techniques. It would, moreover, be impossible to draw up an exhaustive list either of existing or of possible future techniques, and considerable work would be necessary to keep it up to date. On the other hand, we feel there should be some reference to significant examples of environmental modification techniques, for otherwise the general public would find it very difficult, in view of the complex issues involved, to understand what the convention is all about. As I pointed out earlier the citing of examples also establishes certain criteria for the interpretation of the rather vague terms "wide-spread, long-lasting or severe".

The next point I should like to deal with is the choice of examples listed.

For the purposes of the definition contained in article I, the examples specified should meet at least one of the three criteria: widespread, long-lasting or severe.

We believe furthermore, that the examples selected should have a certain relevance to reality, for we should avoid giving the impression that we are talking of the world of science fiction and should concentrate rather on the dangers in the real world. But we can only assess these dangers for the present and the foreseeable future. One criterion for the choice of examples should therefore be whether, according to serious scientific opinion, the use of environmental modification techniques as a means of warfare would be possible in the foreseeable future.

The following factors have to be taken into account in assessing to what extent the use of such techniques would be possible:

(a) technical feasibility,

(b) suitability as a means of causing damage to another State. This would be non-existent or doubtful unless the time and place of the damage can be more or less accurately determined, particularly when the State using such techniques could also cause grave damage to itself or third countries,

(c) the ratio between costs and desired effect. The use of exceedingly costly techniques is unlikely if much cheaper ways of causing the intended damage are available.

Applying these criteria, we have come with the help of our experts to the following conclusions as regards the examples listed in article II:

1. An upset in the ecological balance of a region is an appropriate example.

2. The same applies to changes in weather patterns, although we feel that more precise wording would be desirable here. In the light of article I there should be no doubt in this context that only measures having wide-spread, long-lasting or severe effects are meant. The term "clouds" does not seem to fall under this heading, and we believe it would therefore be better to substitute "cloud systems" for "clouds".

This would make it clear that this provision does not apply to activities conducted in a limited area and over a short period only.

3. We approve also of the example of changes in climate patterns. 4. As far as its effects are concerned, we feel that the use of tsunamis as a means of causing damage within the meaning of the convention is a graphic example. We do not discount the possibility that it may be technically feasible for countries possessing thermo-nuclear devices to cause tsunamis. However, particularly in the light of the ratio of necessary costs to desired effects, which are virtually incalculable in advance, the use of this technique seems problematic. It is doubtful whether one State wanting to cause damage to another would adopt this roundabout course when it possessed the means to inflict the damage directly, especially since tsunamis can hardly be regarded as a means of "secret warfare". We would be interested to know to what extent other countries think these examples are realistic.

5. Earthquakes, whose effects can be considered wide-spread, longlasting or severe would, according to our experts be caused only in locations where they normally occur from natural causes, that is in the fault zones on the earth's crust with their unstable tensions and at times when an earthquake is imminent. The possibility of setting off or, rather, precipitating earthquakes depends on the ability to forecast earthquakes, which today we do not possess. It is more or less impossible to know when science will have this ability. Nevertheless it cannot be entirely excluded that this stage will be reached in the foreseeable future. We also have doubts as to how far this technique is suitable as a means of warfare within the meaning of the convention. It is difficult to see how and when the effects can be calculated with such accuracy that there is no likelihood of damage to the country employing it or to neighbouring countries. Nevertheless, activities of this kind, although not very likely to be undertaken are, in the foreseeable future, not entirely beyond the bounds of possibility. We therefore hesitate to suggest that this example should be deleted. We would, however, appreciate other States' views on this point.

6. We need not go into detail on the possibility in principle of causing changes in the state of the ozone layer. There is world-wide concern that such changes could result from the unintended side-effects of peaceful activities.

Our experts, however, have considerable doubts as to the feasibility of using such changes to cause specific damage to another State. They believe that less concentrated parts of the ozone layer could, as the result of air currents and turbulence, quickly and unpredictably shift and change, move over regions of continental size and be regenerated. The modified parts of the ozone layer would therefore not remain sufficiently long over the area in question nor remain sufficiently permeable to cause damage as the result of an increase in ultraviolet radiation. And at the same time the possibility of damage to neutral, friendly or even the State's own territory could not be excluded. Under these circumstances it seems improbable that a country would use this technique

as a weapon against another State. On this point, also, we would be interested to learn the views of other countries on the reservations we have expressed.

7. Similarly, we think it is doubtful whether changes in the state of the ionosphere can be considered an appropriate example. Here, too, the effects would probably be felt by both friend and foe. It is also questionable whether changes resulting in a disturbance in the propagating conditions of electro-magnetic waves do in fact have effects which could be termed as destruction, damage or injury within the meaning of the convention.

8. In the opinion of our experts, changes in ocean currents, as far as global current areas such as the Gulf Stream or the Kuro Shiwo are concerned, can neither at present nor for the foreseeable future be regarded as technically feasible. The volume of water carried by the Gulf Stream is equivalent to several thousand times the volume of the biggest rivers of the earth. Even taking into account the future potential of nuclear technology, there is probably no way of modifying ocean currents of this magnitude.

We therefore propose that this example be deleted.

