I would be very interested at this moment in a pause if I could have any assurance that it would be reciprocated and the other people would pause.

I don't quite understand, though, why you want me to have our Marines and our airmen pause and put their hands behind their backs while the other people don't pause, and continue to shoot at them.

After all, those are our men. And if they will pause-the aggressor will pause, we will pause immediately. If they will withdraw, we will withdraw immediately. We will lay on the table tomorrow a schedule to move out of South Viet-Nam, to come home, to leave no troops in that area, to give up our bases-provided they will lay on the table their schedule for withdrawal, and their schedule to get their people to quit the killing and the murdering that is going on.

North and South will be permitted to make a free decision concerning the unification of Viet-Nam.

My Government subscribes to these points without reservation, for we see in them, as have many members of the Assembly, a way to a settlement which would respect the rights of South Viet-Nam and deprive North Viet-Nam of nothing to which it has a legitimate claim.

We have made our commitment to a political solution and therefore remain prepared to engage in immediate discussions-through private, informal channels or through more formal negotiations. Similarly, we have offered to take the first step toward deescalation: to order a prior end to all bombing of North Viet-Nam the moment there is an assurance that there would be a response toward peace from North Viet-Nam.

We are given much advice as to what we ought to do in this area. We have considered this advice, and, having considered it, we would like to know from Hanoi privately or publicly what would happen if we followed it. We have said repeatedly that we do not seek a permanent military presence in Viet-Nam and have offered to agree to a time schedule for supervised, phased withdrawal of all external forces-those of North VietNam as well as those of the United States.

ing of all forces on the appropriate side of that line;

—a demilitarized zone on either side of that line from which all forces, supplies, and equipment were to be withdrawn;

-the obligation of the parties on either side of that line to insure that their territory was not used for hostile actions against the other and to prevent the crossing of that line by unauthorized civilian and military personnel;

-the political decision concerning the reunification of Viet-Nam was to be made-in freedom and peace and without interference from any source by the peoples in the South and the North;

—and, finally, an obligation on the part of all to refrain from interference in the internal affairs of all the states on the Indochinese peninsula.

We, for our part, preserve in the belief that these principles do indeed continue to provide a basis for a peaceful and honorable settlement.

It is through some contact, some dialog, of course that we are most likely to proceed toward a settlement. While public statements of position could usefully lead to a dialog, they can neither be a substitute for it nor accepted as a final rejection of it. We want that dialog to begin and are, therefore, prepared to use any of the many private channels available at this very moment. Our commitment to a political solution remains undiminished, as does our willingness to take the first step which may be conducive to the necessary discussion or negotiations concerning the contents of a political solution.

I would conclude by stating simply that the offers we have made before this Assembly are genuine and they remain open. To those who doubt their sincerity, whether parties to the conflict or not, I would make the most direct reply I can think of: There is only one sure way to test the sincerity of a man or a country-challenge him to make good through deeds what he offers in words.

We are prepared to accept-and make good on-that challenge.

Progress and Programs in South Vietnam

THE MILITARY EFFORT

7. The Government of Vietnam described the significant military progress being made against aggression. It noted with particular gratitude the substantial contribution being made by free world forces.

8. Nonetheless, the leaders noted that the movement of forces from North Vietnam continues at a high rate and that firm military action and free world support continue to be required to meet the threat. The necessity for such military action and support must depend for its size and duration on the intensity and duration of the Communist aggression itself.

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9. In their discussion, the leaders reviewed the problem of prisoners of war. The participants observed that Hanoi has consistently refused to cooperate with the International Committee of the Red Cross in the application of the Geneva Conventions," and called on Hanoi to do so. They reaffirmed their determination to comply fully with the Geneva Conventions of 1949 for the Protection of War Victims,16 and welcomed the resolution adopted by the Executive Committee of the League of Red Cross Societies on October 8, 1966," calling for compliance with the Geneva Conventions in the Vietnam conflict, full support for the International Committee of the Red Cross, and immediate action to repatriate seriously sick and wounded prisoners of war. They agreed to work toward the fulfillment of this resolution, in cooperation with the International Committee of the Red Cross, and indicated their willingness to meet under the auspices of the ICRC or in any appropriate forum to discuss the immediate exchange of prisoners.

PACIFICATION AND REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT

10. The participating governments concentrated particular attention on the accelerating efforts of the Government of Vietnam to forge a social revolution of hope and progress. Even as the conflict continues, the effort goes forward to overcome the tyranny

47 See TIAS 3364 (6 UST 3316).

48 See TIAS 3362 (6 UST 3114); TIAS 3363 (6 UST 3217).

49 Not printed here.

of poverty, disease, illiteracy and social injustice.

11. The Vietnamese leaders stated their intent to train and assign a substantial share of the armed forces to clear-and-hold actions in order to provide a shield behind which a new society can be built.

12. In the field of Revolutionary Development, measures along the lines developed in the past year and a half will be expanded and intensified. The training of Revolutionary Development cadres will be improved. More electricity and good water will be provided. More and better schools will be built and staffed. Refugees will be taught new skills. Health and medical facilities will be expanded.

13. The Vietnamese Government declared that it is working out a series of measures to modernize agriculture and to assure the cultivator the fruits of his labor. Land reform and tenure provisions will be granted top priority. Agricultural credit will be expanded. Crops will be improved and diversified.

14. The Vietnamese leaders emphasized that underlying these measures to build confidence and cooperation among the people there must be popular conviction that honesty, efficiency and social justice form solid cornerstones of the Vietnamese Government's programs.

15. This is a program each of the conferring governments has reason to applaud recognizing that it opens a brighter hope for the people of Vietnam. Each pledged its continuing assistance according to its means, whether in funds or skilled technicians or equipment. They noted also the help in nonmilitary fields being given by other countries and expressed the hope that this help will be substantially increased.

ECONOMIC STABILITY AND PROGRESS

16. The Conference was told of the success of the Government of Vietnam in controlling the inflation which, if unchecked, could undercut all efforts to bring a more fulfilling life to the Vietnamese people. However, the Vietnamese leaders reaffirmed that only by constant effort could inflation be kept under control. They described their intention to enforce a vigorous stabilization program, to control spending, increase revenues, and seek