The U.S. Government had sought to develop an effective inspection method which would be as unintrusive as possible. It utilizes a "passive" device-one which has no moving parts or electronics which might be subject to malfunction, which makes no permanent attachments to impair the future use of the facility, and which can remain undisturbed in place on a shutdown plant until removed for an inspection. The neutrons generated in the core of an operating reactor can be detected and measured by means of a material which captures neutrons. The monitoring device consists of wires containing natural cobalt. The wires are placed in a tube, which is then rolled flat. They thus take on a unique configuration inside this "safing tape," and this "fingerprint" is X-rayed before the tape goes into the reactor. The tape is then sealed by an ingeniously devised plastic cap into which pieces of metal shavings have been mixed at random. Photographs are made of this second "fingerprint." The reactor cannot then be operated in violation of an agreement without activating the telltale cobalt inside; the outside seal cannot be disturbed without altering the fingerprint. Inspections need not occur with annoy 43 Text ibid., pp. 596-605. 44 See ibid., pp. 554-560. ing frequency, and can be scheduled in advance. On November 16, 1966, this method for policing the "cutoff" measure was demonstrated on a shutdown reactor at the Atomic Energy Commission's Hanford Plant, near Richland, Wash. U.N. General Assembly delegates and advisors from 51 countries and several international organizations witnessed the demonstration as guests of the U.S. Government. Freeze on offensive and defensive missiles In his seven-point message to the ENDC on January 27, President Johnson renewed his proposal for a freeze on the numbers and characteristics of offensive and defensive strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDVs). He stated that if progress were made on the freeze, the United States would then be prepared to explore the possibility of significant reductions in the number of these delivery vehicles. The "freeze" was first proposed in 1964." The U.S. Representative reminded the ENDC that had this proposal been accepted and implemented then, the subsequent substantial increases in SNDV inventories of the United States and the Soviet Union would not have taken place.* In Geneva on August 16, U.S. Delegate Fisher outlined the U.S. rationale for inclusion of antiballistic missiles in a freeze proposal.“ He noted that the strategic stability which exists today depends on the knowledge that each side has the ability to inflict unacceptable damage and casualties on the other in retaliation for an initial attack. If a freeze were put into effect on offensive forces alone, this strategic balance could be upset by the deployment of an improved defensive system by one of the adversaries. Such a shift in the military balance would force the other side to undertake counteractions, such as the parallel deployment of an antiballistic missile system, increased offensive deployment, or the introduction of new or improved weapons capable of penetrating or bypassing ballistic-missile defenses. The resulting arms race would be selfdefeating. Higher and higher destructive potentials would be reached, and, 45 See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, pp. 1012-1014. 46 See Documents on Disarmament, 1966, pp. 139-146. 47 See ibid., pp. 562-567. despite the presence of defensive systems costing billions of dollars or rubles, casualties would still reach fantastically high levels if nuclear war should occur. Secretary of State Rusk underlined the U.S. concern in his press conference December 21. "We would regret very much," he said, "the lifting of the arms race to an entirely new plateau of major expenditures . . . with perhaps no perceptible result in the total strategic situation." 148 Nuclear-free zones The United States is strongly in favor of the establishment of nuclearfree zones where the initiative for such zones originates within the area concerned; where the zone includes all states in the area whose participation is deemed important; where the creation of a zone would not disturb necessary security arrangements; and where provisions are included for following up on alleged violations in order to give reasonable assurance of compliance with the zone. Under these criteria, the United States is precluded from accepting the proposal to make Central Europe a nuclear-free zone, but for such areas as Africa and Latin America, the idea has met with the full support of the United States. The most notable example of a successful agreement to insure that a geographical area will be free of nuclear weapons (and other weapons as well) is the 1959 Antarctica Treaty."9 51 An active attempt to make Latin America a nuclear-free zone has been going on since 1962, when Brazil first introduced the idea to the the 17th U.N. General Assembly." The following year five Latin American presidents joined in proposing a Latin American nuclear-free zone, and with the blessing of the 18th U.N. General Assembly, a Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America was established. The Commission, after a series of working meetings, has drawn up draft treaty 52 and is scheduled to meet again January 31, 1967. Although differences remain in the positions of some of the members of the Commission with respect to the provisions of a 4 Ante, doc. VI-21. 49 Text in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, pp. 452-458. 