posal. Several delegations, however, showed restraint and even scepticism. We hope that the initial discussion of the draft agreement on this question at the spring session of the Committee will encourage a large number of delegations to participate more actively in the examination of so important a problem at the summer session. We believe that it would be useful to hold another round of informal meetings of the Committee with the participation of qualified governmental experts. But it is quite obvious that, if this work is to be more productive, experts from the greatest possible number of States-and above all from those which possess considerable capabilities for developing new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction-must participate in it.

As for the time at which such informal meetings of the Committee on Disarmament should be held, we intend to submit an appropriate proposal very shortly.

At present the best prepared item on the Committee's agenda concerns the elaboration of a convention on the prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques. The draft conventions on this problem submitted last year by the Soviet Union and the United States were on the whole approved in principle by participants in the Committee's work. Nearly all the members of the Committee expressed a positive attitude to the drafts. At the same time, in the course of the spring session, suggestions were made with regard to the preamble and the main articles of the draft conventions; specific amendments to the drafts were also submitted. The Soviet side has thoroughly studied all these suggestions and amendments."

We consider that there is every possibility now to complete negotiations on the draft convention so that the Committee would be able to submit it to the United Nations General Assembly this year. It is precisely at the current session of the Committee that agreement on the text must be reached. We hope that this will be done successfully, and that mutually acceptable solutions to still outstanding questions will be found. The Soviet delegation proceeds from the premise that insignificant matters must not be allowed to obscure the main point from view, namely, our common agreement on the need to deliver mankind from the danger of the use of environmental modification techniques for military purposes.

The basic questions related to the finalization of the draft convention, as we understand it, are the scope of prohibition and verification. With regard to the scope of prohibition wishes were expressed that the relevant wording should be specified-either in the text of the convention or in statements of interpretation. We are prepared to work in a constructive spirit with a view to reaching final agreement on these provisions.

On the question of verification, proposals were made to adopt a procedure ensuring that the actual state of affairs should be ascertained in case of suspected violations of the convention before this question is 9 For the text of the draft convention, see ibid., pp. 385-388.

submitted to the Security Council for consideration with a view to a political decision. It seems to us that the present draft texts provide for the necessary possibilities to that effect.

During the CCD's spring session, some delegations drew attention to the wording of article V, paragraph 1 concerning international procedures, and requested clarification of what was specifically meant by these procedures. In this connexion, the Soviet side would like to explain that consultations and co-operation on the basis of appropriate international procedures, should problems arise in relation to the application of the provisions of the convention, include the possibility of determining the facts of the case within the framework of existing international organizations, such as the World Meteorological Organization, the United Nations Environment Programme, or through a specially created committee of experts of the States party to the convention. The functions of these bodies would, of course, be confined to facilitating consultations should problems arise in relation to the application of the provisions of the convention. The results of the abovementioned consultations should be examined by the Security Council as provided for in article V, paragraph 2 of the draft convention.

As regards our future work on the convention, we share the views expressed on this matter by the distinguished representative of the United States, Ambassador J. Martin, and believe that the early establishment, on a temporary basis, of an informal working body within the framework of the Committee on Disarmament and open to all its members, would solve the problem of completing the work on the convention during this session of the Committee.

The Committee still has before it a very important question, namely that of the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction. The Soviet delegation has repeatedly stated and wishes to reaffirm today that the Soviet Union is in favour of the complete prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and of their destruction. The draft convention introduced by the socialist countries in 1972 provides for such a solution; it is still valid now. At the same time, in order to speed up the solution of this problem we are agreeable, as a first step, to the prohibition of the most dangerous and lethal types of chemical weapons. As is known, the Soviet Union and the United States have agreed to take a joint initiative in this direction. In the course of this session we intend to present a number of considerations of the Soviet side regarding real ways and means of prohibiting such means of warfare.

The Committee is faced with major and complicated problems, the solution of which is awaited by an overwhelming majority of States and by all peace-loving peoples of our planet. Our duty and our responsibility is to live up to these expectations. There is every reason to hope that the Committee on Disarmament, which already has to its credit the successful elaboration of a whole series of international agreements on disarmament, will be able to make another important

contribution to the solution of the most pressing problem of the contemporary world by working out new specific measures in the field of disarmament. Much remains to be done and must be done here and now at the present summer session, specifically with a view to submitting to the United Nations General Assembly at its thirty-first session a draft convention on the prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques.

The Soviet delegation will be guided precisely by this interpretation of the tasks faced by the Committee on Disarmament, and it will spare no effort in tackling them successfully.

Statement by the Japanese Representative (Ogiso) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Japanese Ratification of the Non-Proliferation Treaty [Extract], June 22, 1976 1

In my statement on 9 March in this Committee, I referred to the situation in my country as regards the ratification of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.2 Subsequently, during the Committee's spring session, several delegations expressed their concern about this subject, and so I wish to address myself briefly to the subject today.

