, now, a new group to make sure that the question you put is being dealt with in a responsible manner.

It is my judgment that the arms sales have contributed much more to stability than to the opposite. But we are not pushing arms sales. We are responding to needs that countries feel-and most of which they would be in a position to get anyway from other sources.

Mr. Greenberg: But, Mr. Secretary, those figures on Saudi Arabia include something like 600-700 Sidewinder missiles. Now what possible defense justification could there be for a country like Saudi Arabia to have that many missiles, except perhaps to defend its interests against Iran, which we have also supplied with

Secretary Kissinger: Much more to defend its interests against some neighbors it has that are armed by the Soviet Union. And of the Sidewinders, a large a significant percentage is going to have to be used for training purposes. So that what will be left is a minimum defensive package. And if you look at the countries surrounding Saudi Arabia, you would not pick Iran as the most likely one to attack it.

Televised Interview of General Secretary Brezhnev,
October 5, 19761

I should like to emphasize that we judge the development of the international situation primarily by the extent to which it is possible to make progress in consolidating peace and eliminating the threat of nuclear war. In our view, definite positive results have been achieved in this area in recent years.

A great deal has been done to recognize the need for peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems. Clearcut principles on which coexistence should be built have been worked out. A number of important interstate documents, both bilateral and multilateral, have been signed on this score, including the Final Act of the allEuropean conference. Constructive cooperation in the economic, scientific-technical and cultural fields is being formed step by step.

But if these healthy trends are to become really irreversible, it is necessary to curb the arms race, to set a limit to it and then to turn it around. Otherwise, it is possible one fine day to lose much of what has been achieved as a result of great efforts.

In arms limitation, some things have been accomplished in recent years. However, what has been done can in no way be regarded as satisfactory.

We are surprised at the position that the governments of a number of Western countries are taking on this question. It seems that in words no one denies the importance of arms reduction but that in fact spokes are being put in the wheels, so to speak. Certain circles in Western countries are persistently spreading fictions about some kind of Soviet menace and capitalizing on the fear that they themselves are assiduously arousing.

Yes, the Soviet Union has impressive armed forces. But we declare precisely and clearly that the Soviet Union has never threatened anyone, is making no threats now, and is ready at any time to reduce its armed forces on a reciprocal basis.

We have been forced to improve our defenses-I repeat, we have been forced to-because we are confronted with an unbridled arms race. Now and then voices are heard to the effect that NATO "must be the strongest power in the world," that NATO as a whole should be building up its armaments and thereby exerting constant pressure on the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. That is what spurs on the arms race in today's world with such force.

If the level of the Soviet Armed Forces really disturbs anyone, then it would seem that the other side should have even more reason

1 Current Digest of the Soviet Press, vol. XXVIII, no. 40 (Nov. 3, 1976), pp. 3-4. The interview was given in the Kremlin to the French commentator Yves Mourousi.

'Department of State Bulletin, Sept. 1, 1975, pp. 323 ff.

to seriously get down to arms reduction and to advance step by step to a great goal-general disarmament. We are prepared to work out binding international agreements and have submitted concrete proposals on this score to the UN, particularly to the current General Assembly session, and at the Vienna talks. I shall not repeat them. I shall say only that the struggle against the arms buildup has become an urgent one. Therefore, it deserves the special attention of the top leaders of states.

In your questions, you mentioned the Helsinki conference.

On the whole, we can make a positive appraisal of what has been accomplished since the all-European conference. Good new forms of cooperation have come into being. The Soviet Union, basing its actions on the principles worked out in Helsinki, has concluded a number of important agreements with countries that participated in the conference. In particular, we can cite the agreement between the USSR and France on the prevention of the accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weaponry that was signed in July 1976.3

We have started the practice of giving notification about largescale military exercises and inviting foreign observers to attend them. This has substantial importance for strengthening trust among states.

However, everything is not going smoothly-far from it. Our attention is drawn to incessant attempts to distort the letter and spirit of the Final Act or call the whole Act into question. This is the handiwork of those who call for a return to the cold war, to tension. Such forces exist in the US, the FRG and other countries. Therefore, the struggle for implementation of the provisions of the Final Act is at the same time a struggle against relapses into the cold war, against the schemes of detente's opponents.

As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, we respect and are carrying out the accords reached in Helsinki in every way-I emphasize, in every way. The central element of these accords is everything that is connected with strengthening security and peace. But, needless to say, we do not in the least underestimate the importance of cooperation in the fields of the economy, science, technology, culture and information, in the development of people-to-people contacts and the implementation of confidence-building measures.

The Soviet Union advocates the pooling of efforts on an allEuropean basis to accomplish the vital tasks that face us in the fields of power engineering, transportation and environmental protection. Our proposals on this score are well known.

Thus, real facts show that the Soviet Union, displaying initiative and persistence, is, together with other socialist countries, making progress in the great work of implementing everything that was agreed upon in Helsinki. We shall continue to do so.

'Ante, p. 466.

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