50 See ibid., 1962, pp. 1318–1319. the treaty, a compromise is thought to be possible. In any case, the United States regards the initiative of the Latin American countries as an outstanding example of regional activity to limit and control armaments, and has formally conveyed its full support to the Commission. Controlling conventional weapons Although the discussions at the ENDC and the U.N. General Assembly centered mainly on halting and turning back the nuclear arms race, attention was also given to the problem of controlling conventional armaments. The seventh point of the President's message of January 27 to the ENDC presented an approach for progress in this area, in suggesting that countries, on a regional basis, explore ways to limit competition among themselves for costly weapons often sought for illusory reasons of prestige. He stated that if "arrangements can be worked out and assurance can be given that they will be observed, the United States stands ready to respect them." 53 Elaborating on this matter in a statement to the ENDC on April 19, ACDA Director Foster suggested six principles as possible guidelines for the control of conventional arms: that the affected countries not acquire military equipment which they agree to regulate; that the initiative come from within the region concerned; that any arrangement include all states in that region whose participation is deemed important by the other participants; that potential suppliers respect the restrictions agreed to; that arrangements contribute to the security of the states concerned and to the maintenance of a stable military balance; and, lastly, that provision be made for satisfying all interested parties that the arrangement is being respected.* There are many difficulties involved, but the United States has offered full cooperation in implementing regional arms control arrangements. Regional agreements to control armaments will enhance security by reducing tensions, permitting constructive utilization of economic resources, and contributing to the ultimate achievement of general disarmament. ACDA has worked in close coordination with the Department of State 63 Infra. 54 Text in Documents on Disarmament, 1966, pp. 226–230. 51 See ibid., 1963, pp. 1040-1041. 52 Post, doc. X-9. in seeking ways to bring diplomatic influence to bear on the policies of foreign nations with respect to the acquisition of "prestige" armaments. Discussions are continuing among U.S. officials and Latin-American members of the Organization of American States. This question will probably be one of the major items to be included on the agenda of the summit meeting of Latin American Presidents which is scheduled to take place in the spring of 1967. It is hoped that the heads of the states represented at the conference will declare their intention not to acquire certain types of sophisticated military equipment. General and complete disarmament In 1962, at the opening of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee, both the United States and the Soviet Union tabled plans for general and complete disarmament." These plans have in common, as agreed in advance by the United States and the U.S.S.R., a plan for a three-stage process of disarmament, to be carried out under effective controls. There the similarity begins to break down. The U.S. plan calls for balanced reductions, across the board by percentages, for all armaments and forces; the Soviet plan advocates immediate elimination, in the first stage of the disarmament process, of all nuclear delivery vehicles, with the exception of a "nuclear umbrella," to be retained by the United States and the Soviet Union until the end of the third stage. The Soviet "nuclear umbrella," as first proposed by Soviet Foreign Min 55 See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 1156–1165, and pp. 1215– 1220. B The Problem of General and Complete [See also ante, docs. IV-16, 29, 31, and VI-13, 21.] Document X-2 Letter From the President (Johnson) United States Seven- The avoidance of war and particularly nuclear war is the central, common concern of all mankind. My country is dedicated to this end. The effort to control, and reduce and ultimately eliminate-modern engines of nuclear destruction is fundamental to our policy. We have, with all mankind, a common interest in acting now to prevent nuclear spread, to halt the nuclear arms race, and to reduce nuclear stocks. For this reason, we must press on with our work in Geneva. It is true that our meeting is shadowed by continuing aggression against the people and Government of South Viet-Nam. There are differences among the members of this Conference on VietNam, but these differences make our common interest in preventing nuclear spread and curbing the nuclear arms race all the more important to pursue. Even while our own nation is engaged in necessary resistance to aggression in South-East Asia, it must continue to pursue every avenue for stable peace, both in Viet-Nam and throughout the world. That great general effort has no more important set of goals than those of disarmament, which are the business of this Conference. I have instructed the United States delegation to urge upon your meeting the following 7-point program: 2 1. First, let us seek a non-proliferation treaty which, in the words of the United Nations General Assembly is "void of any loopholes which might permit nuclear or non-nuclear Powers to proliferate, directly or indirectly, nuclear weapons in any form." " We are prepared to sign such a treaty, making it applicable to nuclear and non-nuclear countries alike. We are prepared to work with other countries to assure that no non-nuclear country acquires its own nuclear weapons, gains national control over nuclear weapons, achieves the power itself to fire nuclear weapons, or receives assistance in manufacturing or testing nuclear weapons. We are prepared to agree that these things should not be done directly or indirectly, through third countries or groups of countries, or through units of the armed forces or military personnel under any military alliance. 