institutions, and provide a better life for its people. The U.S. is providing substantial help, technical advice, support and material aid. But this is primarily an effort of the Vietnamese themselves.

A.

99

This report is mainly a review of accomplishments. It is designed to show how the GVN and U.S. are moving forward on a broad front in an effort to win the "other war." It does not by any means contend that this war is won. Indeed, I would not overstate the progress to date. There are still many shortcomings in our own non-military programs and in those of the GVN. Much more remains to be accomplished. But the cumulative evidence of what is being done is impressive, especially in the light of the tragic problems confronting this embattled Republic of Vietnam.

Aside from all the difficulties which face any new developing country, the Vietnamese people are seeking to build a modern nation against a background of terror, harassment and aggression mounted by a determined enemy-from both within and without. This enemy seeks to throttle Vietnam's economy by systematic disruption of its transport, communications, and commerce. His use of terror and harassment has as its target not just military forces but the soldiers of Vietnam's "other war"-the school teachers and health workers, the village chiefs and agricultural workers, the literate and those who would lead Vietnam toward social justice and modernization. In the last seven months 3015 of these "other war soldiers" have been murdered or kidnaped by the VC. Here is a little known but tragic drama of the war in Vietnam. That steady progress can be made under such conditions is a tribute to the Vietnamese people.

damental to the successful resolution of the Vietnam conflict as are our military operations to ward off aggression.

Shortly after Honolulu, you gave a new management to our role in this "other war" by appointing Deputy Ambassador William Porter to direct the American efforts in the field under the guidance of Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge. Then, five months ago you designated me as your Special Assistant to supervise and direct these civil side operations from the Washington end. In the last five months, my deputy Ambassador William Leonhart and I have made four trips to Vietnam. Recently we have received from Ambassadors Lodge and Porter a series of detailed progress reports on how we and our Vietnamese allies are faring in the "other war." They and the U.S. Mission in Vietnam have played a central role in the accomplishments cited in this report to you-it is really theirs.

The months since Honolulu have seen a quickening pace of our joint efforts not just in the well-publicized field of military operations but also in the less dramatic and often overlooked "other war." U.S. civilian agencies-especially AID, USIA, and experts from other departments-are making exceptional efforts parallel to those of our military forces. The latter as well are contributing greatly to the non-military effort, through civic action programs, medical aid, logistic support, and in a host of other ways.

C.

The report that follows lists both the problems we and the GVN confront and some of our accomplishments to date-including the progress made toward achieving the goals set at Honolulu. The statistical record is impressive. But statistics tell only a fraction of the story. The highlights are that the Republic of Vietnam, assisted by the United States and 32 other free nations, has committed itself to:

-A Revolutionary Development program for constructive change in the countryside. Both governments are mounting a growing effort to protect the countryside, revive its economic health, and provide it with modern services. Our efforts will not

3 Not printed here.

Agency for International Development. 5 United States Information Agency.

end when Communist aggression ceases, but will remain as the foundation of a modern nation.

-A campaign to preserve economic stability. In the midst of war, the GVN has courageously sought to bring its economic house in order-devaluing its currency, overhauling its fiscal system, and employing budgetary restraint.

-New stress on Health, Education, and Welfare. The U.S. has put increasing emphasis on helping to meet the health and educational needs of Vietnam's people, and on caring for the impoverished refugees who are tragic victims of the war. These programs of AID, with help from our military services and private U.S. sources, are among the largest and most impressive in Vietnam.

-Expansion of the already successful amnesty program. In the last eight months, over 12,000 people have voluntarily left the jungles and swamps and returned to the Government, which in turn has given them amnesty and a chance for a new life. The number so returning in 1966 is already higher than in all of 1965.

-Major steps towards representative government. This month, in unprecedented wartime conditions-and against VC efforts to terrorize and intimidate a free people from voting— the Vietnamese elected 117 members of an Assembly which will draft a democratic constitution for the Republic of Vietnam.

D.

