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For these reasons, the strategic arsenals of the two sides find their principal purpose in matching and deterring the forces of the opponent and in making certain that third countries perceive no inequality. In no recent crisis has an American President come close to considering the use of strategic nuclear weapons. In no crisis since 1962-and perhaps not even then-has the strategic balance been the decisive factor. Even in Korea, when we possessed an overwhelming superiority, it was not relevant to the outcome.

STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION

It is against this background that we have vigorously negotiated mutual limitations in strategic arms. These are compelling reasons for pursuing such talks.

-Since successive rounds of competitive programs will almost certainly yield only equilibrium, we have sought to regulate the competition and to maintain the equivalence that will exist in any case at lower levels.

-Stabilizing the strategic balance frees resources to strengthen our forces in areas where they are most needed; it will ease the problem of enhancing our capabilities for regional defense and in seapower, the areas where an imbalance could have serious geopolitical consequences. -Agreed limitations and a more calculable strategic relationship will facilitate efforts to reduce political confrontations and crises.

-And, finally, the American people expect their leaders to pursue every responsible approach to peace and stability in the thermonuclear era. Only then can we expect them to support the sacrifices necessary to maintain our defensive strength.

We have made progress toward these goals. In the 1972 SALT agreements we froze antiballistic missile systems in their infancy and thus avoided potentially massive expenditures and instabilities. We halted the momentum of the Soviet missile buildup for five years-a period in which, because of the long leadtimes involved, we had no capacity for deployment of our own. We intended to use that five-year interval to negotiate a longer term and more comprehensive agreement based on numerical equality and, failing that, to close the numerical gap by our own efforts as our modernization programs developed.

This is precisely what President Ford achieved at Vladivostok 3 a year and a half ago and what we are trying to enshrine in a binding treaty that would run through 1985. Both sides would have equal ceilings on missiles, heavy bombers, and on multiwarhead missiles;" this would require the Soviets to dismantle weapons, while our planned forces would not be affected. And neither the weapons of our allies nor our forward-based nuclear systems, such as carriers and tactical aircraft, would be included; these had been Soviet demands since 1969. These are major accomplishments which are overwhelmingly in our interest, particularly when we compare them to the situation which could have prevailed had we failed to achieve restraints on Soviet pro

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grams. Nevertheless, very important issues remain to be resolved. We will make every effort to conclude a satisfactory agreement, but we will be driven solely by the national interest and not by arbitrary or artificial deadlines.

The SALT agreements are the opposite of one-sided concessions to the U.S.S.R., as they are so often portrayed. Soviet offensive programs were slowed; none of ours were affected. Nor has the Administration countenanced Soviet violations of the first SALT agreement, as has been irresponsibly charged. In fact we have carefully watched every aspect of Soviet performance. It is the unanimous view of all agencies of our government-only recently reconfirmed-that no Soviet violation has occurred and that none of the ambiguous actions that we have noted and raised has affected our security. But we will remain vigilant. All ambiguous information will be carefully analyzed. No violations will be tolerated. We will insist on full explanations where questionable activity has occurred.

We will maintain the strategic balance at whatever level is required-preferably within the limits of successful SALT negotiations but, if necessary, without those limits. We will not heed those who maintain that all that is required are limited, minimum deterrence forces to threaten the Soviet civilian population. To follow their advice would deprive us of all options save capitulation and the massive destruction of civilian life; it would create a large numerical imbalance against us, which could have significant political consequences, possibly tempting our adversaries and upsetting our friends.

But neither will we be deflected by contrived and incredible scenarios, by inflated versions of Soviet strength, or by irresponsible attacks on SALT into diverting defense resources away from vital areas the forces for regional and local defense and our Navy. For these are the areas where shortfalls and imbalances can rapidly turn into geopolitical shifts that jeopardize our fundamental interests and those of our allies.

Statement by ACDA Director Iklé to the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs of the House Committee on International Relations: First Use of Nuclear Weapons, March 25, 19761

Mr. Chairman, I welcome the opportunity to appear today before you and the other members of the subcommittee to discuss a question in which I have had a longstanding interest, the question of first use of nuclear weapons.

1

1 First Use of Nuclear Weapons: Preserving Responsible Control: Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, Ninety-fourth Congress, Second Session, Mar. 16, 18, 23, and 25, 1976, pp. 154-155.

In talking about first use of nuclear weapons, it must be made clear that we are talking about a defensive resort to nuclear arms in the event of an overwhelming conventional attack that U.S. allied forces cannot turn back with conventional arms alone. I am not at this point speaking of a strategic “first strike" designed to eliminate the retaliatory capability of Soviet strategic forces, a point addressed later in my statement.

Over the last 25 years there has been a significant, albeit slow, development in U.S. attitudes and doctrines regarding such first use of nuclear weapons. This development can be fairly summarized as a narrowing of possible events for which U.S. policy envisages first use. Thus, in his 1954 message to Congress, President Eisenhower said: "A wide variety of atomic weapons-considered in 1946 to be mere possibilities of a distant future-have today achieved conventional status in the arsenals of our armed forces." By contrast, in a press conference in 1971, President Nixon explicitly ruled out the suggestion-he called it "rather ridiculous"-that our use of air power in Indochina might include tactical nuclear weapons.

Two formal steps-one in 1971; the other in 1974-are illustrative of this narrowing of first-use contingencies.

