like to conclude my discussion of the test ban issue with a few remarks about the nuclear testing restraints that, in the face of these remaining obstacles, the United States and Soviet Union agreed to adopt as a practical step toward the CTB objective. I am referring, of course, to the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and its associated agreement on peaceful nuclear explosions."

As members of this Committee are aware, the TTBT, which was signed in Moscow in July 1974, bans underground nuclear weapon tests with a yield exceeding 150 kilotons. In accordance with article III of that Treaty, the United States and the USSR began negotiations in October 1974 on a separate agreement governing the conduct of underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. On several occasions, my Government expressed the view that, because of the integral relationship between the verification of a threshold on nuclear weapon tests and the conduct of PNEs, we would not present the TTBT to the Senate for ratification until a satisfactory agreement for peaceful nuclear explosions had been concluded.

I can now report to the Committee that the United States and Soviet delegations have concluded their negotiations, and that an ad referendum agreement is being reviewed by the two Governments. It is our hope that the draft agreement will be formally approved by the Governments shortly and that the two agreements will be ratified and will enter into force in the near future. I expect to be able to present a full report to the Committee during the summer session on the contents of the PNE agreement, its relationship to the TTBT, and the implications of the TTB/PNE régime for our common objective of achieving further nuclear testing restraints.

Before leaving the test ban issue, I would like to express my delegation's appreciation to the Swedish delegation, which took the initiative to hold the current series of informal meetings, and to all the experts who have helped make those meetings a most constructive conclusion to our spring session.

In concluding this intervention, I would like to touch briefly on another subject. During the spring session, considerable attention was devoted to the question of the Committee's procedures. Informal meetings and consultations resulted in substantial progress toward agreement, if only on a provisional basis, on two important aspects of the operation of the CCD. Inability, so far, to achieve consensus on an additional item under discussion has prevented the Committee from taking a formal decision on these matters, and it appears at this time that consideration of these three questions will have to be deferred until the start of our summer session.

While we would have preferred to put these provisional decisions behind us before the recess, we see no cause for concern in the current status of our consideration of procedural questions. After all, changes

B For the text of the treaty and its protocol, see Documents on Disarmament, 1974, pp. 225-229.

The agreement was signed on May 28; see post, pp. 328–348.

in procedures, even those that may appear quite minor, may nonetheless have important implications for the work of the Committee. They therefore deserve careful and detailed scrutiny, and they must be based on a true consensus of the CCD's members. If we can continue to approach these matters in the same constructive spirit that all delegations have displayed to date, I am certain that we can solve the remaining difficulties early in the summer session, either individually as a package, or in the context of the comprehensive procedural review. This should give us time to make any adjustments in procedures, such as regarding the preparation of the annual report, without interfering with the smooth operation of the Committee.

I would suggest that one item be given priority when we reconvene in June. Several delegations have expressed the view that it would be desirable to establish an informal working body to facilitate the negotiation of the draft convention on environmental warfare. My delegation shares this view. Whatever such a body is called, we believe it should be established in the opening days, if not the opening hours, of our summer session. In our view, it should have a rotating chairmanship, it should enjoy the assistance of the Secretariat, it should be able to request the preparation of whatever records are deeemed advisable, and it should issue whatever reports are considered necessary. We further believe it should not prejudice the work of the comprehensive procedural review-to which my delegation looks forward.

Finally, I can unequivocally say that this has been the most interesting, hardworking, and productive CCD session that I have attended. I want to express my appreciation to all of my colleagues for their co-operation and understanding which has made this possible. I would also like to thank Ambassador Hyvärinen and the Secretariat for all their excellent work, and in particular mention Mr. Corradini, Mrs. Gill, and the interpreters who put up with so much in our unstructured informal meetings.

Senate Resolution 406 on United States-Soviet Relations, May 5, 1976 1

1

Resolved, It is the sense of the Senate that:

(a) United States relations with the Soviet Union are a central aspect of United States foreign policy, and thus it is critically important that we should sort out the difficulties that exist in the SovietAmerican relationship, and define the national interest in that relationship.

1S. Res. 406, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. The resolution was submitted by Senators Cranston, Baker, Mansfield, Scott (Penn.), Sparkman, Case, Kennedy, Tower, Clark, Mathias, Jackson, and Byrd. It was approved by a vote of 86 to 7, with 7 not voting.

(b) Without illusions about the fundamental differences which separate the United States and the Soviet Union, we believe that the survival of the values we cherish in our free society requires the most careful and judicious regulation of relations between these two great powers. We proceed, then, from a recognition of the fact that the United States and the Soviet Union have, and are likely to have for some time, many competitive and conflicting interests. But we believe, nevertheless, that it is in the interest of both countries to regulate this competition and these conflicts so that they do not lead to war.

(c) The basic premise of the United States approach to this relationship is that the United States must remain unchallengeably strong militarily, both to insure United States security and to contribute to the security of our friends and allies abroad. This military strength must include a strategic capability which is fully sufficient to deter any Soviet attack on the United States or its allies, and which leaves no room for misperception by the Soviet Union of our readiness and determination to defend our vital interests and allies.

