seal that can be monitored remotely is under development. We hope to be able to present more details on this during the summer session.

In addition to these on-site but non-intrusive technical methods, treaty parties can be expected to rely on their own national means of verification to monitor continued inactivity at mothballed CW production plants. An agreement might therefore contain provisions aimed at facilitating such verification. An analogy would be the provisions in the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and its Protocol requiring that all nuclear weapon tests be conducted at designated test sites and that data on the geology of the test sites be exchanged in order to permit more accurate measurements by national technical means. Such means of facilitating CW verification have rarely, if ever, been considered by the Committee, but they seem to warrant further examination.

Although the United States has examined many techniques for verifying a CW production ban, none has been found to be more reliable. for resolving serious questions regarding compliance, and for restoring confidence in compliance, than on-site inspection of the facilities involved. The relative utility of on-site inspection has been recognized widely in the Committee; although, because of anticipated political objections as well as the desire to protect commercial secrets, support for on-site inspection has most often taken the form of support for the concept of "inspection by challenge". This concept would give a State asked about activities on its territory the authority to accept or reject. a request for on-site inspection. A provision for inspection by challenge is, of course, contained in the Japanese draft convention.

While a number of delegations have endorsed the idea of inspection by challenge, I would agree with the representative of Canada, who at our 643d meeting commented that we are "substantially lacking in the sort of detail that would permit such a system to be applied".11 I would suggest, therefore, that the Committee thoroughly consider the modalities of an on-site inspection system-both of inspection by challenge and mandatory inspection, although the two systems would have many features in common.

As a basis for assessing the effectiveness and acceptability of on-site procedures in relation to a production ban, several aspects of a possible verification system should be explored, including:

-procedures to be used in investigating the possible production of single-purpose agents compared to procedures for investigating the possible production of dual-purpose agents for weapons purposes; -the utility and method of interviewing officials responsible for a production facility in advance of inspecting that facility;

-the utility of visual inspection of grounds surrounding a facility; -the utility of, and procedures for, technical sampling of the environment surrounding a facility-for example, the soil, ground water, vegetation, and surface of the outer walls of buildings;

circumstances under which visual inspection and/or sampling inside a facility would be permitted;

11 Ibid., 1974, p. 354.

-the nature and amount of equipment that observers would be permitted to use;

-procedures for conducting a chemical analysis of samples, particularly whether this should be done on-site or at remote locations; --whether, after an on-site inspection and subsequent analysis of the data, return visits should be permitted to confirm the results or to obtain additional information.

These, of course, are only a few of the many aspects of an on-site inspection system that should be examined.

Aside from providing an adequate level of assurance that clandestine CW production is not taking place, a verification system suitable for an agreement to ban CW production and to destroy an agreed quantity of CW stocks would have to provide assurance that the quantity of CW stocks specified for destruction was actually destroyed. In August 1974, at our 654th meeting, I pointed out that the United States knew of no way to verify the destruction of declared stockpiles except by onsite observation of the actual process. The State destroying the agent could select a site far removed from other military or civilian installations, or perhaps located in a third country.12 My Government therefore believes that a procedure could be devised that would not reveal industrial or military secrets. Others in the Committee have indicated that they share this view.

An effective verification system for destruction of declared stockpiles must be capable of confirming that the type and quantity of the agent being destroyed have been correctly represented, and that no agent is being diverted during the destruction process. My delegation hopes to submit in the near future a working paper describing procedures, involving both monitoring instruments and inspection personnel, that we believe would be useful in achieving these objectives.

As part of the Committee's examination of verification of a CW production ban and verification of CW stockpile destruction, it might be useful to consider the feasibility and utility of technical exchange visits to selected chemical production or disposal facilities of various types in different countries.

Considerable attention has already been given in the Committee to the role that an international treaty authority could play, not only as an element in a CW verification system, but more generally as a means of ensuring the efficient operation of a CW treaty régime. My Government believes that such a body would be useful for the implementation of a CW agreement, and wishes now to present some thoughts regarding its organization and functions.

We think that the effective operation of the treaty regime should be the responsibility of the parties themselves, and not the responsibility of a new international organization established for the purpose. A consultative body might accordingly be set up, with membership open 12 Ibid., pp. 423-426.

to all parties or composed of a smaller group selected on a rotational basis. This body could draw on the technical expertise of its member States, and might also decide on occasion to seek the assistance of experts from other States, or from professional associations or international organizations with special expertise. Such a body could be convened periodically and as need arises. We anticipate that there would be some need for a permanent staff for the consultative body and for some services to be performed throughout the year, and we believe that the Secretary-General of the United Nations and his staff might play a useful role in this area.

We would expect the consultative body to perform a wide variety of functions. It could provide an opportunity for treaty parties to consider new scientific and technical developments that could affect the operation of the agreement. It could receive and discuss periodic reports by parties of chemical production data and other information deemed useful to treaty implementation. The circulation of such reports to treaty parties could be a responsibility of the permanent staff. The consultative body could also assume important responsibilities with regard to treaty compliance, including making arrangements for any on-site inspections.

