Senator SYMINGTON. Now, I have three more questions I would like to ask you, Dr. Iklé, and may I respect fully compliment you for your tolerance, but this subject, in my opinion, transcends in importance any other subject that is being discussed anywhere about the future of civilization.

SHIPMENT OF ENRICHED FUEL TO INDIA

As you know, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has held public hearings on the shipment of enriched fuel to India for the Tarapur reactor.

Should the United States insist on any further control if the requested fuel is provided?

Mr. IKLÉ. Well, in a way, that is the point we have addressed in a more narrow sense regarding the desirability of working out measures to prevent the accumulation of plutonium containing spent fuel at Tarapur. So I really would come back to what we discussed a minute ago, namely, the desirability of working out the arrangement for the return of this spent fuel, which doesn't require a leasing arrangement, but which can be done in other ways, so long as we can have the plutonium containing spent fuel returned or otherwise prevent its accumulation.

Senator JAVITS. I will give you the questions very promptly, but I did not wish to duplicate what my colleagues may have done, so it is necessary to do it after this hearing.

One question I would like to ask you is kind of a generic question which you, I am sure, can answer. It really divides itself into three

parts.

PEACEFUL NUCLEAR ASSISTANCE: CONTROLS, RISK, AND ABUSE

One, can we really effectively control other nations to whom we sell nuclear materials for peaceful purposes, and what is the parameter of risk that we have to take if we are going to engage in this business at all under present circumstances?

Second, have we an effective enough early warning system if anybody abuses the privilege, i.e., India? Or, you know, the finger of suspicion points to other nations as well, the new ones that are getting nuclear material and those who have before.

And item 3, what should we do about it, that is, even if the finger of suspicion pointed or there is a breach, what should we do about it? Mr. IKLÉ. Senator, the answer to your first question, can we really control other nations from misusing the peaceful nuclear assistance, or what are the parameters of the risk, as you put it, is that we have quite a better understanding of this risk than we had ten to twenty

years ago, and it is for this reason that we are trying to change the regulations concerning the export controls, shipments and transfer of technology.

Happily, the most important peaceful nuclear uses, the power reactor for generating electric power, particularly the ones based on the American technology, are relatively more easily controlled, particularly if the fuel, once used in the reactor, is not permitted to be accumulated, and if we can prevent the fissionable material, the plutonium, from being separated. It is for this reason that we are adamant against reprocessing facilities.

Now, in the future, new technology may become available, and it may become available to a large number of countries, because an increasingly large number of countries will have the means themselves to develop this technology. So in the long run, all we can do is to gain time, and try to maintain political incentives for many countries not to develop nuclear arms, which is really the key.

Your second question is almost a more troublesome one: Do we have an effective way to get early warning? And that really raises the question as to the effectiveness not only of the International Atomic Energy Agency's safeguard system, in which the question of early warning becomes very doubtful once you begin to accumulate these materials because they could be quickly slipped into the shells of weapons, so to speak, which had been prepared beforehand. That is, there could be a quick transition from the safeguarded material to the arsenal.

But it also raises the question of our intelligence capability, which is so important in this non-proliferation area. In this connection, it has been a matter of grave concern to me that over the last few years we have had so much turbulence concerning our intelligence organizations, that some of the approaches upon which we have to rely in this area have become jeopardized. We have been urging Members of Congress to pay attention to this problem, so that we do not make ourselves blind and deaf in this area. We want to improve the intelligence organizations, and we want to make sure that everything is legal and constitutional, but we must not trim things down to such an extent that we can no longer get this early warning that you asked about, Senator.

Senator JAVITS. And what about the third question? What can we do about it, even if we had early warning?

Mr. IKLÉ. We have to work on many fronts, really, and it depends on the situation in the country. Is it an ally of ours? If there is an alliance, perhaps we can use that relationship to dissuade the country from going ahead if we have early warning.

It is worthy to note that most of the countries that are perhaps on the fringe of moving toward a nuclear weapons capability are also on the fringe of our alliance system, or are not tied into an alliance system at all; and in particular cases, maybe there are other disincentives that could be mobilized before the final decision is taken.

Senator PERCY. I have gone back over the chronology of our contacts with India, and there seems to have been during the course, a difference of opinion between the government of India and the government of the United States. It does appear that India used some U.S. supplied heavy water to produce the plutonium for the explosion in 1974.

Do you consider the use of our heavy water in this way to be a violation of our 1956 contract with India which required that the heavy water be used only for "peaceful purposes"?

Mr. IKLÉ. If the heavy water was used for the manufacture of material for the nuclear explosion, it would be a violation of our agreement. as we understand it. Unfortunately, we did not make this particular understanding explicit at the beginning. This is one of the things we have learned only over time.

Senator PERCY. When they disagreed with our statements that explosions of any type are non-peaceful, did we come to grips with India. at that time to sharpen and clarify our differences, or did it slide over until the explosion actually occurred?

