IV. RECOMMENDATION OF THE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON THE INDIAN OCEAN

20. The Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean unanimously recommends to the General Assembly the adoption of the following draft resolution:

Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace

The General Assembly,

Recalling the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, contained in its resolution 2832 (XXVI) of 16 December 1971, and recalling also its resolutions 2992 (XXVII) of 15 December 1972,5 3080 (XXVIII) of 6 December 1973, 3259 A (XXIX) of 9 December 1974 and 3468 (XXX) of 11 December 1975,8

Reaffirming its conviction that concrete action in furtherance of the objectives of the Declaration would be a substantial contribution to the strengthening of international peace and security,

Noting the resolution adopted at the Fifth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries on the subject of the Indian Ocean Peace Zone Proposal,"

Deeply concerned that there has been an escalation of the military presence of the great Powers conceived in the context of great Power rivalry in the Indian Ocean, and believing therefore that the implementation of the purposes and objectives of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace has acquired a new urgency,

Regretting that, despite repeated invitations, certain great Powers as well as certain major maritime users of the Indian Ocean have not so far found it possible to co-operate with the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean and the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean,

1. Takes note of the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean,10 in particular section II thereof concerning the consultations entered into by the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean in pursuance of paragraphs 3 and 4 of General Assembly resolution 3468 (XXX);

2. Requests the Ad Hoc Committee and the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean to continue their consultations with a view to formulating a programme of action leading to the convening of a Conference on the Indian Ocean;

3. Renews its invitation to all States, in particular the great Powers and major maritime users of the Indian Ocean, to co-operate in a practical manner with the Ad Hoc Committee in the discharge of its functions;

4. Requests the Ad Hoc Committee to continue its work and consultations in accordance with its mandate and to submit to the General Assembly at its thirty-second session a report on its work;

5. Requests the Secretary-General to continue to render all necessary assistance to the Ad Hoc Committee, including the provision of summary records.

Statement by Under Secretary of State Habib to the Subcommittee on International Political and Military Affairs of the House International Relations Committee: Arms Transfer Policy [Extracts], September 21, 19761

Mr. Chairman, I am particularly happy to have this opportunity to discuss with the members of the International Political and Military Affairs Subcommittee the important role of arms transfers in our foreign relations with friendly and allied governments.

The occasion for this meeting is of course your consideration of the notifications before the Congress of our intention, in response to request from 14 foreign governments, to provide a variety of military equipment and defense services. The total value of these proposed sales is over $6 billion, a figure that has naturally attracted considerable notice and comment. The figure is an impressive one, but I believe we can place it in better perspective through an examination of its component parts. Before turning to the specific cases before you, however, I would like to make one general comment that applies to all of them.

That is, as we know from hard experience, it simply costs a vast amount more today to erect an adquate defense than it did 20 or even 5 years ago. Not only does sophistication add substantially to the price, but there is a constant rise in costs owing to inflation. In the early 1950's when our security assistance program almost wholly consisted of grants, we provided allies with equipment worth about $5 billion a year; in today's prices that would be well over $10 billion a year-higher than today's sales figures. So, from the inflationary point of view alone, the dollar values of today's arms transfers are not out of line with those of earlier periods.

1 Proposed Foreign Military Sales to Middle Eastern Countries-1976: Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Political and Military Affairs of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, Ninetyfourth Congress, Second Session, pp. 67, 69–71.

More significantly, the actual number of weapons systems transferred is smaller in many cases because of the high unit cost of sophisticated weapons. As an example, the most modern jet fighter available in the 1950's would have cost about $700,000 in fiscal year 1975 dollars; today's most modern jets cost 10 or 15 times that figure. The cost of even far less exotic hardware, such as tanks, has more than doubled owing to increasing sophistication. In short, because of both inflation and sophistication a billion dollars buys far less arms than in earlier years.

Before concluding, Mr. Chairman, I would like to make some general remarks about the background of these proposed sales. I can assure you that we are very much aware of the criticism that has been directed at our decisionmaking on arms sales. I would like to stress that the proposed sales that are before you have been subjected to a thorough review process and decided on their own individual merits. We have not relaxed our standards in deciding whether or not to sell military equipment abroad. Indeed, both the Department of State and Defense view their primary responsibility as regulating and managing sales programs, not promoting them.

The review process begins generally in the field where our military missions and our Embassies first receive an indication of foreign interest in a U.S. defense article or service. Our people are not salesmen and do not push the sales of weapons abroad; rather they work with their foreign counterparts when possible to assure that estimates of national defense requirements are accurate and reasonable. Thus, frequently a foreign nation's desire for a particular system is either reduced in number or delayed in time following the advice of our personnel. On many occasions, we have been successful in persuading foreign counterparts that a particular glamorous system is not appropriate to their requirements. Our arms industry-like our agriculture and our other advanced technology industries-happens to be the best in the world. We not only manufacture the best planes, ships, and other systems, we provide better training and more reliable logistical support. We do not seek to force arms sales on others. Our products are sought by modernizing states. Further, this preference for dealing with the United States indicates a confidence in the United States as a responsible world power whose policies are directed toward the goals of peace and stability, rather than disruption, subversion, or the stimulation of conflicts.

