The first SALT agreements were therefore without question in the American national interest. In the five-year respite gained by the 1972 interim agreement, it was our intention to negotiate a long-term pact on offensive weapons that would firmly fix both sides at an equal level once our new programs became operational. This is precisely what President Ford achieved at Vladivostok in November 1974.

In this accord in principle, both sides agreed on a ceiling of 2,400 strategic weapons covering strategic systems and heavy bombers-but not counting any of our forward-based aircraft in Europe, or our allies' strategic weapons, many of which can reach Soviet soil. The ceiling of 2,400 is lower than the level the Soviet Union already has reached; it would require the dismantling of many Soviet weapons, while the planned levels and composition of our forces would not need to be reduced or changed. An equal ceiling of 1,320 was placed on numbers of strategic weapons with multiple warheads. Soviet heavy missile launchers will remain frozen. These limits would cap the strategic competition in numbers for a 10-year period, yet preserve all the programs we need to assure deterrence and strategic sufficiency.

Obviously no single agreement can solve every problem. This is not a question of loopholes, but of evolving technology, with respect to which we intend to remain vigilant. We will negotiate carefully to make certain that the national interest and national security are protected. But if we succeed in turning the Vladivostok accord into a 10-year agreement, we will have crossed the threshold between total unrestrained competition and the difficult but promising beginning of long-term strategic equilibrium at lower levels of forces. The United States and the Soviet Union have already agreed to turn to reductions in strategic forces in the next phase of the negotiations, starting in 1977.

One would have thought that these accomplishments would speak for themselves. Instead, they have triggered a flood of charges which mislead the American people and our friends, give a wrong impression of irresoluteness to our adversaries, and complicate the prospects for a new agreement that is in the overriding national interest.

No charge is more irresponsible and potentially more dangerous than the allegation that the United States has knowingly tolerated violations of the first SALT agreements.

What are the facts? A Standing Consultative Commission was created by the agreements of 1972 precisely to consider disputes or ambiguities in implementation. Such incidents were almost certain to arise in a first, quite limited agreement between longstanding adversaries possessing weapons systems of great complexity whose growth is verified not by some neutral policing mechanism but by each side's own intelligence systems. Every questionable activity that has arisen has been systematically analyzed by this government and considered by

4 See also the U.S.-Soviet memorandum of understanding of Dec. 21, 1972, Documents on Disarmament, 1972, pp. 868-869.

the President and his advisers. Whenever any question remained, it was then promptly raised with the Soviets. All instructions to the American representative on the Consultative Commission reflected the unanimous views of all U.S. agencies concerned and the data and assessment produced jointly by them. No one had a bias in favor of absolving the Soviets an inherently malicious charge. No one prevented all questionable or suspicious activities from being raised with the Soviets. And not all the questioned activities were on the Soviet side.

All of these issues have been and will continue to be seriously handled and dealt with through a process that has proved effective. Yet irresponsible charges continue to lump together incidents that have been explained or are still being considered with wild allegations that have no foundation. They sometimes put forward inaccurate figures and data which often can be refuted only by divulging sensitive intelligence information. Yet with all the recent flurry of allegations, no recommendations are made of what countermeasures we should take or how to assess the significance of any given alleged violation.

In what way do the alleged violations affect the strategic equation? In what manner, if any, have we been foreclosed from protecting ourselves? Would those who inaccurately allege violations simply throw over all the agreements regardless of the benefits they provide the United States? Would they halt the negotiation of further agreements? What purpose is served by leading our public and the Soviet Union to believe-totally incorrectly-that the United States is blind to violations or that its government deliberately deceives its people? Can anyone seriously believe that this Administration which has strenuously resisted Communist advances in every part of the worldand is often strongly criticized for it-would ignore Soviet violations of a formal agreement?

I can assure you that this Administration will not tolerate violations. It will continue to monitor Soviet compliance meticulously. It will pursue energetically all ambiguities or signs of noncompliance. But it will not be driven by demagoguery to make false or hasty judgments. No department or agency charged with responsibility for this problem holds the view that any violations have occurred.

As we assess SALT we must face squarely one question: What is the alternative to the agreement we have and seek? If the SALT process falters, we must consider what new or additional strategic programs we would undertake, their likely cost, and above all, their strategic purpose.

An accelerated strategic buildup over the next five years could cost as much as an additional $20 billion. Failing a satisfactory agreement, this will surely be the path we must travel. It would be a tragically missed opportunity. For in the process of such a buildup, and the atmosphere it would engender, it would be difficult to return to serious negotiations for some time. Tensions are likely to increase; a new, higher baseline will emerge from which future negotiations

would eventually have to begin. And in the end, neither side will have gained a strategic advantage. At the least, they will have wasted resources. At worst, they will have increased the risks of nuclear war.

Of course the Soviet Union must ponder these alternatives as well. Their sense of responsibility must equal ours if there is to be an equitable and durable agreement based on strict reciprocity. We consider a SALT agreement important, but we will take no chances with our national security.

Let me sum up:

-We will never stand for the violation of a solemn treaty or agreement, and we will remain alert.

-We will never tolerate a shift in the strategic balance against us-by violations of agreements, by unsatisfactory agreements, or by neglect of our own programs. We will spend what is necessary to maintain strategic sufficiency.

-The President is determined to pursue the effort to negotiate a saner strategic balance on equitable terms-because it is in our interest and because we have an obligation to our own people and to world peace.