Mr. IKLÉ. We did notify the Indian government, I believe it was in 1970, again, that our interpretation of peaceful uses did not permit any nuclear explosion. Of course, it is also clear in our obligation under the Non-Proliferation Treaty to which I referred to earlier. But the heavy water, of course, Senator, as you probably recall, was furnished in the mid-50s, in 1955, and incidentally, with the very active participation of Congress.

I have heard it said recently that there was a deal made by the Administration secretly to give heavy water to India. Yet when the heavy water was given, there was a Congressional delegation in India urging the Administration to speed up the delivery.

ANSWERS OF DR. IKLE TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS OF SENATOR

SPARKMAN

Question 1. What is your position as to whether India should be granted permission by the United States, as allowed under our Agreement for Cooperation, to reprocess the plutonium from the spent fuel of the United States-supplied Tarapur reactors?

Answer. In my view, the preferred solution to this problem would be an arrangement whereby the USG would buy back from the Indian Government the spent fuel from the Tarapur reactors, as contemplated in the U.S.-Indian agreement for cooperation.

Question 2. Do you believe that IAEA safeguards are now adequate to detect on a timely basis any diversion of separated plutonium in India for weapons purposes??

7

For IAEA safeguards, see Documents on Disarmament, 1961, pp. 21–34; ibid., 1965, pp. 446-460.

Answer. I believe that IAEA safeguards currently in effect are adequate to detect on a timely basis the diversion of significant quantities of special fissionable materials from peaceful uses in the Tarapur reactors. None of that material currently exists in the form of separated plutonium.

Question 3. Section 10 of S. 1439 seeks agreement among the suppliers for cooperative provision of fuel enrichment, fabrication and reprocessing service under international safeguards. Do you agree with this objective? Is the United States actively seeking such arrangements?

Answer. Cooperative provision of nuclear fuel services is an idea which is presently being explored by the U.S. Government and by the international community, most especially in conjunction with the IAEA Regional Nuclear Fuel-Cycle Center Study, proposed by Secretary Kissinger and Director General Eklund and actively supported by the U.S.

Question 4. Should the nuclear suppliers establish, as S. 1439 urges, minimum physical security standards protecting against theft and sabotage?

Answer. The general principles of such minimum physical security standards have already been recommended by the IAEA, and are published as The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, IAEA Document INFCIRC/225 (1975). Moreover, these principles have already been endorsed by all nuclear supplier governments, and major suppliers are now including provisions, in their nuclear cooperation agreements to specifically require adequate levels of physical security systems in recipient countries for the protection of nuclear materials and equipment.

Question 5. Do you agree with the concept set forth in S. 1439 of an international mechanism for enforcement of security standards for recovery of stolen nuclear materials, and for dealing with saboteurs and thieves?

Answer. The U.S. Government has proposed on several occasions the development of an international convention on the physical protection of nuclear materials, and is currently working with the IAEA and with other concerned governments to this end.

Question 6. Should there be an international mechanism, as the bill urges, for recovering nuclear materials, technology, components or facilities from a country which willfully violates international safeguards?

Answer. The U.S. Government believes that it would be impossible to define in advance all the possible problems and the means of coping with them, which may exist in this context. To do as the bill suggests might undermine our flexibility and thus prove counterproductive. International arrangements on this subject already are in existence.

however, to deal with certain aspects of this question, namely, provisions of U.S. agreements for cooperation, IAEA safeguards agreements, the Statute of the IAEA, and the Charter of the United Nations.

Question 7. Section 10 of S. 1439 urges the United States and other suppliers to agree to prohibit the transfer to any individual nonnuclear weapons country of any technology, component or facility capable of enrichment, fabricating or reprocessing special fissionable material. Do you agree with this objective?

Answer. I would agree that agreement among supplier governments to halt future transfers of such sensitive technologies to States which presently have no such facilities would be desirable if it could be achieved. The U.S. Government has consistently refused to engage in such exports and hopes that other governments will emulate this example.

Question 8. Section 10 would request the President to seek agreement with the other suppliers not to make nuclear transfers to any nonnuclear weapons country which does not agree to full IAEA safeguards on all peaceful nuclear activities and undertakes not to acquire nuclear weapons. Do you agree with the objective? Is this consistent with present United States policy?

Answer. Such an agreement, if it could be achieved, would be both acceptable and consistent with present U.S. Government policy, so long as our present supply commitments were not retrospectively affected.

Message From President Ford Transmitting to the Senate the Treaties Between the United States and the Soviet Union on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Explosions, July 29, 19761

To the Senate of the United States:

With a view to receiving the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification, I transmit herewith the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests, and the Protocol thereto, referred to as the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTB Treaty),2 and the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes, and the Protocol thereto (PNE Treaty).3 The TTBT was signed in Moscow on July 3, 1974 and the PNE Treaty was signed in Washington and Moscow on May 28, 1976. For the information of the

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Aug. 2, 1976, pp. 1222–1223. 2 Documents on Disarmament, 1974, pp. 225-229.

3 Ante, pp. 328-348.