2. Second, through a non-proliferation treaty and through efforts outside such a treaty, we must continue to secure application of International Atomic Energy Agency or equivalent international safeguards over peaceful nuclear activities. To this end, I urge agreement that all transfers of nuclear materials or equipment for peaceful purposes to countries which do not have nuclear weapons be under IAEA or equivalent international safeguards. At the same time, the ma 1 Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966, vol. I, pp. 92-94. The message was read to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) by the U.S. Representative (Foster) on Jan. 27. The ENDC met in Geneva, Jan. 27-May 10 and June 14-Aug. 25, 1966. 2 Text in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pp. 352-353. jor nuclear powers should accept in increasing measure the same international safeguards they recommend for other states. Recently, many responsible members of both Houses of the Congress of the United States introduced resolutions dealing with measures to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. These resolutions are an indication of the importance that the people of the United States attribute to such measures, and to the role that international safeguards should play in them. I fully share these views. 3. Third, so that those who forswear nuclear weapons may forever refrain without fear from entering the nuclear arms race, let us strive to strengthen United Nations and other international security arrangements. Meanwhile, the nations that do not seek the nuclear path can be sure that they will have our strong support against threats of nuclear blackmail. 4 4. Fourth, my country persists in its belief that the perils of proliferation would be materially reduced by an extension of the limited test ban treaty to cover underground nuclear tests. For such an extension, the United States will require only that number and kind of inspections which modern science shows to be necessary to assure that the treaty is being faithfully observed. We call upon those nations truly interested in such a ban to provide to this Committee any improvements in means for the detection and identification of seismic events which their research efforts may have developed. 5. Fifth, let us seek agreement not to increase, and indeed to reduce, nuclear materials in weapons stockpiles. The United States continues to urge a verified halt in the production of fissionable materials for use in weapons. We continue to urge that such a On May 17, 1966, the U.S. Senate adopted unanimously S. Res. 179, 89th Cong., 2d sess., which commended "the President's serious and urgent efforts to negotiate international agreements limiting the spread of nuclear weapons" and supported the principle of additional Presidential efforts directed toward solution of the problem of nuclear proliferation. On June 13, President Johnson wrote to Senator John Pastore of Rhode Island, who introduced the resolution, thanking him for his efforts in securing adoption of this expression of sentiment (see Documents on Disarmament, 1966 (U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency publication 43, 1967), pp. 302-303, 306-307, and 329-330). 4 Text in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, pp. 1032-1034. halt be accompanied by the transfer of large quantities of fissionable material to peaceful purposes, under international safeguards. We continue to urge the demonstrated destruction of thousands of nuclear weapons by the United States and U.S.S.R. to produce this fissionable material. We have also stated our willingness, if others cannot now agree to halting all production of fissionable material for use in weapons, to accept step-bystep reductions of such production by the shutting down of equivalent facilities on a plant-by-plant basis, with the same type of effective inspection applicable to all. 6. Sixth, as another step to reduce the dangers and burdens of nuclear arms, let us direct our attention to modern, long-range, high-speed carriers of nuclear destruction. I urge continued exploration of the terms and conditions which could make acceptable to all the proposal I put before you in 1964 for a freeze on offensive and defensive strategic bombers and missiles designed to carry nuclear weapons. If progress can be made here, the United States will be prepared to explore the possibility of significant reductions in the number of these delivery vehicles. To facilitate agreement, let us begin now to seek common understanding of some of the issues involved in both these proposals. 5 7. Seventh, as we focus on nuclear arms, let us not forget that resources are being devoted to non-nuclear arms races all around the world. These resources might better be spent on feeding the hungry, healing the sick and teaching the uneducated. The cost of acquiring and maintaining one squadron of supersonic aircraft diverts resources that would build and maintain a university. We suggest therefore that countries, on a regional basis, explore ways to limit competition among themselves for costly weapons often sought for reasons of illusory prestige. The initiative for arrangements of this kind should, of course, come from the regions concerned. The interested countries should undertake not to acquire from any source, including production of their own as well as importation from others, military equipment which they proscribe. If such arrangements can be worked out and assurance can be given that they will be observed, the United States stands ready to respect them. 5 Text ibid., 1964, pp. 1012-1014. |