a number of things that cannot be verified. This allows the edges of the treaty to be nibbled, and I think that most lawyers would agree that a law that cannot be enforced probably should not be in existence. Senator PELL. The same rule applies to a blockade by the Navy. Mr. DAVIES. Yes, sir. There is an element of that in the thoughts and the decision processes that went on in the Government that led to this formulation. I must add that the formulation, as you see it in the proposed draft, is the result of a considerable discussion between ourselves and the Soviet Union, and all of the words have been debated thoroughly from quite different points of view, and I think we have, as in any treaty of this sort, something of a compromise. I believe it to be a practical compromise, and I believe it to be an effective compromise.

SOURCE OF "WIDESPREAD, LONG-LASTING AND SEVERE❞

Senator PELL. What was the emphasis on this phrase, the so-called Troika language, widespread, long-lasting, and severe? Did this come from our side, or the Soviets?

Mr. DAVIES. I do not know where that came from. The phrase, to my knowledge, first appeared in the joint communique signed by Mr. Brezhnev and the President in July of 1974, in Moscow.' That is the first time I had seen the phrase, and I simply cannot enlighten you as to where it came from.

Senator PELL. I had understood that the Soviets did not originally want the Troika qualifiers, and that we were the ones who pressed them to accept it. Would that be an incorrect statement?

Mr. DAVIES. I do not know the answer to that, Mr. Chairman. I really do not. It is possible. All I can say is that the Soviets signed the joint communique.

Joint United States-Soviet Communique, January 23, 1976 1

On 20-23 January in Moscow discussions took place between General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee L. I. Brezhnev, Politburo Member and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR A. A. Gromyko and the United States Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger.

The talks touched upon a broad range of questions of mutual interest to the United States of America and the Soviet Union. Taking part in the discussions were, on the American side, Walter J. Stoessel,

7 Documents on Disarmament, 1974, p. 231.

1 Department of State Bulletin, Feb. 16, 1976, p. 165.

Jr., Ambassador of the U.S.A. to the USSR; Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the Department of State; Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs; William Hyland, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; James P. Wade, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, and others; and on the Soviet side, V. V. Kuznetsov, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs; G. M. Korniyenko, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs; A. F. Dobrynin, Ambassador of the USSR to the U.S.A.; A. M. Alexandrov, Assistant to the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, and others.

Both sides are in agreement that the course of further strengthening and development of relations between the U.S.A. and the USSR would serve the interests of the peoples of both countries and is an essential factor in the cause of relaxation of international tension and the strengthening of peace. In the course of the negotiations special attention was devoted to examination of concrete questions relating to the working-out of a new long-term agreement between the U.S..A. and the USSR on limitation of strategic offensive weapons, on the basis of the agreement reached during the negotiations between the President of the U.S.A. and the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee in Vladivostok in November 1974.2 Progress was attained on a number of these questions, and it was agreed that negotiations will be continued with the aim of finding mutually acceptable solutions to the remaining problems.

During examination of the status of negotiations on reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe, both sides had in mind the task of facilitating progress in these negotiations. There was also an exchange of views on a number of other urgent international problems.

The negotiations took place in a business-like and constructive atmosphere. Both sides consider the exchange of views to have been been useful.

Letter From Senator Pell to ACDA Director Iklé:
Environmental Modification, January 23, 19761

DEAR DR. IKLÉ: I am sorry that you were not able to appear before my Subcommittee's hearing on the environmental modification treaty. I appreciate, however, your sending Admiral Davies to represent you. He was a most cooperative and forthcoming witness.2

'See Documents on Disarmament, 1974, pp. 746–747.

1 Prohibiting Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Oceans and International Environment of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Ninety-fourth Congress, Second Session, on the Draft Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, p. 16.

'Ante, pp. 8–12.

I would like you to know and to make known to the rest of the Washington community involved in the environmental modification negotiations that based on all of the testimony which I heard at the January 21 hearings, I find no persuasive reason justifying the Administration's retention of the qualifiers "widespread, long-lasting or severe." Your letter of September 24, 1975 to Congressman Gude suggested that anything that is effective militarily would be prohibited by these criteria.3 If that is so, I see no reason to adhere to criteria which only preserve ineffective options.

I urge you to re-examine these criteria and the other areas of ambiguities which were raised by me, Congressman Gude, and Dr. Weiss with a view toward strengthening the treaty to make it a more effective means of arms control. In my view Senate approval of a treaty could be jeopardized if the prohibition against hostile uses of environmental modification techniques is not an unqualified one.

Finally, during the course of the hearing, I mentioned that several questions would be submitted for replies to be inserted in the record. Those questions are enclosed, and it is my hope that responses could be forthcoming as quickly as possible so that the printing of the hearing can be expedited.*

With every good wish,
Ever sincerely,

CLAIBORNE PELL.

Statement by ACDA Director Iklé to the Senate Committee on Government Operations: Export Reorganization Act of 1976, January 30, 1976 1

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I greatly appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to address the subject of nuclear export controls.

