I have the impression, however, that the conclusion of a CTB. together with other measures in the field of nuclear arms control and disarmament, is not enough appreciated by the two Powers as being highly important for the rest of the world, influencing decisions by other countries. In this connexion I may mention the adherence to the non-proliferation treaty. Of course, I do not say that a CTB will save for always the NPT. It can only be one of the many steps necessary to make this treaty viable in the long run. But a CTB is in any case necessary in the process of diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in the world. Notwithstanding the improvement in international relations between the two main Powers, they seem to be so obsessed by each other, trying to match each other in all kinds of ways, starting new strategic nuclear weapon systems which cost billions of dollars or roubles, that they do not realize sufficiently what influence their attitude could have on the rest of the world. The NPT-Review Conference gave already a clear indication of this state of affairs, which may have grave consequences. I do not underestimate the problems involved in arms control and disarmament: we will know that these are complicated and difficult. But if the arms race continues, disaster can be the only end-product to be expected.

Statement by the Nigerian Representative (Clark) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Arms Transfers [Extract], August 3, 19761

I regret that today I cannot go into any detailed reply to the recent call by Mr. Iklé of the United States delegation for a debate on the conventional arms trade. I can only say now that the government promotion of arms exports has not come from the developing countries. Arms exporters know the purposes and benefits of the trade more than the importers. Needless to say that the political, military and economic implications of the traffic are better calculated by countries that claim to have world-wide responsibilities and spheres of influence which are supported by military might. The insecurity and restlessness of the newly independent countries are known to have been stirred up by external Powers in order to stimulate armament expenditures. To this end, one newly-independent country has been played off against another, and internal discussions and disaffections fuelled and fanned, not to mention armament manufacturers bribing government officials so as to increase the sales of arms. After all, who authorize and licence the export of arms from one country to another but Governments?

1CCD/PV.717, pp. 25-26.

2 Ante, pp. 497-501.

Who gain from the balance-of-payment earnings from arms sales and therefore nurture economic and industrial environment necessary for the research, development and production of advanced-technology weapons but Governments? Who peddle the sales of weapons with an eye to serving their foreign-policy and global-security objectives but Governments? And which Governments are these? Are they the governments of the rich, industrial countries or those of the poor developing countries which only seek arms to defend their national independence and sovereignty and to safeguard their internal public order and security. The "merchants of death" today are not the Sir Basil Zaharoffs but Governments and government-sponsored multinational corporations after power and profits.

Furthermore, it will be a sorry day if the doctrine is allowed to gain ground that the CCD should no longer concern itself with nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, and that because of the increase, albeit lamentable, in the international trade in conventional weapons it should concern itself with negotiation of agreements on conventional weapons only. Nor will another version of that doctrine be tolerated, which says that only nuclear-weapon States count. For this will be an open and reckless invitation to the proliferation of nuclear weapons throughout the world. It does not make sense to equate the dangers of nuclear weapons and those of conventional weapons. I had better stop here. Perhaps it would be better to give some time to the consideration of the United States proposal. Meanwhile, I revert to the Mid-Term Review exercise.

Nigerian Working Paper Submitted to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Conclusions of the Mid-Term Review of the Disarmament Decade, August 3, 19761

A. Valuation and Assessment of the Tasks and Duties of the CCD During the Disarmament Decade

1. The continuing diversion of human and material resources from peaceful economic and social pursuits to military and armament purposes is contrary to the purposes and objectives of the Disarmament Decade.

2. The CCD, while acknowledging that during the review period some progress has been made in reaching agreements on collateral measures of disarmament, is concerned at the meagre achievements of the Disarmament Decade in terms of truly effective disarmament and arms limitation agreements under strict and effective international control.

1CCD/510, Aug. 3,,1976.

3. The primary obligation of the CCD during the Disarmament Decade remains the adoption of a comprehensive programme dealing with all aspects and priorities of the problem of the cessation of the arms race and general and complete disarmament under effective international control so as to negotiate specific arms control and disarmament agreements, particularly in the field of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, beginning with CTB and CWB. 4. The CCD, having adopted a comprehensive programme and viable method of work, should decide upon a precise time-table and schedule for the consideration and negotiation of specific instruments, bearing in mind relevant United Nations General Assembly resolutions, such as res. 2661C (XXV), and all proposals on specific issues already put before it.

5. The CCD should forge closer links with the United Nations General Secretariat in order to fulfil its responsibilities to the United Nations more efficiently.

