the recess-time will give the Western delegations an opportunity to reconsider these problems and will enable them to take a more realistic position.

Finally, I would like to underline once again that the Socialist participants' position has created conditions in which the progress in the Vienna negotiations is possible. Now, we look forward for a more constructive and active attitude of the Western states.

Question-and-Answer Session with Secretary of State Kissinger: Nuclear Exports and Controlling the Arms Race [Extracts], July 22, 19761

Q. Dr. Kissinger, my question is: In the light of the recent nuclearweapons-making capability, please explain your position on the export of nuclear materials.

Secretary Kissinger: The danger of nuclear proliferation arises from the fact that, with the energy crisis, nuclear energy has become economical-in fact, essential-therefore a market for many countries that can produce nuclear reactors all over the globe. Most of these nuclear reactors, as a byproduct, produce materials that, either directly or through reprocessing, can be turned into fissionable materials.

Therefore the problem is how, short of prohibiting the export of nuclear reactors-which none of the nuclear suppliers seems to be ready to accept one can establish safeguards that inhibit nuclear proliferation.

Now, this is a very difficult process. Our policy has been that we will not sell processing plants which will enable countries to reprocess the material that emerges from nuclear reactors into fissionable material suitable for explosives. Other countries have not followed this approach, and we have brought a considerable amount of pressure to prevent the spreading of reprocessing plants.

We have also created or invited countries to join a suppliers conference, in which countries that are supplying nuclear materials or nuclear reactors would agree on common safeguards so that the nations of the world do not compete with each other in easing safeguards in order to do nuclear business. This conference has made considerable progress, but the rate of the spread of these nuclear reactors is such that it becomes extremely difficult to prevent the capabilities of the countries receiving them in the nuclear field from growing.

It is a problem to which we have given the highest priority attention, in which we are making a major effort, in which we will continue to make a major effort, and which we hope we can get under increasing control.

1

1 Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 16, 1976, pp. 226, 228.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, my question to you is: Beyond the limitations created by SALT on strategic-weapons delivery systems, what new initiatives can the United States take to reduce the global arms race? And second, how long can bilateral deterrence provide global security in an increasingly multipolar world? 2

Secretary Kissinger: Of course, the most important negotiation is the one of strategic arms limitations that is now going on in Geneva, which attempts to put a ceiling on the strategic arms race and which, in its next phase, will attempt to turn it down and reduce the strategic

armaments.

In addition, we are engaged in negotiations for the reduction of forces in Central Europe, which also attempt to ease the burden of arms in those areas.

The third area in which arms competition creates problems is in such areas as the Middle East, where there are large resources and many arms suppliers and on top of it many contentious parties—and parties whose own differences among each other seem to them to outweigh the requirements of global peace very often. Now, in that area, how to control the shipment of arms into an area like the Middle East is a matter to which we must give increasing attention.

I would point out, however, a number of serious problems here. The shipment of arms among Arab countries is relatively easy, while Israel has only one country from which it can acquire arms. So until about five years ago, it used to be thought that if the shipment of arms could be limited into the Arab states bordering Israel, one could get some through. But the fact of the matter is that arms now move with increasing ease among these various countries, as we have seen recently in Lebanon, and therefore the problem of controlling the international arms trade must reach all of the suppliers and all of the possible recipients and also those countries that could transfer arms among each other and therefore strengthen one of the sides in the region. That is an important issue to which we have to turn.

Press Interview of Secretary of State Kissinger: Arms Sales to Oil-Producing Countries [Extract], July 22, 19761

Q. Mr. Secretary, how can a rise in the price of oil by the oil-producing countries be prevented by other means than trading in armaments? Secretary Kissinger: Well, I don't think that the trade in armaments is a device to prevent a rise in oil prices. I think it results from

2 The SALT agreements have been published in Documents on Disarmament, 1972. pp. 197–205.

the rise in oil prices that has already occurred, because it gives the oilproducing countries enormously large resources with which to purchase either industrial goods or armaments-if that's what they choose. So the basic problem is not that we are trying to prevent a rise in oil prices by selling armaments.

The fact is that having already achieved such tremendous surpluses as a result of the oil prices that have occurred since 1973, the oilproducing countries can enter the international market and buy armaments. And if they don't get them from us, they get them from other countries. And it isn't in our interest.

Our purpose in selling arms, when we do, is not to prevent a rise in prices but in order to prevent other countries from gaining the position of influence that often comes with the sale of arms.

Statement by the Soviet Representative (Likhatchev) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Chemical Weapons, July 22, 19761

Mr. Chairman, the Soviet delegation intends to express its ideas in connexion with the mid-term review of the Disarmament Decade at the next plenary meeting of our Committee. In today's statement we consider it necessary to touch upon some aspects of the problem of prohibiting chemical weapons, and also to put forward a number of considerations which, in our view, arise from the results of the unofficial meetings recently held on this question by the Committee on Disarmament with the participation of technical experts.

