and international exchanges in this sphere. Besides, these matters are outside the field of competence of the Committee on Disarmament. We consider that, in its present form, article III of the draft duly reflects this approach to the problem of peaceful activities in the area under consideration.

Those who spoke on the draft convention in the Committee devoted considerable attention to the provisions concerning the measures that may be taken in the event of a breach of the obligations deriving from the convention. These provisions, which are set forth in article V of the draft convention, provide for the obligation of States parties to the convention to consult one another and to co-operate in solving any problems which may arise in the application of the convention, and for the possibility of lodging a complaint with the Security Council if any State party acts in breach of its obligations under the convention.

The procedure proposed in the draft convention for lodging complaints with the United Nations Security Council is the most appropriate and practical one. Under the United Nations Charter, the body responsible for maintaining peace and security is the Security Council. In accordance with its powers, the Council will determine, on the basis of article V of the convention, the procedure for considering complaints received by it regarding the violation of the convention.

A few delegations, speaking on the said draft convention, have made some critical observations and comments on that part of article V which deals with the consideration of complaints against a violation of the convention. Thus, the representative of the Netherlands, Ambassador Van der Klaauw, stated that his Government is not at all happy with the fact that the Security Council would be the only body that could consider complaints against a violation of the convention and carry out an investigation. He spoke in favour of creating an “intermediate body" for the preliminary consideration of complaints, with the co-operation of experts. He suggested that the Secretary-General of the United Nations should be given fact-finding powers in the event of a violation of the convention, in which task he would be assisted by a committee, composed of parties to the Treaty.1o

The Soviet side considers that the procedure for solving problems arising from a violation of the convention, dealt with in article V of the draft convention is fully justified. This procedure is based on generally accepted rules of international law, namely: on the use of an appropriate international procedure within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter. The procedures established in the United Nations Charter for considering problems of the maintenance of international peace and security represent the most perfect expression and application of the universally accepted rules of international law, which most fully express the real means and possibilities regarding the settlement of controversial international issues and situations. These rules have acquired universal recognition, as

10 Ante, p. 89.

expressed in the broad membership of States in the United Nations and in their recognition of the United Nations Charter.

Moreover, the procedure for investigation proposed in the draft convention has already been widely adopted in international practice. It has been adopted in a number of international agreements concluded on the limitation of arms and on disarmament, and prepared within the framework of the Committee on Disarmament. Thus, article III of the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof provides, in particular, for consultation and co-operation between the parties to the Treaty if any doubts arise concerning the fulfilment of the obligations assumed under the Treaty." If such consultation and co-operation do not remove the doubts, a State party may, in accordance with the provisions of that article refer the matter to the Security Council for consideration. The convention on the prohibition of bacteriological and toxin weapons (articles V and VI) provides for the same procedure for the consideration of complaints against a violation of the convention as is proposed in the draft convention on the prohibition of environmental modification techniques for hostile purposes now under consideration in the Committee.12

Some remarks have been made in favour of giving the United Nations Secretary-General fact-finding powers in the event of a violation of the convention. The Soviet side does not share this attitude. The Secretary-General is the chief administrator of the Organization and it does not seem appropriate to enlist his aid in resolving questions and situations which are sometimes not only of a technical nature, but also political.

It has been argued that it would be inappropriate to lodge complaints directly with the Security Council, since "A State would be reluctant to lodge a complaint with the Security Council if it did not possess conclusive evidence that a violation of the treaty had occurred", 13

In this connexion, we should like to note that article V, paragraph 1, of the draft convention provides for procedures other than the lodging of complaints to the Security Council, namely: consultation and co-operation of States parties to the Convention in solving any problems which may arise in connexion with the application or violation of the convention. A complaint would be lodged with the Security Council only after all other possibilities of dealing with a controversial issue or situation, either by direct consultations between the interested parties, or by the use of appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter, had been exhausted.

11

See Documents on Disarmament, 1971, pp. 7–11.

"For text of the biological weapons convention, see ibid., 1972, pp. 133-138. Ante, p. 88.

13

The establishment of an intermediate body would create complications of a political and legal nature at the international level.

For the reasons I have stated, the Soviet side does not share the opinion expressed regarding an alteration of the procedure-provided for in article V of the draft convention now being considered by the Committee on Disarmament-for solving problems arising from a possible violation of the convention on the prohibition of the use of environmental modification techniques for hostile purposes.

Those are the observations we should like to make in connexion with the discussion in this Committee of the draft convention on the prohibition of the use of environmental modification techniques for hostile purposes. I would note, once again, that these observations are of a preliminary nature.

We hope that both the current exchange of views on the problem under consideration, and the meetings of the Committee on Disarmament to be held with the participation of experts, starting on 5 April next, will help towards the Committee's completing its work on the text of the convention already this year, and submitting it to the United Nations General Assembly at its thirty-first session.