In May last year, the Japanese Government submitted to its National Diet a bill requesting approval of Japan's ratification of the NPT. In view of the importance of this Treaty, the Japanese National Diet considered very carefully all aspects of the Treaty, including nuclear disarmament, security, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. On 24 May of this year, our National Diet finally passed the bill approving the Treaty's ratification by Japan.

Then, on 8 June my Government deposited the instruments of the Treaty's ratification by Japan with the Governments of the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the United States, in accordance with article 9, paragraph 2 of the Treaty. One of the points which was debated most in the Diet as being of great concern was the questions on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament as provided for in article VI of the Treaty.

and non-nuclear-weapon States. In this connexion, particular attention was focused on such matters as the achievements of the negotiations on effect measures relating to nuclear disarmament as provided for in article VI of the Treaty.

Taking these points into consideration, my Government particularly emphasized, in its statement issued on the occasion of depositing the instruments of ratification, that "this Treaty permits only the 'nuclear

2

1CCD/PV. 705, pp. 19-21.

Ante, pp. 350-352. For treaty text, see Documents on Disarmament, 1968, pp. 461-465.

weapon States' to possess nuclear weapons and allows them a special status", and that "the nuclear-weapon States must rectify this discrimination in the future by totally abolishing their nuclear weapons". To this end, my Government went on in the statement to express its resolve to continue its efforts for the promotion of nuclear disarmament. As the statement thus contains my country's basic position on disarmament, we have taken steps to submit the text to the Committee. and to have it distributed among its members in the form of document. CCD/494.3

As my delegation has made clear in this Committee on various occasions, my country takes the position that to make the disarmament negotiations fruitful, it is essential for both France and the People's Republic of China, which are nuclear-weapon States, to accede to agreements on disarmament, including the NPT, and to participate. actively in the discussions of the Committee on Disarmament. Furthermore, in my statement in this Committee on 9 March, I emphasized the responsibility of the United States and the Soviet Union in realizing a comprehensive test ban, and made some suggestions on the possibility of expanding the Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests between the United States and the Soviet Union into a multilateral agreement, making it the starting point for realizing a comprehensive test ban. On 28 May, the two leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union signed an agreement on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, which is inseparably related to the Threshold Treaty. We welcome the signing of the agreement as having laid a sound basis for realizing a comprehensive test ban. As to a comprehensive test ban, my delegation intends to continue its efforts so that further tangible results may be obtained with a view to its realization. In so doing, my delegation. will take into consideration the deliberations of the CTB expert group which is expected to be formed soon. It will also study the views of other delegations on the PNE Agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union, in as much as the Agreement contains significant. provisions concerning on-site inspection in certain circumstances.

Mr. Chairman, since paragraphs 1 and 2 of the text of the statement of my Government now before us are of direct relevance to the basic position of my country which I have now outlined, I wish to draw the attention of the distinguished delegates to them. They read as follows:

3

1. The Government of Japan hopes that as many States as possible, whether possessing a nuclear explosive capability or not, will become parties to this Treaty in order to make it truly effective. In particular, it strongly hopes that the Republic of France and the

Not printed here.

Documents on Disarmament, 1974, pp. 225–227.

People's Republic of China, which possess nuclear weapons but are not parties to this Treaty, will accede thereto.

2. The Government of Japan urges the nuclear-weapon States. which have special responsibilities for nuclear disarmament, to take concrete nuclear disarmament measures, such as the reducton of nuclear arms and the realization of a comprehensive nuclear test ban, in accordance with article VI of this Treaty. It urges the nuclear-weapon States not party to this Treaty also to take nuclear disarmament measures.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, on the occasion of the ratification of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, my delegation wishes to reiterate the intention of my country to continue to participate in deed as well as in word in the international efforts aimed at nuclear non-proliferation.

Press Interview With Secretary of State Kissinger: Détente and Strategic Arms Limitation [Extract], June 25, 19761

Mr. Sommer: To change the tack, how do you account for the fact that so many of your policies which used to be widely acclaimed are now rather unpopular? For instance, détente. Is that due to shifts in public mood, or is it due to problems inherent in these policies? Has détente been a one-way street? What is the position of the U.S.S.R. today, compared to what it was when you started? Has détente reached the end of the road? How is it going to continue?

Secretary Kissinger: I would judge that a year from now, the policy that has been called détente will be seen to be reflecting the existing realities, and the only realistic and, for that matter, moral policy that the West can pursue.

Memories are brief. Think back to the period of the fifties and sixties, when we had endless crises over Berlin and other issues, crises that led to the edge of confrontation.

It seems to me axiomatic that when two countries possess the capacity to destroy civilized life, they cannot conduct their affairs on the basis of a constant test of strength with nuclear weapons. They have an obligation to attempt to avoid crises, if possible, to moderate crises if they occur, and to search for a constructive relationship.

If they do not do this, it will demoralize their publics. They will create "peace movements," in every country, that accuse their governments of having failed in its principal obligation of protecting them against a nuclear catastrophe. The very fact that there are no signifi

1 Department of State Bulletin, July 26, 1976, pp. 129-130. The interview was published in the June 30 issue of Die Zeit of Hamburg.