9. We would however suggest, in order to bring out the two aspects of feasibility and intelligibility to the general public, that instead of changes in ocean currents, a new example-altering the course of rivers and modifying natural drainage systems-be included in the list. The reason for drawing attention to such activities, which could both disturb the ecological balance and cause changes in climate patterns, lies in particular in the possibly grave and direct consequences of depriving the population and natural environment of whole regions of water supplies.

And now a brief comment on article III. In our view this article, which explicitly excludes the use of environmental modification techniques for peaceful purposes from the prohibition, is an important provision. It is in line with the approach adopted in other arms control conventions, which specifically exclude peaceful activities. We feel, however, that the present wording could be improved, and we support the Swedish proposal to amend the phrase "the provisions of this Convention shall not hinder . . . " to read: "the provisions of this Convention do not apply . . .". The point of this would be to prevent any misunderstandings concerning the possibility and need. for international rules regarding the use of environmental modification techniques for peaceful purposes.

I should like now to discuss the complaints procedure. Already in the First Committee, at the thirtieth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, we have set out our reservations regarding the complaints procedure as envisaged in the draft, and we have emphasized that provision must be made to ensure that it cannot be blocked by the veto of the permanent members of the Security Council.

To spell out our thinking on this matter more clearly we should like to draw attention to the following problems: arms control treaties

which do not provide for a proper verification procedure but simply for complaints to be lodged with the United Nations Security Council can hardly claim to have made available the necessary instruments to ensure verification. One example along these lines is the Convention on the Prohibition of Bacteriological Weapons. As we stated at the time, we do not envisage the complaints procedure provided for in that Convention as a model for future arms control treaties, and we regret that both the present draft convention on the prohibition of environmental warfare, as well as another draft submitted at the last session of the United Nations General Assembly, adopt the procedure provided for in the Convention on Bacteriological Weapons.

Not only general consideration of arms control policy but also the equality of States provide grounds for reservation regarding the envisaged complaints procedure, as it would not exclude the possibility of the veto right of certain States being extended to the field covered by the convention now under consideration. The unique structure of the Security Council can be understood only in the context of the special powers assigned to this body under the United Nations Charter. This structure is closely linked with the spheres covered by the Charter and is not appropriate for other spheres subject to contractual regulation. Also for this reason we believe it would be proper to establish, for verification and complaints procedures under the convention, a separate body outside the United Nations system. Another point in favour of this solution would be that States which are not members of the United Nations could also become parties to the convention. Any State with a complaint would, of course, be free to submit it to the Security Council, where the conditions for such a step laid down in the United Nations Charter are fulfilled.

The scientific complexity of the subject matter of the convention and its largely unresearched nature also argues for the setting up of a special verification committee. A body concerned solely with the verification of this convention could concentrate more on keeping up to date with relevant scientific and technological developments than the Security Council, which has many other problems to deal with. The consideration that the detection of a variety of conceivable violations of the convention might be possible only after many years of observation-the example of changes in climate patterns with hostile intent might be cited here-also points to the establishment of a special verification committee. Such a committee should be composed of a limited number of representatives of States which have ratified the convention. Its composition would naturally also have to reflect the different regional and political characteristics of the contracting parties.

The task of the verification committee would be to establish as far as possible the facts of the case. All States party to the convention should undertake to co-operate at any rate by providing the necessary information. Where there is no alternative, on-site inspection should

Documents on Disarmament, 1972, pp. 133-138.

not in principle be excluded. Our aim is to establish a body capable of carrying out the tasks assigned to it. For this reason the complainant as well as the representative of the State against which the complaint. is directed should abstain from voting on the decisions of the committee. The aim should be to take decisions by consensus, but if this cannot be achieved it should be possible to adopt a recommendation by a majority of votes. If the verification committee concludes that a serious violation of the convention has occurred which might, depending on the circumstances, necessitate Security Council action, it would be obliged to submit its findings without delay to the Security Council. The procedure we propose would have the advantage that at least the investigation of a complaint could not be blocked right from the beginning. Nor, incidentally, would the powers of the Security Council be curtailed.

The composition of the verification committee and its powers must, of course, be the subject of detailed further discussion. We do not feel it would be appropriate at this stage to be more specific until it is clear whether there is sufficient support for these suggestions among the CCD member States. We would be grateful for a considered response to our suggestions and welcome comments which will make possible further progress.

Statement by the Swedish Representative (Thorsson) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament [Extracts), March 25, 19761

In my statement this morning I am going to discuss the possibilities of reaching an international agreement on the ban of chemical weapons, I shall comment further on the draft convention banning environmental warfare and I shall put down the Swedish position regarding certain aspects of the CCD set-up and procedures.

But before I do so, I shall have a few words to say on an issue before us for years, time and time again given-by the General Assemblythe highest priority on our agenda. I find it unbelievable that the parties carrying the main responsibility for the sordid fact that this issue still remains unsolved can appear untouched by the continued political and moral pressure exerted on them finally to show the polit ical will and capacity to solve it. I am, of course, referring to the comprehensive test ban agreement.

I would like to recall that in my intervention in the CCD on 19 February 1976,2 I dwelt at some length on the possibilities of concluding, soon, such an agreement. And I called on the two super-Powers members of the CCD, which would not expose themselves to any risks for their military security by taking the lead in starting the process

1CCD/PV.697, pp. 20–28. 'CCD/PV.689, pp. 6–11.