I believe all of us, whether in the executive or in the legislative branch, are in agreement that the effective regulation of nuclear exports is one of the most important means of curbing nuclear proliferation. To this end, I welcome the sustained interest of the Congress and, especially this committee, in seeking to insure that nuclear export controls will aid in achieving U.S. nonproliferation objectives.

3

Excerpt printed ante, p. 11. For complete text of letter, see Prohibiting Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques: Hearing . . pp. 5-6.

4 The questions and answers are printed post, pp. 100–103.

1

Export Reorganization Act of 1976: Hearings before the Committee on Government Operations, United States Senate, Ninety-fourth Congress, Second Session, on S. 1439, to Reorganize Certain Export Functions of the Federal Government to Promote More Efficient and Effective Administration of Such Functions, pp. 565-567.

GIVE REORGANIZATION A CHANCE TO WORK

Of necessity, export controls in a highly complex area such as this require close coordination among the various government agencies and constant scrutiny with a view to perfecting and maintaining the most effective system possible. Since the creation of the independent Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the interagency coordinating process has undergone numerous changes, not just the initial "shaking down" associated with any form of reorganization. However, the coordinating process has been improving steadily. ACDA is presently fully integrated into this process and able to make its views known on nuclear export policy formulation, U.S. nuclear agreements and arrangements with other countries, and all strategically important nuclear export applications. I firmly believe that the present system, which has been characterized by the Congressional Research Service as having created "a whole new field of public administration" should be given a chance to work without imposing another "revolution" on the changes brought about by the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974. Aside from these general considerations, I am concerned with some of the specific provisions of S. 1439.2 Many of these were touched on by the witnesses on panel two yesterday and it is perhaps not necessary for me to comment further this morning. However, two sections impact directly on ACDA-Sections 8 and 9. Some discussion is

necessary.

Section 8(a) establishes the requirement that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission "obtain a nuclear proliferation assessment statement from the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency" with respect to a number of the Commission's functions, including those involving international agreements for cooperation and subsequent amendments thereto.

Section 8(b) provides that this Agency

prepare and furnish such nuclear proliferation assessment statements directly to the Commission, to the Secretary of State, and to the Congress, at least a substantial portion of which shall be a nonclassified summary of major findings and recommendations.

Regarding these provisions in the bill for nuclear proliferation assessments, it is my view that current procedures already insure that the NRC receives the information it needs to carry out its responsibilities. ACDA, of course, must continue to play an important role in providing NRC with the relevant information. However, I do not believe that new procedures as proposed in the bill are needed.

The other section directly impacting on ACDA is section 9(b) which would require the NRC to conduct a study of comprehensive safeguards guidelines and regulations for atomic energy facilities, components and materials for use for nonmilitary purposes. As you know, the Nonproliferation Treaty is one of the major arms control

agreements, and my Agency has always played a significant role in its implementation, including the institution and upgrading of safeguards. I feel that section 9 (b) ignores ACDA's proper role in this area and that ACDA should become directly and prominently involved in any proposed study, together with other relevant executive branch agencies.

Turning now to your request to respond to the points raised in the analysis of U.S. agreements for cooperation in atomic energy, prepared for your committee by the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress. Comments for the record on each of the 14 points will be furnished. However, I want to single out and mention briefly those six points which, in my opinion, are of particular significance to our nonproliferation policy. They are those dealing with the extension of safeguards to nuclear materials produced in facilities built with the help of U.S. technology, point 6; the reprocessing of spent fuels, point 7; international safeguards for all nuclear activities in an agreement nation, point 8; the physical security or physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities, point 9; the preference to be accorded NPT parties, point 10; and the subject of peaceful nuclear explosions, point 13. I believe we have made much progress in these areas. Of course, further efforts, both at the domestic and international level, are required to strengthen our nonproliferation policy.

NEED FOR GOOD INTELLIGENCE

Sound and effective nuclear export controls are essential, but they alone cannot avert the dangers of nuclear proliferation nor protect us from nuclear damage in a world where the destructive power of the atom has become so widely available.

Something else is needed, and I cannot stress this need too much. It is the need for good intelligence.

Congress will play a critical role, and you in particular will play a role in this full committee as you consider intelligence matters. As I have stated on other occasions, peaceful nuclear technology can provide

the means as well as the cover for acquiring the nuclear bomb. The dividing line between peaceful uses and the nuclear bomb is getting so thin and complex that we cannot expect to discriminate on the basis of remote physical observations alone.

In many instances, intent is the only factor distinguishing peaceful nuclear activities from the preparation of an arsenal of weapons. And how do we determine intent?

We cannot rely on any single intelligence method as we seek to discover intentions; we must use every available means. We must not

3 Documents on Disarmament, 1968, pp. 461-465.

United States Agreement for Cooperation: An Analysis Prepared for the Committee on Government Operations, United States Senate, by the Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress (Com. prt.; 94th Cong., 2d Sess.), Jan. 1976.