(d) Beyond this determination to do all that is necessary to defend and protect our Nation, we believe that an integral part of our national security policy should be to seek through negotiations to reduce, moderate, and stabilize the military competition between the United States and the Soviet Union, in the belief that the lessening of international tensions must remain a continuing United States goal, we therefore support:

(1) Efforts to conclude, as soon as practicable, negotiations on a timely basis to implement the principles of the November 1974 Vladivostok accords and, in addition, to continue to negotiate to reduce mutually the strategic military forces permitted each country under those accords.2 These agreements, to be submitted to the Senate as a treaty, should be based upon actions founded on clearly stated and verifiable stipulations.

(2) Initiatives on the part of both the United States and the Soviet Union demonstrating a commitment to the achievement of peaceful solutions in present and potential areas of conflict, in ways consistent with the mutual obligations of both powers to refrain from seeking advantages by exploiting troubled areas of the world.

(3) Other diplomatic, economic, commercial, and cultural initiatives which are undertaken with a careful regard for the balance of risks and advantages, which are implemented on a mutual and reciprocal basis, which are consistent with the economic and national security interests of the United States, and which support the implementation of the Articles of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe-particularly the provisions relating to respect for human rights and cooperation in humanitarian fields.

(4) Taking actions in all these matters in close consultation and cooperation with our allies.

'See Documents on Disarmament, 1974, pp. 746–747.

SEC. 2. The principle that any future treaty or agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union shall not limit the United States to levels of intercontinental strategic forces inferior to the limits provided for the Soviet Union.

SEC. 3. A joint effort on the part of the United States and the Soviet Union to bring about the immediate withdrawal by Cuba of all of her armed forces from Africa.

SEC. 4. Finally, the American objective is to achieve individual freedom and peace in the world. We believe that the people of our country want their Government to translate this aspiration into practical measures. We recognize that the possibilities for constructive cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union may be limited but we declare it to be the American purpose to carry on a process whose ultimate aim is to enlarge the sphere of cooperation as much as may prove possible.

SEC. 5. (a) The Congress finds that

(1) the three Baltic nations of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have been illegally occupied by the Soviet Union since World War II;

(2) the Soviet Union appears to interpret the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, signed at Helsinki, as giving permanent status to the Soviet Union's illegal annexation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania; and

(3) although neither the President nor the Department of State issued a specific disclaimer in conjunction with the signing of the Final Act at Helsinki to make clear that the United States still does not recognize the forcible conquest of those nations by the Soviet Union, both the President in his public statement of July 25, 1975, and the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs in his testimony before the Subcommittee on International Political and Military Affairs of the House Committee on International Relations stated quite explicitly that the longstanding official policy of the United States on nonrecognition of the Soviet Union's forcible incorporation and annexation of the Baltic nations is not affected by the results of the European Security Conference.

(b) Notwithstanding any interpretation which the Soviet Union or any other country may attempt to give to the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, signed in Helsinki, it is the sense of the Congress (1) that there has been no change in the longstanding policy of the United States on nonrecognition of the illegal seizure and annexation by the Soviet Union of the three Baltic nations of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, and (2) that it will continue to be the policy of the United States not to recognize in any way the annexation of the Baltic nations by the Soviet Union.

SEC. 6. This resolution shall be transmitted by the Secretary to the President of the United States.

For the Final Act, see Department of State Bulletin, Sept. 1, 1975, pp. 327 ff.

Presidential Veto of International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, May 7, 19761

To the Senate of the United States:

I am returning, without my approval, S. 2662,2 a bill that would seriously obstruct the exercise of the President's constitutional responsibilities for the conduct of foreign affairs. In addition to raising fundamental constitutional problems, this bill includes a number of unwise restrictions that would seriously inhibit my ability to implement a coherent and consistent foreign policy:

• By imposing an arbitrary arms sale ceiling, it limits our ability to respond to the legitimate defense needs of our friends and obstructs U.S. industry from competing fairly with foreign suppliers.

By requiring compliance by recipient countries with visa practices or human rights standards set by our Congress as a condition for continued U.S. assistance, the bill ignores the many other complex factors which should govern our relationships with those countries; and it impairs our ability to deal by more appropriate means with objectionable practices of other nations.

• By removing my restrictions on trade with North and South Vietnam, S. 2662 undercuts any incentive the North Vietnamese may have to provide an accounting for our MIAS.

• By mandating a termination of grant military assistance and military assistance advisory groups after fiscal year 1977 unless specifically authorized by Congress, the bill vitiates two important tools which enable us to respond to the needs of many countries and maintain vital controls over military sales programs.

The bill also contains several provisions which violate the constitutional separation of executive and legislative powers. By a concurrent resolution passed by a majority of both Houses, programs authorized by the Congress can be later reviewed, further restricted, or even terminated. Such frustration of the ability of the Executive to make operational decisions violates the President's constitutional authority to conduct our relations with other nations.

While I encourage increased Congressional involvement in the formulation of foreign policy, the pattern of unprecedented restrictions contained in this bill requires that I reject such Congressional encroachment on the Executive Branch's constitutional authority to implement that policy.

1

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, May 10, 1976, pp. 828-830. 'For the text of S2662, see the Congressional Record (daily), Apr. 6, 1976 (vol. 122, no. 51), pp. H2952-2964, or Conference Report on International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, H. rept. 94-1013, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., Apr. 6, 1976. The bill was passed by both the House and Senate on Apr. 28, 1976. Subsequently, the President approved a revised bill, post, pp. 386-430. The President's statement of approval is printed post, pp. 430–432.