Statement by Department of Defense Director of Defense Research and Engineering (Currie) to the Senate Committee on Armed Services: Arms Control Implications of Strategic Programs [Extract], February 5, 1976 1

Despite allegations to the contrary, an objective of the Defense Department is to control arms. In order to explain this apparent paradox, I would like to dwell on the rationale for arms, and on the objectives of arms control.

We arm to provide national security: to support national goals— the first of which is survival itself-and to support our foreign policy objectives. Militarily, we assure our survival by a policy of deterrence, but we are aware that we cannot make deterrence absolute. There are conflicting demands for resources, fundamental among which is the demand that we survive economically, as well as militarily; that we do not erect an impregnable barrier around a hollow shell. We prepare our programs for deterrence recognizing the priorities of such other claims and do not demand arms without end. This is simply prudence, and is not explicitly intended as arms control.

The classic objectives of arms control are three: to limit the probability of war occurring, to limit the destruction should war occur,

1 Hearings on Fiscal Year 1977 Authorization for Military Procurement, Research and Development, and Active Duty, Selected Reserve, and Civilian Personnel Strengths (94th Cong., 2d Sess.), Pt. 4, pp. 2079-2083.

and to reduce expenditures for arms. At the same time, arms control must support national security. In this context, the first two objectives are fundamental, whereas the third enters indirectly, related to economic survival and maintenance of living standards, and may indeed conflict with the first two.

Our programs are consistent with these objectives. A major consideration in designing strategic forces is stability, to limit the likelihood that a war would be initiated in a crisis in order to achieve the advantage of striking first. Our forces should not be such as to invite attack: there should not appear to a potential adversary that an attack on our forces could leave him in a militarily stronger position than the status quo ante. Thus, we focus on improving the survivability of our forces to a disarming first strike attack, and on increasing the capability of those forces which do survive.

We also are designing our forces to reduce the consequent damage should war occur. Not only is it our policy to control escalation to the lowest level possible; our forces are being designed so accurate placement of smaller yield weapons reduces collateral damage. However, the lack of defenses against missile or heavy bomber attack circumscribes the degree to which we can limit damage to ourselves.

Thus, the objectives of arms control are not opposed to, but are quite consonant with, objectives which we pursue in the design of forces. But such objectives can also be achieved more formally under the rubric of "arms control." Arms control is a cooperative approach to armament. policy, where the cooperation may be quite explicit, through negotiations and treaties, or informal, through understandings, or even quite nebulous, such as reciprocated constraint. The element of cooperation, however obscure, is essential. Although one may take unilateral steps as signals of a willingness to cooperate, continued unilateral steps, particularly in the direction of unilateral disarmament, can lead to an imbalance which invites an enemy to attack or coerce us. In attempting to reduce the risk of war such a path carried too far becomes counterproductive and increases the risk of war or could force us to abandon some of our primary national objectives.

The SALT negotiations currently underway represent an attempt. at formal cooperation. A major difficulty in conducting these negotiations stems from the difficulty in learning whether the Soviets are seeking the same arms control goals as we.

United States force objectives and SALT objectives are publicly set forth, examined in detail, debated, and supported by the public. record of testimony, program decisions, and defense expenditures. No such record exists of Soviet objectives. While they may be revealed in political and ideological statements, Soviet force objectives and SALT objectives can generally be confirmed only by experience and activities. Time has not yet revealed their objectives, but it is difficult to reconcile their programs with the objectives stated above.

Recently enacted law requires that we submit arms control impact statements on each nuclear weapon system and on major non-nuclear

weapon systems. Our strategic research and development program conforms to the requirements of existing arms control treaties and gives recognition to current negotiation efforts. We firmly support the essential principle of Vladivostok-equality between the United States and the Soviet Union in central strategic systems. We further support the objective of bilateral strategic arms reductions. We recognize, however, that arms control agreements are imperfect at best and that we must take unilateral action where required to preclude major strategic asymmetries while negotiations continue toward perfecting agreements which preserve the essential national security interests of the United States. Our vigilance is based on the historical fact that international behavior of nations is governed by their supreme interests. If the Soviets believe their interests conflict with arms control agreements, the former will govern. It is our job to assure that the Soviets see clearly that their interests are best served by honoring such agreements.

Statement by Secretary of State Kissinger to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy: Nuclear Fuel Assurance Act, February 6, 19761

I am pleased to have this opportunity to testify on behalf of the Department of State in support of the Nuclear Fuel Assurance Act of 1975.

Since its creation in 1946, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy has played a unique and highly constructive role not only in the establishment of nuclear power as a major, viable energy source but also in enabling the United States to provide leadership in international nuclear cooperation under effective guarantees and safeguards. Senate Resolution 221, which you cosponsored, Mr. Chairman,2 calling for further strengthening of safeguards and other measures against proliferation, is a timely and important addition to our nonproliferation policy. The legislation you are considering now can be another milestone in the development of our peaceful nuclear program.

The Department of State attaches the highest importance to the earliest possible passage of this measure which will enable the United States to reassert its traditional leadership in international nuclear cooperation.

From our foreign policy standpoint, nuclear cooperation obtains a number of important benefits to the United States, the most significant of which are:

-Strong support to our efforts to stem further proliferation of nuclear weapons and other military uses of the atom.

2

1 Department of State Bulletin, Mar. 8, 1976, pp. 301-305.

Sen. John O. Pastore. For text of the res., see Documents on Disarmament, 1975, pp. 813-814.