peaceful purposes, and others. The Soviet delegation proposes to present the position of the USSR on these matters at later meetings of the Committee on Disarmament.

Aware of the urgent need to solve a broad range of disarmament problems, the Soviet Union will make efforts to achieve progress in the negotiations on those problems. In this context the Soviet side is fully aware that the arms race has still not been stopped, that it is continuing as regards both the development of even more destructive means of warfare and building up of the total mass of armaments. What is required in order to reverse this trend are efforts, good will and willingness to reach agreements on disarmament matters on the part of a broad range of States, and especially the nuclear Powers. The Soviet Union is hopeful that the members of the Committee on Disarmament will make every effort and take proper measures to make discussion of the problems of arms race limitation and disarmament in the Committee effective and to ensure that it results in new international agreements which will contribute to materialization of the process of international détente.

Statement by the United States Representative (Martin) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Environmental Modification [Extract], February 17, 19761

Last fall the General Assembly, in its resolution 3475 (XXX), requested the CCD to seek early agreement on the text of a convention on the prohibition of military and other hostile uses of environmental modification techniques, if possible during 1976.2 We believe the Committee should make every effort to conclude the negotiations this year as recommended by the General Assembly. If we are to achieve that objective, we have much work ahead of us in this session.

Nevertheless, important steps have already been taken, and the groundwork for the negotiations has already been laid. Last year the Committee held informal meetings with experts, which yielded valuable insights into the technical issues of environmental modification. Shortly thereafter, the United States and the Soviet Union submitted identical texts of a draft convention as a basis for negotiation. A number of other delegations, here and at the General Assembly, have expressed their views on various aspects of the draft and on the subject generally. As a result, it seems fair to say that most and perhaps all the major issues that need to be considered have been identified.

The discussion to date has shown that we have already reached a consensus concerning the basic objective of our work. As reflected in

1CCD/PV.688, pp. 24-27.

Documents on Disarmament, 1975, pp. 788-789. 'Ibid., pp. 385-388.

the Assembly's resolution, there is a consensus that it is desirable to develop a multilateral convention to spare mankind from the potential dangers of environmental warfare. The task now before the CCD is to determine how this objective can best be achieved.

Comments and suggestions made so far indicate four general areas of concern, which we hope interested delegations will discuss in more detail this spring. Today I wish only to identify these areas. In a later statement I will examine them more fully and explain the views of my Government.

The first and perhaps the most important area relates to the definition of the activities to be prohibited. The draft submitted by the United States and the Soviet Union takes an approach that we consider both practical and effective. It would prohibit the military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques having widespread, long-lasting, or severe effects as the means of destruction, damage, or injury to another State party.

It has been suggested that the convention should prohibit all hostile use of such techniques, regardless of their scale, duration, or severity. It has also been proposed that the threat, as well as actual use of environmental modification techniques should be prohibited. In considering these and other possible means of defining the scope of the convention, we believe that two essential conditions must be met: the prohibition must effectively overcome the serious dangers of the hostile use of environmental modification techniques, and the prohibition must be defined in a manner that provides an adequate basis for determining whether or not a party is observing its obligations. We believe that the draft before the Committee meets these conditions.

A second important area for discussion concerns the provisions for resolving problems that may arise under the convention and for dealing with possible violations. Many delegations have emphasized the importance of having procedures that provide adequate confidence that obligations are being faithfully observed. For this purpose the draft convention would establish the right and obligation of parties to consult and co-operate directly or through appropriate international procedures in solving any problems; it would also set out a complaints procedure. These provisions are complementary, although each procedure may be used independently.

A number of delegations have criticized the reference to the existing machinery of the Security Council or suggested that special procedures be established to ensure that no investigation of a complaint would be subject to a veto. Some delegations may intend to propose alternative provisions. In examining this question, we believe the most important consideration is the practical effectiveness of the provisions in deterring violations in the first place and dealing with them if they occur. We believe the procedures in the draft convention satisfy these practical needs.

Apart from these issues, several delegations have raised the question of the relationship between the convention and the draft proto

cols under discussion at the Diplomatic Conference on Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts. Differences have been noted in the language used in the draft convention and in sections of the protocols dealing with protection of the environment, and it has been suggested that the approaches in the two documents should be harmonized.

However, it seems clear to us that there are fundamental differences between the objectives and coverage of the protocols and those of the convention. Most significantly, the protocols are intended to protect the natural environment from especially serious damage from the use of conventional means or methods of warfare, whereas the convention's purpose is to prohibit the deliberate hostile use and manipulation of natural processes as a weapon. Moreover, the protocols apply only to armed conflicts while the prohibitions established in the convention would be applicable even if no other weapons are used or no other military operation is taking place. Given these differences alone, we see no reason to try to establish a direct link between the two endeavours, although obviously we must ensure that the two are not incompatible.

