sent my views on S. 1439, a bill which would reorganize the export functions of the Federal Government pertaining to nonmilitary nuclear equipment, material and technology.2

As you may know, I have previously testified before the Senate Government Operations Committee concerning earlier versions of this bill on April 24, 1975, and on January 30, 1976. As I pointed out in my testimony in January:

I firmly believe that the present system should be given a chance to work without imposing another "revolution" on the changes brought about by the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974.

It is for that reason that I am opposed to S. 1439.

Of necessity, export controls in a highly complex area such as this require close coordination among the various interested Government agencies. I wish to assure the committee that my Agency is presently fully integrated into this process and is able to make its views known on nuclear export policy formulation, U.S. nuclear agreements and arrangements with other countries, and all strategically important nuclear export applications.

We see the present system as a workable one which has been improving steadily. To impose a reordering of the role and practice of various Government agencies at this time might not lead to better decisions. On the contrary, I fear, time and attention would be diverted from the policy issues to the administrative changes.

It is encouraging to see that the administration and the Congress have a common goal of insuring that nuclear export controls contribute to the achievement of U.S. nonproliferation objectives. We all like to see more farsighted decisions in this important area, decisions which give priority to the security implications of nuclear exports.

Let me turn now to some specific sections of the bill which are of particular interest to ACDA. We are opposed to section 7, entitled "Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement." This section would require us to prepare such statements on all new or modified agreements for cooperation and certain major actions taken pursuant to these agreements and to furnish them directly to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Secretary of State, and the Congress.

At present the nonproliferation aspects of proposed exports are carefully considered in the determinations made under current statutes and agreement procedures. I want to stress that ACDA is vigorously pursuing our nonproliferation policy as part of this interagency coordination.

However, we question the propriety of procedures requiring ACDA, an executive branch agency, to submit the advice it gives the Secretary

For text as reported by the S. Com. on Government Operations, May 13, 1976, see ibid., p. 68 ff.

of State and other agencies in the executive branch directly to the Congress.

It is my view that current procedures insure that the NRC receives the information it needs to carry out its responsibilities. ACDA, of course, must continue to play an important role in providing relevant information to NRC. I do not believe, however, that formal procedures, as proposed in the bill, are needed.

Finally, in regard to section 8(b) we believe sound efforts to preserve and upgrade the effectiveness of IAEA and domestic safeguards are underway. As you know, the Nonproliferation Treaty is one of the major arms control agreements and my agency has always played a significant role in its implementation, including the support of the IAEA safeguards system, which is so vital to the effective implementation of our nonproliferation objectives."

I feel that ACDA and other concerned executive branch agencies are now directly and prominently involved in the improvement of both IAEA and domestic safeguards.

This completes my prepared testimony. I will be pleased to respond to any questions you may have.

Statement by the United States Representative (Martin) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, June 22, 19761

Before beginning my formal statement, there are two things I should like to do-one I do with a certain amount of sorrow, the other with considerable pleasure.

The first is to take note of the retirement of Ambassador Roshchin after over 10 years of service as the representative of the Soviet Union to, and the Co-Chairman of, this Committee. It has been an honour for me to have been associated with a gentleman of his integrity and ability during my entire service with the CCD. I always found him to be understanding, cheerful, courteous, and co-operative. At the same time, he represented his Government forcefully and well. It is impossible to over-estimate the size of his contribution to our past work. No one was more keenly disappointed than he during the periods when we failed to make progress, and no one can claim to have participated more actively and knowledgeably in the Committee's successes-the several important arms control and disarmament agreements concluded by the Committee during his tenure. It is no understatement to say that he must be considered among the foremost figures in the field of disarmament of our times. I am certain that even in retirement he will find ways to continue to make contributions to the field in which he was so deeply immersed and to which he is so fully dedicated. He will indeed be missed. I wish to extend to him and to Mrs.

"For treaty text, see Documents on Disarmament, 1968, pp. 461–465. For IAEA guidelines regarding safeguards under the NPT, see ibid., 1971, pp. 218-244. 1CCD/PV.705, June 22, 1976, pp. 7–11.

Roshchin all the best wishes for a very happy and productive retirement.

Second, it is my pleasure to welcome Ambassador Likhatchev in his new capacity as leader of the Soviet Delegation and Co-Chairman of the Committee. We all got to know him during the spring session. I am certain that I speak for all of us when I say we look forward to working with him. I know that our relations will be friendly and cooperative, and I trust they will lead to the results for which we are all striving.

I would like at the outset of my statement today to refer to two events of great significance that have occurred since we last met.

On 28 May, President Ford and General Secretary Brezhnev signed the Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes, as well as a Protocol which is an integral part of the Treaty. The signing of these documents brought to a successful conclusion 18 months of complex and intensive negotiations pursuant to article III of the 1974 Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests.3

The new Treaty will govern the conduct of all underground nuclear explosions that the parties may carry out for peaceful purposes. It commits the parties not to carry out any individual PNE having a yield of more than 150 kilotons-the same limit established for weapons tests in the 1974 Treaty-or any group of explosions having an aggregate yield of over 1,500 kilotons. The Protocol establishes the most detailed procedures ever set out in an arms control agreement for the verification of compliance, including procedures for extensive data exchange and on-site observation under certain circumstances. Taken as a whole, the Treaty and Protocol are designed to assure that no weapons-related benefits otherwise precluded by the Threshold Test Ban Treaty will be derived from nuclear explosions for peaceful

purposes.