In the first part of my statement I discussed several aspects of the scope and definition of phased CW limitations. In the second part, I have discussed various means that might be used to verify such limitations, and pointed to critical areas that, in our view, deserve particular attention.

Pursuant to the summit commitments of July and November 1974 to consider a joint CW initiative at the CCD, my Government has discussed these issues with the Government of the Soviet Union. The United States plans to continue its contacts with the Soviet Union with a view to developing a joint initiative. We can fully associate ourselves with the remarks of several delegations at this session that the United States-Soviet commitment to consider a joint initiative should not distract the Committee from working toward a CW agreement. We believe that useful work toward CW prohibitions can proceed on both tracks. We therefore look forward to hearing views of others on these important issues, both in our plenary meetings and in the informal meetings with experts scheduled at the initiative of the Federal Republic of Germany, during the CCD's summer session.

Statement by the Japanese Representative (Ogiso) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Chemical Weapons, April 13, 19761

The purpose of my intervention today is to state the views of my delegation on the question of banning chemical weapons and to offer some explanations on the "Working paper on the question of chemical 1CCD/PV.702, pp. 17-21.

warfare agents to be prohibited by the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons" which was submitted by my delegation and is now before us.2

Before entering into substance, however, I wish to express the appreciation of my delegation for the detailed statement made by the distinguished United States representative, Ambassador Martin. That statement contains important and interesting points which will be carefully studied by my delegation.

3

The question of banning chemical weapons has of course continued to be given high priority in the deliberations at this Committee. In the meantime, two draft conventions have been submitted, one by the Eastern countries and one by Japan, and so has a working paper of the non-aligned countries containing views on the main provisions for an agreement on banning chemical weapons. Also numerous statements were made and working papers submitted. However, when we view this question in terms of completing a convention, we note that there are a number of problems to be solved, starting from the problem as to whether we should aim at a comprehensive ban from the beginning or realize this by stages, and going on to the problems of deciding the scope of chemical warfare agents to be prohibited and of the function and organization of verification.

6

Against this background, we have been hoping that steps would be taken to materialize the joint initiative on banning the "most dangerous, lethal means of chemical warfare" as set out in the joint statement at the summit talks between the United States of America and the Soviet Union in July 1974; and, such being the case, we regret that no progress has been made to this day. In view of the lack of progress for the past 2 years in the CCD on this question, though in expectation of the joint initiative, I would call upon all the delegations present here to renew their efforts for the conclusion of a convention banning chemical weapons.

It is in this context that my delegation welcomes and supports the proposal made by the Federal Republic of Germany to hold an informal expert meeting of the Committee on the question of chemical weapons during its summer session. My delegation hopes that, during this informal meeting, we shall be able to put into order proposals and suggestions submitted in the past and to lay a firm groundwork for facilitating future deliberations on this question.

I shall now address myself to the current main problem concerning the question of banning chemical weapons-namely, to the problem

of defining the scope of chemical warfare agents to be prohibited in the convention.

The draft convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons (CCD/420) which my delegation submitted in April 1974 contains two basic principles-namely, (1) that the convention provides for a comprehensive ban as the ultimate aim, and (2) that the comprehensive ban should be realized by stages.' Though a comprehensive ban as our first principle should undoubtedly be our ultimate aim, it would be unrealistic to imagine that it can be achieved outright since the chemical warfare agents to be prohibited include dual-purpose agents which can also be used for peaceful purposes, and since there are problems which have to be solved such as finding verification measures to ensure compliance with the convention by States Parties. So, our approach should be in line with the second principle that a comprehensive ban should be realized by stages. In this respect, we associate ourselves fully with the statement made on 23 March by Ambassador Schlaich of the Federal Republic of Germany in which he said, "Given the realities of the situation, the only alternative is to adopt a step-by-step policy, without at the same time losing sight of the ultimate goal of a ban on chemical weapons." And we believe that this concept of how the subject should be approached is shared by many distinguished representatives.

As I have just stated, the draft convention which my delegation submitted provides for the first principle of a comprehensive ban in article I by adopting purpose criteria in banning "Chemical warfare agents of types and in quantities that have no justification for protective or other peaceful purposes". At the same time, it provides for the second principle of achieving a comprehensive ban by stages, by banning those agents for which verification measures are available. This principle is contained in article IV, by virtue of which some chemical agents are to be excluded tentatively from the initial ban. To put these two principles into execution, two steps should be takennamely, (1) to define the scope of chemical warfare agents to be prohibited ultimately, and (2) to define the scope of chemical warfare agents to be prohibited initially. This takes us to paragraph 2 of our working paper before us.

As stated in the paragraph, chemical warfare agents which should be ultimately banned in a comprehensive ban may be classified into four groups. Group 1 are those which have established themselves as part of the weapon systems of States and are retained and stockpiled in their arsenals. Group 2 are those which were used in past wars such as the First World War. There may be some which fall into both group 1 and group 2 concurrently, but this does not affect