Another issue that has emerged from our discussions concerns the implications of the draft convention for the conduct and possible international regulation of peaceful uses of environmental modification techniques. We share the view that an arms control convention dealing with hostile uses of such techniques should not attempt to deal with the complex questions involved in peaceful uses. Article III of the draft is intended to make that clear without prejudging efforts by States or international organizations either to promote or to regulate such uses.

As I indicated earlier, my delegation expects in the near future to discuss in more detail these problems and their treatment in the draft before the Committee. We hope other delegations will be able to join in a constructive and useful consideration of the issues in the coming weeks as we pursue this important negotiation.

Statement by ACDA Director Iklé to the Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Organizations, and Security Agreements of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: Nuclear Export Policy, February 23, 19761

This morning I would like to comment on two kinds of initiatives undertaken by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the executive branch to deal with nuclear proliferation.

The draft protocols of the Diplomatic Conference can be found in document A/10195 of the U.N. General Assembly.

'Nonproliferation Issues: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Organizations, and Security Agreements of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Ninety-fourth Congress, First and Second Sessions, on Nonproliferation Issues, pp. 269-270, 271–273.

The first concerns nuclear exports; the second, multinational nuclear fuel-cycle centers.

U.S. INITIATIVES CONCERNING USE OF CIVIL NUCLEAR EXPORTS

The United States over the years has sought to work with other countries to insure that civil nuclear exports would be used only for peaceful purposes. We have recently had a number of bilateral and multilateral discussions with nuclear exporters to develop common rules on safeguards and export controls. As a result, the United States, together with other exporters, has decided to apply certain principles to our future nuclear exports. Most of these are consistent with current U.S. practice; some are new. All are designed to inhibit the spread of nuclear weapons while permitting nuclear exports of equipment to meet the world's growing energy needs.

SECRECY OF EFFORTS CONCERNING NUCLEAR EXPORTS QUESTIONED

Senator SYMINGTON. Why is this effort held so secret? Why do some countries say they don't want people to know what is being decided on?

Mr. IKLÉ. My guess, Mr. Chairman, is this has to do with internal considerations of these countries. We, the United States, have no particular desire to be coy about these efforts which we think are in the world interest to enhance nonproliferation.

But we felt it was desirable, in order to advance this difficult understanding, to accede to the wishes of certain other countries.

Mr. IKLÉ. The principles on which we have agreed include the following:

The requirement that recipients must apply international (IAEA) safeguards on all nuclear imports.

The requirement that the recipients give assurances not to use these imports to make nuclear explosives for any purpose, whether called "peaceful" or not.

The requirement that the recipients have adequate physical security for these imported nuclear facilities and materials to deter theft and sabotage.

The requirement for assurances that the recipients will demand the same conditions on any retransfer of these materials or types of equipment derived from the original transfer to third countries.

Now, on the question of more sensitive exports-those which involve fuel enrichment, spent fuel reprocessing, and heavy water. We intend

to exercise restraint in supply of these exports, particularly when we think they could add significantly to the risk of proliferation.

In addition, in cases where we do export sensitive technology, we require that the recipients obtain our consent before they retransfer any sensitive nuclear technology to a third country.

These are the minimum standards the United States will apply to its nuclear exports. We are prepared to be more stringent when appropriate.

Together with other leading exporters of nuclear technology, we are also committed to followup efforts along three lines:

1. To promote international cooperation in exchanging information on physical security, on measures of protection of nuclear material in transit, and on measures for recovery of stolen nuclear material and equipment;

2. To improve the effectiveness of IAEA safeguards through special efforts in support of that organization; and

3. To encourage the designers and makers of sensitive equipment, such as reprocessing plants, to construct it in a way that will facilitate the application of safeguards.

U.S. INITIATIVES CONCERNING MULTINATIONAL

FUEL-CYCLE CENTERS

Mr. Chairman, the second kind of initiatives we are undertaking have to do with multinational fuel-cycle centers. The idea for such centers was enclosed in the Final Declaration of the Review Conference held by the parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty in Geneva last year. At the United Nations General Assembly last autumn, Secretary Kissinger stressed the grave danger posed by the spread of national reprocessing plants to nuclear proliferation and thus to world security, and proposed establishment of multinational fuel-cycle centers as a safer alternative to national control of reprocessing facilities.3

The International Atomic Energy Agency has now begun a major study of the regional multinational center concept; the United States actively supports it, and I expect it will be completed sometime early next year. Preliminary indications seem to confirm our expectation that large-scale multinational centers could achieve significant economies of scale compared with smaller national reprocessing plants. But more important from my perspective, these centers may be an attractive alternative to national reprocessing plants, particularly for countries with more limited nuclear capacity. This alternative then may encourage countries to forgo national reprocessing facilities and work together. This would make safeguards, and the physical protection of dangerous nuclear materials, more efficient and effective. In short, if the concept proves successful, multinational centers could