The texts of the Treaty and Protocol, together with an accompanying Agreed Statement, are being circulated as Committee documents. I plan to comment on the provisions set out in these documents, and their significance, in some detail in the near future.

The other landmark event of recent weeks was the ratification of the Non-Proliferation Treaty by the Government of Japan on 2 May.* We are all well aware of Japan's consistent support for the objectives of non-proliferation and nuclear arms control, and of its important contribution to the CCD's work in these areas. As Ambassador Ogiso noted during our spring session, ratification of the NPT will enable Japan to participate, in name as well as in fact, in international efforts aimed at nuclear non-proliferation.

In this connexion, I would like to quote President Ford's statement upon learning of the Japanese action. He said:

I welcome the Japanese Diet's approval for ratification of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. This action is a singularly important event in the life of the Treaty, which is a pillar of international efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and to contribute to the broader goal of nuclear arms control.

Japan, one of our closest allies, has one of the world's most extensive peaceful nuclear programs. Ratification of the Treaty will clearly add to the Treaty's vitality and effectiveness and to the extension of the international safeguards regime. It should also facilitate Japan's peaceful nuclear endeavours and enhance Japan's influence on nuclear arms control.

As I have frequently stated, our efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation are receiving high priority. I am encouraged by the progress being made in this field. We are thus especially gratified by this further demonstration of Japanese dedication to the same goal. We trust that Japan's example will encourage yet broader adherence to the Treaty and its objectives."

Let me add to these remarks, on behalf of the United States delegation, our sincere congratulations to Ambassador Ogiso and the delegation of Japan.

My delegation hopes that these two important developments outside the CCD will be complemented by the Committee's own work on nuclear issues during the summer session. In particular, we look forward to further consideration of the proposal by the delegation of Sweden earlier this year for creation of an ad hoc group of experts to examine the potential role of international co-operation in the detection and identification of seismic events. If the Committee decides to set up such a group with satisfactory terms of reference, the United States is prepared to participate. On that assumption, we would anticipate an organizational meeting this summer.

The Committee will also be calling on the assistance of experts in the near future in connexion with our informal meetings on the question of chemical weapons. On 13 April, I outlined in some detail the United States views on possible approaches to a first-stage CW agreement, and on the difficult but vitally important verification problems that must be solved. My delegation looks forward with interest to hearing the views of others on these matters. In my April statement I noted that on several issues an adequate basis already appears to exist for forming judgments and reaching general agreement. I believe the informal meetings will provide a valuable opportunity to make progress on these issues, including in particular the questions of definition of chemical agents and of the appropriate scope of an initial-stage prohibition in a phased approach.

We also consider it important that the meetings give impetus to the search for imaginative and effective solutions to verification problems. In this connexion, my delegation would be interested in exploring with other delegations various possibilities for technical exchanges that might advance our work, including the feasibility and utility of exchange visits to selected chemical production and disposal facili

5

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, May 31, 1976, p. 937. 6 Ante, pp. 211-221.

ties in different countries. In our view, as long as the facilities chosen were relevant to CW verification, they need not actually be involved in the production or disposal of chemical warfare agents.

As a contribution to the informal meetings, my delegation will shortly be circulating three working papers elaborating on some issues I mentioned last spring. One paper will deal with verification of the destruction of declared CW stockpiles. The second will report on seals and monitoring devices that might play a useful role in verification of stockpile destruction and of de-activation of production facilities. The third will provide a summary compilation of views and proposals concerning the definition of chemical agents."

My delegation believes that while real steps forward can be made during the summer session on the important issues I have mentioned, the Committee should concentrate its work on the draft convention on environmental warfare. The spring session resulted in an intensive examination of the draft text and considerable clarification of viewpoints on the issues involved in the convention. Between sessions my Government has carefully reviewed the suggestions and proposals of various delegations. While in general we continue to believe that the draft before the Committee provides an effective and practical approach to overcoming the dangers of environmental warfare, we are prepared to consider and discuss ways of meeting concerns expressed by other delegations. During the coming weeks, therefore, let us make every effort to reach agreement in the CCD on a text of the convention on military or any other hostile use of environmental modification, to be reported to the thirty-first session of the United Nations General Assembly.

Negotiations on the convention would of course be facilitated by early agreement on the three procedural questions pertaining to 1976 that were left pending at the end of the spring session. My delegation was gratified that the Committee succeeded this spring in agreeing in principle on the method of preparing the 1976 report, and on the format for the daily communiqué. At the outset of the summer session we should press for agreement on the third element of our 1976 arrangements, regarding organization of work.

As I said on 22 April, my delegation shares the view that it would be desirable to establish an informal working body to facilitate the negotiation of the environmental warfare convention.10 We believe efforts should be promptly undertaken to reach a common understanding on the purposes, operation, and organization of such a body, and we are prepared to contribute in any way we can to the development of an acceptable arrangement.

Finally, going beyond arrangements for 1976, I want to reiterate that my delegation stands ready to participate in a comprehensive