United States Statement on Negotiating an Agreement on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes, March 31, 19761

The Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) was signed on July 3, 1974, and scheduled to take effect on March 31, 1976. However, article III of that treaty calls for the United States and U.S.S.R. to negotiate a separate agreement governing the conduct of underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes (PNE's). At the time of signing the TTBT and on several subsequent occasions, we stated that in view of the close relationship between the verification of a threshold on nuclear-weapon tests and the conduct of peaceful nuclear explosions, we would not present the TTBT to the Senate for ratification until a satisfactory PNE agreement had been concluded.

The negotiations for a PNE agreement began in October 1974 with the agreed objective of insuring that peaceful nuclear explosions would not be conducted so as to provide weapons-related benefits that were otherwise precluded by the TTBT. The two sides have made considerable progress in completing an agreement, and the negotiations are continuing in Moscow to resolve the few remaining issues.

The two sides hope that a satisfactory agreement can be concluded within the next several weeks. During this period, we expect that neither side will conduct weapons tests above the threshold of 150

1 Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 19, 1976, p. 507.

"For text, see Documents on Disarmament, 1974, pp. 225–227.

kilotons. For the immediate future, we have no plans for high-yield weapons tests above the threshold of 150 kilotons.

Statement by British Foreign Secretary Callaghan in the House of Commons: Nuclear Export Policy, March 31, 19761

When considering the export of nuclear equipment, material or technology, we shall study each case on its merits. Our first consideration will always be the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Euratom Treaty, and whether or not the prospective customer has concluded a Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency.3

Our detailed requirements will include the application of IAEA safeguards or comparable safeguards which are verified by the IAEA to exported nuclear equipment and material; an assurance that whatever we export will not be used to manufacture nuclear explosives for any purpose; an assurance that our exports will be adequately protected against the possibility of theft or sabotage; and assurances that if the equipment or material that we export is re-exported, then the new purchaser will be required to give the same assurances on safeguards, nonexplosive use and physical protection as were given by the original customer.

We shall also study with particular care proposals for the export of sensitive equipment or technology. By sensitive I mean equipment or technology which could lead to the construction of uranium enrichment plants, reprocessing plants or heavy water production plants. In general we shall exercise restraint in the export of such plants or their technology, and we are at present contributing to the IAEA's study of the feasibility of including such plants in regional fuel centres in the future. When we decide to export them we shall, of course, require assurances that any sensitive plants using transferred technology, now or in the future will be subject to IAEA safeguards. We shall also need to be consulted before our customers can re-export any sensitive nuclear materials or sensitive equipment or technology to a third country.

I wish to emphasise that the foregoing is the policy of Her Majesty's Government. It is not for me to say what policy other Governments will adopt. They will make their own decisions on their policies and in what to say about them. On the whole question of non-proliferation and nuclear exports, we are of course in close touch with other interested Government and international bodies and organisations.

1 Great Britain. Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), House of Commons, Official Report, vol. 908, no. 81, cols. 515–516.

Documents on Disarmament, 1968, pp. 461-465. 'Ibid., 1971, pp. 218–244.

Statement by the Japanese Representative (Ogiso) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Environmental Modification, April 1, 1976 1

1

As stated at the 692d meeting, on 9 March, I believe that the questions of nuclear arms control and nuclear disarmament will have to be given the highest priority in the deliberations of this Committee. At the same time, however, I would like to stress as well, that the importance of arms control and disarmament measures other than nuclear arms control and disarmament must not be underestimated. Among the non-nuclear arms control and disarmament measures, the question of the prohibition of the military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques is one of the current problems which is receiving public attention. The military use of those techniques by which the environment can be artificially modified is certainly contrary to the well-being and health of the entire human race, and so there is no need to say that the use of these techniques for military purposes must be completely banned.

My delegation considers it is desirable to prepare, even at this stage, effective legislative measures to prevent these environmental modification techniques from being applied for military or other hostile uses. For this reason, my delegation supports the basic ideas contained in the draft convention submitted to this Committee by the United States and the Soviet Union last August, and appreciates this draft convention as greatly expediting negotiations on this matter. From this standpoint, when the United Nations General Assembly adopted resolution 3474[5] (XXX) on this question by a consensus on 11 December last year, my country became one of the co-sponsors. In operative paragraph 1 of this resolution, the United Nations General Assembly requests the CCD to continue negotiations "with a view to reaching early agreement, if possible during the Committee's 1976 session, on the text of a convention on the prohibition of military or other hostile uses of environmental modification techniques", and in line with this directive informal meetings of this Committee with the participation of exports on this subject are to be held as from 5 April.2

Japan will certainly participate in the efforts of the CCD to elaborate at the earliest possible date a draft convention on this question, so that we can present it in time to this year's United Nations General Assembly.

From this basic position of my country I shall now proceed to express our views concerning the draft convention of the United States and the Soviet Union.3

As pointed out by the distinguished representatives of the Netherlands, Sweden, Iran, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United