49 Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966, vol. II, pp. 1459 and 1461-1462.

50 President Johnson was asked: "In his reports from North Viet-Nam, Mr. [Harrison] Salisbury, of the [New York] Times, spoke of heavy destruction in residential areas around two light industries there, a rice mill and a textile plant. Sir, I don't believe that these industries fall within the categories of target objectives previously announced by the Defense Department. Has there been a change in tactics to include such targets or has there been some sort of mistake?" (Ibid., p. 1461.)

51 See ante, docs. IX-194, 199.

that our men have carried out those orders to the very best of their ability.

There will be civilian casualties in connection with the bombing of military targets. There are civilian casualties taking place every day-some this morning-in South Vietnam. I am concerned with casualties in both South Vietnam and North Vietnam. And I wish that all of our people would be equally as concerned.

I think that the quicker we can have a peace conference, the quicker we can arrange a true cease-fire, the quicker we can stop this total war on both sides, the better off all of our people will be.

road to peace, war rages in Southeast Asia. Unjust war, for it results, in fact, from the armed intervention of the United States on the territory of Viet-Nam. Detestable war, since it leads a great nation to ravage a small one. In the name of good sense, of the attachment we still have for Indochina, of the two-century-old friendship we bear for America, we hold it necessary that she put an end to the ordeal by bringing her forces back to her soil. The day-however distant it be-that America would make that decision, our country could-and how wholeheartedly!—strive to open wide the doors through which would pass

52 French Foreign Policy, 1966, pp. 220–221. The message was broadcast on television.

assure you categorically that my Government is prepared to take the first step toward peace: specifically, we are ready to order a prior end to all bombing of North Vietnam the moment there is an assurance, private or otherwise, that there would be a reciprocal response toward peace from North Vietnam.

I am, thus, reaffirming herewith an offer made before the General Assembly-on September 22 56 and again on October 18. We hope and trust that you will use every means at your disposal to determine what tangible response there would be from North Vietnam in the wake of such a prior step toward peace on our part.

While reaffirming our offer, I would also express our conviction that the goal which, I am sure, we both share-an end to all fighting, to all hostilities, to all organized terror and violence cannot be attained by either appeals for or the exercise of restraint by only one side in the Vietnam conflict. We therefore welcome the idea in your letter that there be an extended cease-fire, which would obviously include a cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam as well as an end to all hostilities and organized violence in the south. We believe the temporary truces already arranged in Vietnam offer opportunities for initiatives in that direction-though we cannot but regret that the other parties concerned have shown no interest so far in such a cease-fire.

We continue to believe that peace can come to Vietnam in one of two ways: through deeds, such as a mutual cessation or reduction of hostilities, or through discussions. We agree with you fully that the ultimate basis for a peaceful settlement could be the Geneva Accords. We are, however, entirely flexible in our approach to the discussions we have sought to promote, whether they be formal negotiations or informal contacts. In this connection we would be prepared, as President Johnson publicly stated this morning,5" to meet promptly with the Governments of North and South Vietnam as proposed by the United Kingdom on December 30. As my Government has stated before on many occasions, we are prepared to discuss all proposals and points which any interested party may wish to put

56 Ante, doc. IX-168. 57 Ante, doc. IX-177.

58 Text in American Foreign Policy, 19501955: Basic Documents, vol. I, pp. 750-788. 50 Ante, doc. IX-202.

[Doc. IX-205] 895

forward. I am sure that your desire for a first step to bring about peace is accompanied by a strong interest on your part in what the subsequent step would be.

I would conclude, Mr. SecretaryGeneral, by expressing our certainty that you as all men of good willagree it is the war in all its facets which must be brought to an end. We

are thus heartened—and believe all who desire peace in Vietnam will share the feeling-by your assurance that you will continue to exert your efforts and explore every avenue toward a peaceful solution of the Vietnam conflict.

Sincerely yours,

ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG

1 Documents on Disarmament, 1966 (U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency publication 43, 1967), pp. 821-864. The report was sent to President Johnson on Jan. 23, 1967, by William C. Foster, Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. President Johnson transmitted it to Congress on Feb. 17, 1967.

Concerning the budget of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency for fiscal year 1967, President Johnson had requested obligational authority from Congress of $10 million (see ante, doc. I-3). The amount appropriated by Congress in Public Law 89-797, Nov. 8, 1966 was $9 million (80 Stat. 1503). 2 Infra.

agreements brightened perceptibly. It was clear that at least one of thema treaty governing activities in outer space and on celestial bodies-would be achieved. The other-a treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons-was moving closer to accord.

Nonproliferation

The negotiations at Geneva were dominated by the question of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. As the conference convened, the U.S. draft treaty to halt the spread of nuclear weapons to nations not now possessing them (presented in the previous ENDC session, on August 17, 1965) lay on the table. The Soviet Union had submitted its draft to the United Nations General Assembly on September 24, 1965. This document was subsequently presented to the ENDC on January 27, 1966.

The first principle of a nonproliferation treaty, enunciated in the U.N. resolution adopted overwhelmingly in November of 1965, is that it should contain no "loopholes which might permit nuclear or nonnuclear powers to proliferate, directly or indirectly, nuclear weapons in any form."" Early in the 1966 session of the ENDC, ACDA Director William C. Foster restated the President's pledge:

"We are prepared to work with other countries to assure that no nonnuclear country acquires its own nuclear weapons, achieves the power itself to fire nuclear weapons, or receives assistance in manufacturing or testing nuclear weapons. We are prepared to agree that these things should not be done directly or indirectly, through third countries or groups of countries, or through units of the armed forces or military personnel under any military alliance.""

In an attempt to show a spirit of flexibility and to make its treaty language more precise, the United States, on March 22, 1966, tabled amend

3 Text in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pp. 306–308. 4 Text ibid., pp. 338-339. 5 Text ibid., pp. 352-353. • Post, doc. X-5.