When a request is relayed by our military missions or Embassies to Washington, it is carefully studied in the Departments of State, Defense, ACDA, and other agencies. A large number of factors are evaluated, but a crucial factor is the role the country plays, its rela

tionship to U.S. interests in its area and how our response will affect the furtherance of our specific policy goals and our own national interests. Let me emphasize that we do not sell arms unless there is a very substantial area of policy congruence-particularly security policy-between ourselves and the recipient. All of the nations which we are discussing today can meet that standard.

Among the other factors in our predecision review, we examine whether the introduction of a new military system would affect the regional security balance or perhaps stimulate other requests from neighboring countries that would lead to imbalances. We also have to examine realistically the alternative sources of supply that the country may have and whether a refusal on our part to sell a particular system would simply result in another supplier-for example, the Soviet Union-making the sale.

The desire for modern arms by our friends and allies is understandable when they see potential adversaries well supplied with modern hardware by the Soviet Union and its friends. The continuing efforts by the Soviets to provide weapons to its friends have added to the sense of insecurity of many friendly governments. Iraq, for example, which has less than a third of Iran's population, has a rough equivalency in number of Soviet-supplied modern tanks and aircraft. As we have seen in widely scattered areas, the Soviet Union is not constrained in the supply of weapons to its friends.

In our review process, we are not governed by U.S. balance-ofpayment considerations. The sale and its relation to our broad national interests are dominant. But economic and social factors are taken into account. A proposed sale is vetted in terms of the country's development goals and its ability to finance the particular system.

We have to make a clear judgment that the supply of a system to a foreign country would not weaken the readiness of our own forces. In addition, we weigh the threat to be countered or deterred, and the burden that a new system would place on the foreign nation's ability to absorb new equipment. The value of our defense cooperation with the proposed recipient country is of importance. We have to calculate how a positive or negative decision on a proposed sale might affect any special interests, such as access to facilities or air space rights, that we may enjoy with the recipient country.

Finally, except in special circumstances, we do not sell or otherwise transfer certain sensitive items which would tend to weaken our technological lead or which we feel it otherwise inappropriate to sell to foreign nations. There have been a number of cases in which we have refused to sell arms to our friends, although for obvious reasons, these do not normally make the headlines nor do we seek to publicize them to the detriment of our relations.

Statements by ACDA Director Iklé to the Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Organizations, and Security Agreements of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: United States Nuclear Policy Toward the Republic of China, and Development of Mini-Nukes [Extracts], September 22, 19761

Mr. IKLÉ. Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, it is a pleasure for me to appear before you today. I understand that these hearings are concerned with the question of whether or to what extent, the Republic of China-on Taiwan-has started to separate plutonium from spent nuclear reactor fuel by chemical reprocessing. I have been informed of the intelligence briefing that you have received on this matter, and I would like to comment now on those aspects in which the Arms Control Agency is directly involved.

NPT OBLIGATIONS OF REPUBLIC OF CHINA

The Republic of China ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1970. By becoming a party to this treaty, it assumed the obligation not to develop or otherwise obtain any nuclear explosive device and not to seek any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear explosive devices. Also, the treaty obligates the Republic of China to accept the safeguard system, as it is called, of the International Atomic Energy Agency-IAEA-on plutonium and uranium for all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory or under its control.

Senator SYMINGTON. The statement says the "so-called safeguard system."

Dr. IKLÉ. The meaning I want to convey is better expressed the way I just put it. It really means quotation marks around safeguard system because it has a special technical meaning. It is often capitalized, Mr. Chairman. But the treaty does not prohibit the reprocessing of spent fuel or the accumulation of plutonium.

REPROCESSING SPENT FUEL AND ACCUMULATING PLUTONIUM

Senator CASE. I read this statement before. I hate to interrupt and I won't if you or Dr. Iklé would rather continue. One particular thing struck me right hard. Is this an interpretation that our Government has put on this agreement, or is it your own personal one?

It seems on the face that either "reprocessing spent fuel or the accumulation of plutonium" is a step in obtaining a nuclear explosive device which is specifically prohibited by the treaty.

Why do you say that they are not violating the treaty when they do this?

1

1 Nonproliferation Issues: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Organizations, and Security Agreements of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Ninety-fourth Congress, First and Second Sessions, on Nonproliferation Issues, pp. 346–352, 357–359.

2

For treaty text, see Documents on Disarmament, 1968, pp. 461-465.