The coming year will no doubt present additional trials. As the American people increasingly recognize this "other war" is a difficult and complex conflict, for the enemy has eaten his way into the fabric of Vietnamese society. But as pledged at Honolulu"the leaders of both of the governments are determined that we are going to move forward and we are going to make progress."

We expect in the coming year to focus our efforts on helping the GVN stabilize its economy-increase the pace of Revolutionary Development to recover and reconstruct the countryside-open more roads, railroads, and waterways and strengthen representative institutions. Many of the specific measures we hope to undertake are outlined in the report.

Mr. President, all Americans can be proud of what many of their countrymen are doing-and our tax dollars are supporting-not only to resist aggression in Vietnam but to wage this constructive "other war." It is in our highest tradition. It is for and with the people of Vietnam. It offers them the crucial assurance that their future will be better than their past. The road ahead may be a long one. We will no doubt encounter setbacks. But I believe that we can and will do better yet, toward helping our Vietnamese allies build a free and modern Vietnam.

Respectfully,

R. W. KOMER

Document IX-168

Address by the U.S. Representative at the U.N. (Goldberg) Before the U.N. General Assembly, September 22, 1966 (Excerpt)

United States Proposals for Deescalation of the Viet-Nam Conflict

The essential facts of the Viet-Nam conflict can be stated briefly: VietNam today remains divided along the demarcation line agreed upon in Geneva in 1954. To the north and south of that line are North Viet-Nam and South Viet-Nam. Provisional though they may be, pending a decision on the peaceful reunification of Viet-Nam by the process of self-determination, they are nonetheless political realities in the international community.

The Geneva accord which established the demarcation line is so thorough in its prohibition of the use of force that it forbids military interference of any sort by one side in the affairs of the other; it even forbids civilians to cross the demilitarized zone. In 1962 at the Geneva conference held that year, military infiltration through Laos was also forbidden.* Yet, despite those provisions, South

Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 10, 1956, pp. 518-525.

See American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents, vol. I, pp. 750-788. 8 See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 1075-1083.

Viet-Nam is under an attack, already several years old, by forces directed and supplied from the North and reinforced by regular units, currently some 17 identified regiments, of the North Vietnamese Army. The manifest purpose of this attack is to force upon the people of South Viet-Nam a system which they have not chosen by any peaceful process.

Let it be noted that this attack by North Viet-Nam contravenes not only the United Nations Charter but also the terms of General Assembly Resolution 2131 (XX), adopted unanimously only last December and entitled "Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty." That resolution declares, among other things, that: "No State has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State." It further declares that: "... no State shall organize, assist, foment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed activities directed towards the violent overthrow . . . of another State, or interfere in civil strife in another State." It would be hard to write a more precise description of what North Viet-Nam is doing, and has been doing for years, in South VietNam.

Certainly the prohibition of the use of force and subversion, both by this resolution and by the charter itself, must apply with full vigor to international demarcation lines that have been established by solemn international agreements. This is true not only in Viet-Nam but also in all divided states, where the recourse to force between the divided parts can have far-reaching consequences. Furthermore, solemn international agreements, specifically the Geneva accord, explicitly prohibit recourse to force as a means of reunifying Viet-Nam.

It is because of the attempt to upset by violence the situation in VietNam, and its far-reaching implications elsewhere, that the United States and other countries have responded to appeals from South Viet-Nam for military assistance.

Our aims in giving this assistance are strictly limited.

Text ibid., 1965, pp. 190-192.

We are not engaged in a "holy war" against communism.

We do not seek to establish an American empire or a sphere of influence in Asia.

We seek no permanent military bases, no permanent establishment of troops, no permanent alliances, no permanent American presence of any kind in South Viet-Nam.

We do not seek to impose a policy of alinement on South Viet-Nam.

We do not seek to overthrow the Government of North Viet-Nam.

We do not seek to do any injury to mainland China nor to threaten any of its legitimate interests.

We do not ask of North Viet-Nam an unconditional surrender or indeed the surrender of anything that belongs to it.

Nor do we seek to exclude any segment of the South Vietnamese people from peaceful participation in their country's future.

Let me state affirmatively and succinctly what our aims are.