On May 12, 1971, the United States Government through its ratification of additional Protocol II to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, the so-called Treaty of Tlatelolco, undertook not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against Latin American states party to the Treaty's nuclear-free-zone arrangement. In adhering to Protocol II, the U.S. submitted a formal statement of understanding that: The United States Government would have to consider that an armed attack by a contracting party, in which it was assisted by a nuclear-weapon state, would be incompatible with the contracting party's corresponding obligations under Article I of the treaty.3

In May 1974, in answering Swedish questions about low-yield nuclear weapons, the U.S. Delegate to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament stated:

In response to speculation that further development of low-yield tactical nuclear weapons would blur the present distinction between conventional and nuclear weapons, I wish to state categorically that the U.S. Government has no intention whatever to treat such tactical systems as interchangeable with conventional arms. We fully appreciate that the distinction, or "firebreak," between nuclear and non-nuclear arms is a major factor in preventing nuclear warfare, and we will not act to erode this distinction.*

But while we have been moving in a positive way to reduce the number of possible first-use contingencies, we do not believe that an

'Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1954, pp. 261–262.

Documents on Disarmament, 1971, p. 311. The treaty and its protocols appear ibid., 1967, pp. 69–83.

'Ibid., 1974, p. 163.

unqualified no-first-use undertaking by the United States is advisable. At the May 1975 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, many non-aligned States called for commitments by the nuclear powers never to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against Non-Nuclear-Weapon States. The United States and the other nuclear powers opposed such an undertaking. The U.S. noted that mutual security arrangements have alleviated the security concerns of many Non-Nuclear-Weapon States and that non-use assurances could undercut such commitments to Allies, thus raising concerns about their security, and thereby increasing their incentive to acquire independent nuclear-weapon capabilities. Pointing out that the principal security concern of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States is not the threat of nuclear attack by the U.S., U.S.S.R., or the U.K., but rather the possibility of conventional armed conflict with neighboring Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, the U.S. expressed doubt at the Conference that a worldwide non-use commitment would serve as a powerful incentive to renounce nuclear weapons.

Further, we are faced-at least for several years-with certain significant imbalances in conventional strength in areas where we have important commitments: I refer in particular to NATO's central front. Rectification of this imbalance in Europe is being sought both through the Mutual Balanced Force Reduction negotiations and by U.S. and Allied conventional defense improvements. In this context, it must be remembered that our principal goal is the deterrence of war altogether, and that NATO's doctrine of potential first use can enhance this deterrence.

In the longer term, under appropriate circumstances and in particular regions of the world, it is possible that a non-use pledge in conjunction with an effective nuclear-weapon-free zone arrangement might supplement the security of the Non-Nuclear-Weapon States concerned, as did the Treaty of Tlatelolco, to which I earlier referred.

As we consider any such non-use undertaking, however, we must keep in mind that our Allies might be concerned that such assurances could lead to even broader non-use undertakings. Among the most geographically exposed of our Allies are major industrial nations which in the interest of global stability, have decided not to develop nuclear weapons, although they unquestionably possess the technical and industrial resources to do so. The willingness of such nations to forswear nuclear weapons depends to a considerable extent upon their continued faith in the reliability of their alliance with the United States.

Yet, our refusal to renounce the first use of nuclear weapons should not be misunderstood. It is not a belligerent posture. It does not propose that nuclear weapons would be used except in the most extreme circumstances where large-scale military aggression threatened the vital interests of the United States and its Allies. Indeed, one of our principal security objectives is to reduce reliance on nuclear forces by strengthening our conventional military posture, and particularly by redressing the imbalance in conventional forces on NATO's central

front. If the imbalance in conventional arms can be reduced over the years to come-through improvements in U.S. and Allied conventional defenses and through arms control arrangements our reliance on first use could become less important. Such a trend would be all to the good.

For these reasons, Mr. Chairman, I urge that the Congress reject those proposed resolutions before you which would explicitly require the United States to forswear the first use of nuclear weapons, namely House Resolution 11, House Joint Resolutions 533, 534, 535, 536, 575, 630, 713, and 723.

We appreciate the spirit underlying House Joint Resolutions 618, 626, and 714. It is in fact U.S. policy not to seek to develop a disarming first-strike capability. However, we believe the proposed resolutions would be unhelpful for two reasons. First, they fail to recognize that the development of a disarming first-strike capability is contrary to existing U.S. policy and suggest, erroneously, that the U.S. is currently seeking to achieve such a capability. Second, by failing to distinguish between a disarming first-strike capability and other kinds of capabilities against military forces, the resolution could be read as condemning, without distinction, all strategic capabilities for attacking military targets.

Mr. Chairman, this completes my statement. I would welcome any questions you may have.

Statement by the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs of the Department of State (Vest) Before the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs of the House Committee on International Relations: First Use of Nuclear Weapons, March 25, 19761

I welcome this opportunity to discuss with you the issues relating to the possible initial use of nuclear weapons. The Department of State shares the concern underlying the proposals which these hearings are considering. We must try to make nuclear war less likely and do so in ways which preserve this country's security.

I would like to discuss first the reasoning which underlies our policy regarding the initial use of nuclear weapons. The central objective of U.S. strategic nuclear forces is to deter nuclear attack on and nuclear coercion of the United States and its allies. This objective requires as a minimum that these forces, even after absorbing an all-out first strike, be able to inflict an unacceptable level of damage on our enemies. In addition, we must maintain an overall military capability that can meet any level of enemy attack with a deliberate and credible response. Recent improvements in U.S. strategic forces and in command and con

1Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 19, 1976, pp. 518–520.

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