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will, however, be prepared to hear further amplification of this issue. The second general issue, about which a number of delegations have indicated special concern, relates to the provisions for resolving problems that may arise in connexion with the operation of the convention and for dealing with possible violations. We recognize the importance of this issue. If the convention is to win the support of the international community, parties must have adequate confidence that other parties will observe their obligations.

The provisions in the draft concerning compliance include two separate and complementary procedures. First, all parties undertake to consult and co-operate in solving any problems which may arise in relation to the objectives of the convention or in the application of its provisions. Thus, parties have not only a right but an obligation to consult one another and to co-operate; this consultation and co-operation may also be undertaken through appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter. In our view, this procedure should provide an adequate means for solving most if not all differences that might arise between parties.

In addition, and independently of the consultation procedure, any party may lodge a complaint with the Security Council of the United Nations if it finds that any other State party is in breach of its obligations under the convention. In addition, all parties undertake to cooperate with any investigation which the Security Council may initiate. These undertakings establish a strong presumption that no party will take action to impede or obstruct such an investigation. We believe that these procedures satisfactorily meet the need of all parties to assure adequate confidence of compliance with the terms of the convention.

The third general issue that has been raised concerns the relationship between the draft environmental warfare convention and the draft protocols under discussion at the Diplomatic Conference on International Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts. Several delegations have suggested that the convention should be "harmonized" with those sections of the protocol that deal with protection of the natural environment. We, of course, agree that the convention and protocols should not be inconsistent and we believe the drafts as they stand are not. However, there is a clear distinction between them as to their intended areas of coverage and objectives.

The purpose of the pertinent sections of the Law of War protocols is to protect the natural environment from widespread, long-term, and severe damage caused by conventional means of warfare. These provisions must necessarily be somewhat restricted in their applicability since conventional military operations often unavoidably cause

3 The draft protocols can be found in document A/10195 of the U.N. General Assembly.

serious local damage to the environment. The purpose of the draft convention, on the other hand, is to prohibit the use of new techniques of warfare those which utilize the natural forces of the environment to produce widespread, long-lasting, or severe effects-so as to cause damage to another State party, including its population, assets, or natural resources. Accordingly, the relevant provisions of the draft convention can and should be much broader in scope than the protocols. Thus, since the convention and protocols serve different purposes and are addressed to different weapons, it seems appropriate to my delegation that they differ in their provisions and terminology.

The final major issue I wish to discuss today concerns the relationship between the draft environmental warfare convention and the use of environmental modification techniques for peaceful purposes. The preamble to the draft recognizes that use for peaceful purposes could improve the interrelationship of man and nature and contribute to the preservation and improvement of the environment for the benefit of present and future generations. Article III states that the provisions of the convention shall not hinder the peaceful use of environmental modification techniques or international co-operation in the utilization, preservation, and improvement of the environment for peaceful purposes. The intention of article III is to make clear that the convention does not impinge on or affect peaceful uses or any issues concerning their possible regulation. However, if other delegations find that the present wording can be interpreted as implying that the use of environmental modification techniques for peaceful purposes is not, or should not be, subject to international regulation, we would be ready to consider changes to remove that implication.

In connexion with peaceful uses of environmental modification techniques, it has been suggested that the convention should contain a positive commitment by parties to co-operate in the promotion of such uses, along the lines of article X of the Biological Weapons Convention. There is, however, no clear parallel between the peaceful uses of biological agents, notably for medical research, and the potential but as yet largely undeveloped peaceful use of environmental modification techniques. These techniques are still in a very early state, and it is not clear what benefits they will have or whether the benefits will outweigh any risks involved. We, therefore, think it only prudent in this convention not to commit parties to the encouragement and promotion of the development and use of environmental modification techniques. Having said that, I should point out that all United States research in the field of environmental modification is conducted on an unclassified basis, and there is absolutely no desire on our part not to share technical information. The issue, as we see it, is simply whether or not it is advisable to deal with the question of peaceful uses in this convention. We think not.

Documents on Disarmament, 1972, pp. 133-138.

Before concluding, I would like to mention another issue that was raised at the General Assembly last fall. It concerns article IV of the draft convention. It was indicated at the General Assembly that this article could be in need of clarification. As I noted at the time. the draft was tabled before the Committee, the purpose of article IV is simply to provide for the legal implementation of the convention within a State party, wherever this may be needed for the purpose of domestic law. We are fully prepared to consider suggestions for improving the language of this article in order to assure that its purpose is made clear.

These are our views on some of the issues that have been raised by other delegations. We look forward to further discussion of these and other issues as a means of developing a fuller understanding of the positions of government. Let me once more encourage all delegations having views on various aspects of the draft to state them as soon as possible during the spring session, thus furthering our work towards eventual agreement on a generally acceptable convention text.