We are witnessing noticeably increased activity on the Committee's part in examining the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons one of the important problems of disarmament. It is to be hoped that the increased interest shown both by countries members of the Committee and by other countries, which are not members, in examining this question will help to speed up the achievement of a solution to the problem of prohibiting chemical weapons.

In contrast to some previous sessions of the Committee, no special difficulties have arisen in the course of the present discussion in examining questions concerning the delimitation of the scope of the prohibition. The majority of representatives, while recognizing the possibility of a step-by-step approach, have nevertheless expressed the view that a total prohibition of chemical weapons is the most acceptable one for their countries. We note with satisfaction that differences of principle on this question, on which the final outcome of all the

1CCD/PV. 714, pp. 28–31.

work on the prohibition of chemical weapons depends, have been significantly reduced.

We note in particular the rapprochement of views on the definition of the chemical agents to be prohibited under the agreement. It seems to us that the discussions which have taken place afford every justification for stating that the approach to this question in terms of the criterion of general purpose has won universal recognition. In our opinion, an identity of view has also emerged to the effect that, in the step-by-step approach to the prohibition of chemical weapons, the criterion of toxicity should be accepted as a supplementary criterion.

We consider it necessary to point out that the Soviet Union has always advocated, and still advocates, a complete and general prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and the destruction of stocks thereof. The draft convention submitted by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries in 1972 (CCD/361) is based specifically on this position of principle. That document was the starting-point for a purposeful discussion, in the Committee on Disarmament, of the question of an all-embracing prohibition of chemical weapons, and retains its force to this day.2

At the same time the Soviet Union, prompted by the desire to promote in every way the earliest possible attainment of the goal of prohibiting chemical weapons, has displayed its readiness to accept the idea of some countries for a step-by-step approach to the solution of the problem through prohibition, as a first step, of the most dangerous and lethal chemical means of waging war.

In the meetings which the Committee held with experts participating, an important place was given to the question of verifying compliance with the obligations which would be assumed by States parties to the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

In this connexion, allow me to remind you of the formula on the subject of verification of the prohibition of chemical weapons which appears in General Assembly resolution 2662 (XXV) of 7 December 1970, namely that

verification should be based on a combination of appropriate national and international measures, which would complement and supplement each other, thereby providing an acceptable system that would ensure the effective implementation of the prohibition.3

The system of control envisaged by the socialist countries in their draft convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, which includes national control in combination with international procedures (CCD/361 and CCD/4034), is consistent with that recommendation and realistic.

The possibilities of national control-as was demonstrated, in particular, by the Soviet experts during the meetings held at the current session—are sufficiently broad and are based on scientific methods

of analysis. These include physical, chemical, biological and certain other methods, each of which is elucidated in sufficient detail in the scientific and technical literature. The effectiveness of individual methods is so high that it is possible to record the presence in a sample of exceedingly small quantities of a substance. Magnitudes of the order of a few picogrammes-that is, a few trillionths of a gramme-were mentioned here. There has also been a qualitative increase in the analytical possibilities of control in recent years, when new generations of computers have presented extensive facilities for the storage and processing of varied information.

An essential element of control over the implementation of the convention will undoubtedly be the analysis of statistical data on the production and consumption of the raw materials and semi-products on the basis of which the production of agents for military purposes is organized. Here too there are very great possibilities. They are buttressed by substantial progress in mathematical methods of analysis based on existing computer technology.

Scientific and technical progress over the last four years-that is to say, over the time that has elapsed since the introduction by the socialist countries of their draft convention-has, in our view, confirmed for all to see the realistic nature of the proposal for national control, which could be put into practice by enlisting specially established national control committees. The capabilities of such committees are sufficiently broad, and their activity can be sufficiently effective, in particular, because the various instruments, reagents and computers needed for control purposes are already in serial production. Taking into account the uninterrupted progress of science and technology, it may be assumed that the level of equipment of the committees with up-to-date technology will rise steadily.

According to the working papers submitted at the present session and the statements which have been made, some countries are conducting research into the possibility of control by national meansfor example, with the aid of instrumental methods or extraterritorial long-range facilities. In particular Finland, which has submitted in working paper CCD/501 the results of its experiments on chemical and physico-chemical analysis for the purpose of verifying the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical agents, has advanced well founded arguments concerning the effectiveness of national means of control. Some members of the Committee on Disarmament have also come forward with practical considerations concerning national means of verification. The socialist countries' idea of national control is gaining more and more recognition here and, if anyone proposes to refine or weigh anything in this plan, we shall approach this with due attention and respect. However, as Ambassador Herder, the representative of the German Democratic Republic, quite rightly remarked at the meeting of the Committee on Disarmament held on 6 July 1976, exaggerated refinement of control could lead only