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First, we have never considered the limitation of strategic arms as a favor we grant to the Soviet Union, to be turned on and off according to the ebb and flow of our relations. It is clear that the continuation of an unrestrained strategic arms race will lead to neither a strategic nor a political advantage. If this race continues, it will have profound consequences for the well-being of all of humanity.

Limitation of strategic arms is therefore a permanent and global problem that cannot be subordinated to the day-to-day changes in Soviet-American relations.

At the same time, it must be understood on both sides that if tensions increase over a period of time, the general relationship will deteriorate, and therefore the SALT negotiations will also be affected.

Second, we must consider the long-term consequences of a failure of the SALT negotiations. If the interim agreement lapses, the Soviets will be free of several severe restraints. They can add heavy ICBM's without restrictions. They can build more submarines without dismantling old ICBM's. There will be no equal ceiling of 2,400. The immediate impact would be that the numerical gap frozen in SALT One, and equalized in Vladivostok, would again become a factor, facing us with the choice of either large expenditures in a strategically and politically unproductive area or a perceived inequality with its political implications.2

Of course we will not negotiate any agreement that does not achieve strategic equality for the United States and that we cannot defend as being in the national interest. Nor does it mean that Angola or similar situations will, if continued, not impinge on SALT as well as the general relationship. But it does mean that the general objective of a more orderly and stable nuclear relationship is in the interests of the United States and in the interests of the world and cannot be easily abandoned. This is why the President has decided that I should go to Moscow to negotiate on SALT, and we expect that the talks will be conducted in the same spirit by the Soviet side.

U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS AND ANGOLA

Q. Mr. Secretary, does the fact that you are going to Moscow now mean that you have forwarded a new proposal to the Kremlin on SALT?

Secretary Kissinger: We have not yet forwarded a new proposal to Moscow on SALT, but we expect to do so before I go there, within the next day or two.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what is standing in the way of a compromise that would point the way to a treaty at this point?

Secretary Kissinger: The obstacle to an agreement results primarily from issues that could not be considered fully at Vladivostok because

For the text of the SALT One agreements, see Documents on Disarmament, 1972, pp. 197 ff.

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the technology was not yet developed at that time. Primarily the issues concern how to deal with the Soviet "Backfire" bomber and how to deal with the American cruise missiles; whether and how to count them; whether and what restraints to accept. These are fundamentally the outstanding issues. Most other issues have either been settled in principle or in detail.

Q. Excuse me, if I may follow up. But that was the case several months ago, and you didn't go to Moscow. Now you are going. Does this mean that at least these two outstanding issues are pretty much settled?

Secretary Kissinger: There has been no discussion with the Soviets except that the Soviets have assured us that they are prepared to modify their last position, and on that basis, we hope to be able to work out some solution.

Q. Mr. Secretary, are you saying that you are making Soviet restraint in Angola a quid pro quo for any successful conclusion to the SALT treaty, or are you not saying that?

Secretary Kissinger: I am saying two things: I am saying that Soviet actions in Angola, if continued, are bound to affect the general relationship with the United States; that a substantial deterioration of that relationship can also, over time, affect the strategic arms talks.

At this point, however, I would also maintain that the limitation of strategic arms is not a concession we make to the Soviet Union but it is an objective that is in our interest and it is in the world interest and it is in the interest of world peace. So we will pursue the negotiations in the present framework.

Q. To follow up, if there is no change in the Soviet position on Angola, would you then expect that there could be a successful SALT Two negotiation later on?

Secretary Kissinger: We would have to face this in the light of the circumstances that may exist later.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you have been sending this message-you and the President have been sending this message to Moscow now for several weeks. Have you had any indication whatsoever that the Soviets might be interested in a diplomatic solution to Angola, and secondly, are you willing to discuss this with the Soviets when you go to Moscow?

Secretary Kissinger: It is a close race between the messages we send and the deterioration of our domestic position; and messages that are not backed up at home lose a fair amount of their credibility.

We are prepared to discuss Angola, and we have had some exchanges with the Soviet Union on Angola in recent weeks which we will have to clarify.

Q. Mr. Secretary, is the fact that you are going to Moscow-can that be taken as a sure thing that you will reach an agreement, or is there still the possibility of failure?

Secretary Kissinger: There is the possibility of failure. We do not know the details of the Soviet position, and on the other hand, we assume that the Soviet Union would not invite the Secretary of State to negotiate with Mr. Brezhnev unless a major effort would be made to come to an agreement.

Q. Mr. Secretary, is it your expectation that if things go as you anticipate that you will be able to conclude an agreement in Moscow? Will you set out for us what you are aiming at? Are you aiming at an agreement in principle?

Secretary Kissinger: No, there cannot be a final agreement in Moscow. The most that is achievable in Moscow is an agreement in principle similar to the Vladivostok agreement but covering the outstanding issues such as Backfire and cruise missiles and to relate them to Vladivostok. And then there will have to be technical discussions at Geneva to work out the detailed provisions. And that, under the best of circumstances, would take another two to three months.