Press Interview of Secretary of State Kissinger at Atlanta: Strategic Arms Limitation [Extract], March 6, 19761

Mr. Pruitt: Mr. Secretary, do you have any specific details about the Soviets cheating on SALT One, and what is the outlook for SALT Two?

Secretary Kissinger: There is no agency of the U.S. Government, no department of the U.S. Government, which holds the view that there were Soviet violations of the SALT One agreement. There exist, of course, in any agreement of this complexity, with military forces of this nature, various gray areas either of ambiguous technology or of ambiguous interpretation of the agreement.

None of these so far would affect the American national security. Nevertheless each of these cases is being energetically pursued; and those that have not yet been satisfactorily resolved will be put before the Standing Consultative Commission, which was established by the SALT One agreement, in order to deal with the issue of possible or alleged violations.

With respect to SALT Two, we believe that it is in the interest of the United States and in the interest of mankind that a ceiling be placed on the elaboration of armaments, the numbers of armaments, of a category that can already do catastrophic damage to the United States, the Soviet Union, and the rest of mankind.

Therefore we are prepared to make an agreement that puts a ceiling, an equal ceiling, on both sides. And we think that if such an agreement could be achieved it would be in the interest of both sides.

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We have made a proposal to the Soviet Union in response to ideas that the Soviets put before us which the Soviet Government is now considering. Until we have their response I cannot judge what the possibilities of agreement are.

But I would like to stress that our position has the unanimous support of all agencies of the government-the military, the arms control agency, and the State Department.

Statement by Secretary of State Kissinger Before the Senate Committee on Government Operations: Nuclear Proliferation, March 9, 19761

I welcome this opportunity to speak to you on the subject of nuclear proliferation-one of the most urgent problems facing the United States and the world community and one which will vitally affect the security of all nations for the rest of this century.

As the committee is aware, your concerns over the dangers posed by further nuclear proliferation are widely and deeply shared throughout the U.S. Government. To convey to you both the seriousness with which we view this issue and the steps we are taking to deal with the proliferation problem, I propose to address the following questions in my statement:

First, how does nonproliferation fit into the framework of our overall foreign policy?

Second, what multilateral efforts to deter proliferation have already been initiated, and what further measures do we contemplate?

Third, what actions are we taking as a matter of U.S. national policy to reinforce and extend our international nonproliferation activities?

Fourth, how do we assess the longer term prospects for containing further nuclear spread through an evolving diplomatic and technical strategy?

Before turning to these broader aspects of nonproliferation, I should note that I fully approve of the position on Senate bill 1439 set forth by Deputy Secretary Ingersoll before the committee. For the reasons outlined during his January 30 appearance, we cannot support this bill.2

Department of State Bulletin, Mar. 29, 1976, pp. 405-411.

2 For text of S. 1439, see Export Reorganization Act of 1976: Hearings before the Committee on Government Operations, United States Senate, Ninety-fourth Congress, Second Session, on 8. 1439, to Reorganize Certain Export Functions of the Federal Government to Promote More Efficient and Effective Administration of Such Functions, pp. 1255-1284. For Deputy Secretary of State Ingersoll's statement, see ibid., pp. 698-710.

NONPROLIFERATION PERSPECTIVES

Nonproliferation has been a primary foreign policy goal of the United States through six Administrations, with major accomplishments stemming from U.S. initiatives demonstrating the seriousness with which this policy has been pursued. I cite, for example, the adoption of bilateral safeguards and controls in our government-to-government cooperative agreements, the establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna, and the entering into force of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. As a result of these steps, the number of nuclear-weapon states has been substantially limited.

After I assumed the office of Secretary of State, however, it became apparent that changing circumstances warranted a new look at our nonproliferation strategy:

---Other industrialized states were entering the international nuclear market, thereby challenging our longstanding dominance as a commercial nuclear exporter and threatening to diminish the ultimate effect of our national safeguards and control policies.

-The oil crisis has stimulated many developing as well as developed states to accelerate their peaceful nuclear power programs, both as a means of lowering the cost of generating electrical energy and reducing their reliance on imported petroleum products.

-The nuclear test by India underscored the fact that additional states, even those not part of the highly industrialized world, were capable of using nuclear technology to construct explosives.

In my speech to the U.N. General Assembly in September of 1974, I underscored our concerns over the rapid spread of nuclear technology with potential explosive implications. I chose this forum to address the pressing problem of proliferation since it is clear that the danger of further nuclear-explosive spread is a problem vital to every nation on this planet. At that time, I warned against complacency by observing that:

The world has grown so accustomed to the existence of nuclear weapons that it assumes they will never be used. But today, technology is rapidly expanding the number of nuclear weapons in the hands of major powers and threatens to put nuclear-explosive technology at the disposal of an increasing number of other countries.*

Let me emphasize that pursuit of a vigorous nonproliferation strategy remains a fundamental dimension of this Administration's overall foreign policy:

-We see the need to reduce the danger of nuclear war as the centerpiece of our policy. If additional states acquired nuclear weapons,

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