B. Action To Be Taken This Session

The CCD should decide that it will work out at its 1977 Spring Session

a comprehensive programme dealing with all aspects of the problem of the cessation of the Arms Race and General and Complete Disarmament under effective international control, which would provide the Conference with a guideline to chart the course of its further work and its negotiations

and

to accelerate the pace of its efforts to negotiate truly effective disarmament and arms limitation agreements.

Soviet Draft Agreement on the Prohibition of the Development and Manufacture of New Types of Weapons of Mass Destruction and New Systems of Such Weapons, August 3, 19761

The States Parties to this Agreement,

Guided by the interests of strengthening international peace and security,

Desiring to contribute to saving mankind from the danger of the use of new means of warfare, to limiting the arms race and to bringing about disarmament,

Recognizing that modern science and technology have reached a level where a serious danger arises of the development of new, still more destructive types of weapons of mass destruction and of new systems of such weapons,

Documents on Disarmament, 1970, pp. 682-683.

1CCD/511, Aug. 3, 1976. The draft convention was submitted to the CCD.

Conscious that the development and manufacture of such weapons are fraught with the most serious consequences for the peace and security of nations,

Bearing in mind that recent years have seen the conclusion of a number of important agreements concerning limitation of the arms race and disarmament, including those related to the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction,

Expressing the profound interest of States and peoples in the adoption of measures to prevent the use of the achievements of modern science and technology for the development and manufacture of the above-mentioned weapons of mass destruction,

Desiring to promote the strengthening of confidence among nations. and the further improvement of the international situation,

Seeking to contribute to the realization of the lofty purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

Having agreed on the following:

ARTICLE I

1. Each State Party to this Agreement undertakes not to develop or manufacture new types of weapons of mass destruction or new systems of such weapons, including those utilizing the latest achievements of modern science and technology. New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons shall include: (to be specified through negotiations on the subject).

2. In the event that new areas of development and manufacture of weapons of mass destruction and systems of such weapons not covered by this Agreement emerge after the entry into force of the Agreement, the Parties shall conduct negotiations with a view to extending the prohibition provided for in this Agreement to cover such potential new types and systems of weapons.

3. Each State Party to this Agreement undertakes not to assist, encourage or induce any other State, group of States or international organizations to engage in activities contrary to the provisions of paragraph 1 of this article.

ARTICLE II

Each State Party to this Agreement undertakes, in accordance with its constitutional procedures, to take the necessary measures to prohibit and prevent any activities contrary to the provisions of this Agreement, within the territory of such State or in any territory under its jurisdiction or under its control, wherever it may be.

ARTICLE III

1. In the event that any State Party to this Agreement has any suspicions that another State Party has violated the provisions of

this Agreement, the Parties concerned undertake to consult one another and co-operate in solving the problems which arise.

2. If the consultations referred to in paragraph 1 of this article fail to produce results mutually acceptable to the Parties concerned, the State which has such suspicions may lodge a complaint with the Security Council of the United Nations. Such complaint must include evidence confirming its validity, as well as a request for its consideration by the Security Council.

3. Each State Party to this Agreement undertakes to co-operate in carrying out any investigation which the Security Council may initiate, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, on the basis of the complaint received by the Council. The Security Council shall inform the States Parties to the Agreement of the results of the investigation.

4. Each State Party to this Agreement undertakes to provide or support assistance, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, to any State Party to the Agreement which so requests, if the Security Council decides that such State Party has been exposed to danger as a result of violation of the Agreement.

ARTICLE IV

1. Nothing in this Agreement shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the States Parties to the Agreement to develop and use scientific reseach and discoveries exclusively for peaceful purposes without any discrimination.

2. The States Parties to this Agreement undertake to facilitate scientific and technological co-operation in the use of the latest achievements and discoveries of science and technology for peaceful

purposes.

ARTICLE V

Each State Party to this Agreement undertakes to pursue in good faith negotiations on effective measures to limit the arms race in all its forms and put an end to it, as well as on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

ARTICLE VI

1. Any State Party may propose amendments to this Agreement. Each proposed amendment shall be submitted to the depositary Governments and circulated by them to all Parties to the Agreement, which shall inform the depositary Governments of acceptance or rejection as soon as possible after its receipt.

2. The amendment shall enter into force for each State Party accepting the amendment upon its acceptance by a majority of the States Parties to the Agreement, including the depositary Governments, and thereafter for each remaining State Party on the date of its acceptance of the amendment.