We want a political solution, not a military solution, to this conflict. By the same token, we reject the idea that North Viet-Nam has the right to impose a military solution.

We seek to assure for the people of South Viet-Nam the same right of self-determination—to decide its own political destiny, free of force-that the United Nations Charter affirms for all.

And we believe that reunification of Viet-Nam should be decided upon through a free choice by the peoples of both the North and South without outside interference, the results of which choice we are fully prepared to support.

These, then, are our affirmative aims. We are well aware of the stated position of Hanoi on these issues. But no differences can be resolved without contact, discussion, or negotiations. For our part, we have long been-and remain today-ready to negotiate without prior conditions. We are prepared to discuss Hanoi's four points,1o

10

10 Text ibid., pp. 852-853. See also footnote 35 to doc. IX-86, ante.

together with any points which other parties may wish to raise. We are ready to negotiate a settlement based on a strict observance of the 1954 and 1962 Geneva agreements, which observance was called for in the communique of the recent meeting of the Warsaw Pact countries in Bucharest." We will support a reconvening of the Geneva conference, or an Asian conference, or any other generally acceptable forum.

At the same time we have also been soberly considering whether the lack of agreement on peace aims has been the sole barrier to the beginning of negotiations. We are aware that some perceive other obstacles, and I wish to make here today three proposals with respect to them.

First, it is said that one obstacle is the United States bombing of North Viet-Nam. Let it be recalled that there was no bombing of North Viet-Nam for 5 years, during which there was steadily increasing infiltration from North Viet-Nam in violation of the Geneva accords, during which there were no United States combat forces in Viet-Nam, and during which strenuous efforts were made to achieve a peaceful settlement. Let it be further recalled that twice before we have suspended our bombing, once for 37 days, without any reciprocal act of deescalation from the other side and without any sign from them of a willingness to negotiate.1

Nonetheless, let me say that in this matter the United States is willing once again to take the first step. We are prepared to order a cessation of all bombing of North Viet-Nam the moment we are assured, privately or otherwise, that this step will be answered promptly by a corresponding and appropriate deescalation on the other side.

We therefore urge before this august assembly that the government in Hanoi be asked the following question, to which we would be prepared to receive either a private or a public response: Would it, in the interest of peace, and in response to a prior cessation by the United States of the bombing in North Viet-Nam, take corresponding and timely steps to reduce or bring to an end its own military activities against South Viet-Nam?

11 Ante, doc. IX-138.

12 See ante, doc. IX-96.

Another obstacle is said to be North Viet-Nam's conviction or fear that the United States intends to establish a permanent military presence in VietNam. There is no basis for such a fear. The United States stands ready to withdraw its forces as others withdraw theirs so that peace can be restored in South Viet-Nam and favors international machinery—either of the United Nations or other machinery— to insure effective supervision of the withdrawal.

We therefore urge that Hanoi be asked the following question also: Would North Viet-Nam be willing to agree to a time schedule for supervised phased withdrawal from South Viet-Nam of all external forces-those of North Viet-Nam as well as those from the United States and other countries aiding South Viet-Nam?

A further obstacle is said to be disagreement over the place of the Viet Cong in the negotiations. Some argue that, regardless of different views on who controls the Viet Cong, it is a combatant force and, as such, should take part in the negotiations.

Our view on this matter was stated some time ago by President Johnson, who made clear that, as far as we are concerned, this question would not be "an insurmountable problem."" We therefore invite the authorities in Hanoi to consider whether this obstacle to negotiations may not be more imaginary than real.

We offer these proposals today in the interests of peace in Southeast Asia. There may be other proposals. We have not been and we are not now inflexible in our position. But we do believe that whatever approach finally succeeds, it will not be one which simply decries what is happening in Viet-Nam and appeals to one side to stop while encouraging the other. Such an approach can only further delay the peace which we all desire and fervently hope for.

The only workable formula for a settlement will be one which is just to the basic interests of all who are involved.

In this spirit we welcome discussion of this question either in the Security Council, where the United States itself

13 Text in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pp. 887-892 (quotation on p. 892).