Q. Mr. Secretary, I am curious as to how you are going to conduct these parallel negotiations with the Soviets. On the one hand, you are indicating that the success of SALT may hinge on Soviet activities in Angola. On the other hand, you are going to Moscow in a few days presumably to conclude an agreement in principle. How can you do that without knowing what the Soviet reaction in Angola is?

Secretary Kissinger: I have made clear in my statement that the regulation of nuclear arms in the strategic field between United States, and the Soviet Union is not a benefit we confer on the Soviet Union. It is a generic problem of world order that must be settled at some point and for which conditions are propitious now because of a long record of negotiation and because technology is at a point where it is possible to accept certain restraints now which might then have to wait for another cycle of technology before they can be made effective.

The point I am making is that if there is a general deterioration in our relationship, it could affect SALT. In any event, whatever is agreed in Moscow will take several months to negotiate in greater detail.

Q. If I could just follow up for a second, please-in other words, you are not saying, then, that if there is not some Soviet pullback in Angola before the termination of your trip to Moscow, that that is going to have an adverse effect on SALT.

Secretary Kissinger: That is correct.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you said that messages not backed up at home lose certain credibility, I think. We are now entering a Presidential election 'Ibid., 1974, pp. 746–747.

year. Isn't it likely that those messages will continue not to be backed up, and what impact will that have on foreign policy in general?

Secretary Kissinger: I have always believed very strongly that the foreign policy of the United States must reflect the permanent values and interests of the United States. It is not a partisan foreign policy. And to the best of my ability, I have attempted to conduct this office in a manner that can make it achieve bipartisan support.

It would therefore be a tragedy if during this election year we did not find some means to put some restraint on our domestic debates in the field of foreign policy and to find some means of common action. As soon as the Congress returns I will talk to several of the leaders to see what cooperation is possible to put at least some restraint on partisan controversy, because the penalties we will pay for lack of unity will have to be paid for many years.

But it is a problem. I agree with you.

Q. Mr. Secretary, two questions. I am not sure I have this exactly right, but didn't you say at a previous press conference that the United States would not table another SALT proposal unless the Russians tabled another one first? And secondly, have all the members of the NSC and the Verification Panel signed off on this new proposal that we plan to offer in Moscow?

Secretary Kissinger: With respect to the first question, I said that the United States cannot table a new proposal simply because the Soviets had rejected the old one. We have been given a clear promise that there would be a significant modification in the Soviet position. Under these conditions, we are prepared to put forward a modification of our position, because we would prefer to negotiate from our position rather than from some other.

We have made clear-and I can repeat it here that if the Soviets do not modify their last position, there can be no agreement. And the position which we will forward to them will be substantially different from the last Soviet position. So it will require--

Q. Substantially different from their last position?

Secretary Kissinger: It will also be somewhat different from our position. It is an honest attempt to find a solution that takes into account the real concerns of all sides.

With respect to our internal discussions, I will not have a clear picture until I have read all the newspaper articles that will emerge over the next few weeks, which are invariably more dramatic than the discussions which in fact take place.

But my impression is that there is unanimity on the course that we are pursuing. We have had very good meetings. We have had two Veri

fication Panel meetings, two NSC meetings. There will probably be another NSC meeting before I go, just to review the bidding. And I would say that the government is operating, until the Sunday editions, with complete unanimity.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff don't provide much drama for you, but are they signing on to this proposal?

Secretary Kissinger: The Joint Chiefs of Staff are signing on to this proposal, yes.

Q. Mr. Secretary, would you recommend conclusion of a new SALT agreement with the Soviets if Soviet and Cuban forces are still in Angola?

Secretary Kissinger: I am going to Moscow in order to see whether the deadlock in these negotiations can be broken. We should not play with the strategic arms limitation negotiations. It is a matter that is of profound concern for the long-term future. It is in an area in which no significant advantages can be achieved by either side but in which the momentum of events can lead to consquences that could be very serious. And therefore we will not use it lightly for bargaining purposes in other areas.

On the other hand, obviously, if the general relationship deteriorates, then it could over a period of time even affect the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. But I think we should make every effort to avoid that.

Q. Mr. Secretary, given the congressional attitudes on foreign affairs in general, do you intend to talk to any leaders of Congress before you go to Moscow to negotiate further, and is there any danger that a repudiation by Congress of a SALT agreement might be counterproductive to the very objectives you're seeking for the long term?

Secretary Kissinger: I have been briefing congressional leaders on SALT negotiations consistently. There has been no significant new development in the negotiating process, but I will no doubt be in touch with some of the senior members of the Senate.

As far as repudiation of an agreement is concerned, it would of course be a very serious matter since, in any event, one of the biggest foreign policy problems we now face is the question from other countries of who speaks for the United States. Somebody has to speak for the United States, and there can be no foreign policy without authority.

So if an agreement were repudiated, it would accelerate this very dangerous tendency; but we do not have an agreement yet.

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