3. We and the government of South Vietnam must do everything we can to check inflation there. Such measures in Vietnam as increased taxation, commodity and construction control, improved transport and distribution of goods must be put into effect promptly.

4. A special effort should be made both in the United States and in other free nations to help the South Vietnamese with additional volunteer medical teams (at least 400 people this year), and with the dispatch of hospital and ambulance and immunization units for rural areas. Free world nations can also contribute by training Vietnamese as auxiliary medical personnel in greater numbers. Consideration should be given to making available to the South Vietnamese a number of packaged emergency hospitals which are being released by the civil defense units of various American cities.

5. The continued plight of the refugees in South Vietnam who have fled to the areas under government control is one that demands not only our increased attention, but also the cooperative and humanitarian efforts of all nations. The refugee problem arose with extraordinary speed and on a large scale and overtaxed existing resources. In particular, the most pitiful victims of war-the sick, the elderly and the children-deserve the assistance of men and women of good will everywhere. A vigorous effort should be made internationally to help these people, in addition to the effort now being made through United States and South Vietnamese resources.

6. The United States and other friendly nations should give high priority to assuring India and Pakistan the economic and technical assistance required to implement their development programs while these nations honor the provisions of the Tashkent agreement.45

7. We must continue your vigorous efforts to pursue every possibility to an honorable peace in Vietnam and Asia. We must continue to seek the assistance and good offices of all other nations, the United Nations, the Pope and other religious leaders in this effort.

45 Ante, doc. IX-48.

Document IX-110

Legal Memorandum by the Legal Adviser (Meeker), Department of State, Dated March 4, Submitted to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, March 8, 1966 (Excerpt) 46

The Legality of United States Participation in the Defense of Viet-Nam

V. CONCLUSION

South Viet-Nam is being subjected to armed attack by Communist North Viet-Nam, through the infiltration of armed personnel, military equipment, and regular combat units. International law recognizes the right of individual and collective self-defense against armed attack. South Viet Nam, and the United States upon the request of South Viet-Nam, are engaged in such collective defense of the South. Their actions are in conformity with international law and with the Charter of the United Nations. The fact that South Viet-Nam has been precluded by Soviet veto from becoming a member of the United Nations " and the fact that South Viet-Nam is a zone of a temporarily divided state in no way diminish the right of collective defense of South Viet-Nam.

47

The United States has commitments to assist South Viet-Nam in defending itself against Communist aggression from the North. The United States gave undertakings to this effect at the conclusion of the Geneva conference in 1954. Later that year the United States undertook an international obligation in the SEATO treaty to defend South Viet-Nam against Communist armed aggression. And during the past decade the United States has given additional

49

46 Department of State Bulletin, Mar. 28, 1966, pp. 474 489. This memorandum was made public on Mar. 10, 1966.

47 See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1957, p. 86; and ibid., 1958, pp. 120-121.

48 Text in American Foreign Policy, 19501955: Basic Documents, vol. I, pp. 787-788. 49 Text ibid., pp. 912-916.

51

The Geneva accords of 1954 provided for a cease-fire and regroupment of contending forces, a division of Viet-Nam into two zones, and a prohibition on the use of either zone for the resumption of hostilities or to "further an aggressive policy." "1 From the beginning, North Viet-Nam violated the Geneva accords through a systematic effort to gain control of South Viet-Nam by force. In the light of these progressive North Vietnamese violations, the introduction into South Viet-Nam beginning in late 1961 of substantial United States military equipment and personnel, to assist in the defense of the South, was fully justified; substantial breach of an international agreement by one side permits the other side to suspend performance of corresponding obligations under the agreement." South VietNam was justified in refusing to implement the provisions of the Geneva accords calling for reunification through free elections throughout Viet-Nam since the Communist regime in North Viet-Nam created conditions in the North that made free elections entirely impossible.

The President of the United States has full authority to commit United States forces in the collective defense of South Viet-Nam. This authority stems from the constitutional powers of the President. However, it is not necessary to rely on the Constitution alone as the source of the President's authority, since the SEATO treatyadvised and consented to by the Senate and forming part of the law of the land-sets forth a United States commitment to defend South VietNam against armed attack, and since the Congress in the joint resolution of August 10, 1964,58 and in authorization and appropriations acts for support of the U.S. military effort in VietNam-has given its approval and support to the President's actions."4 United States actions in Viet-Nam, taken by the President and approved

50 See ibid., vol. II, pp. 2401-2402; American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1957, pp. 1214-1216; ibid., 1961, pp. 949-951; ibid., pp. 1056–1057; and ibid., 1963, pp. 884885.

51 Text in American Foreign Policy, 19501955: Basic Documents, vol. I, pp. 750-788 (quotation on p. 759).

2 See footnote 22 on p. 483 of the source text.

43 Text in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, pp. 991-992.

54 See ibid., 1965, pp. 864-868; and post, doc. IX-114.

by the Congress, do not require any declaration of war, as shown by a long line of precedents for the use of United States armed forces abroad in the absence of any congressional declaration of war.55

Document IX-111

Replies Made by the Director of the Office of News (McCloskey), Department of State, to Questions Asked at a News Conference, March 9, 1966 (Excerpt) 56

United States Use of Herbicides and Defoliants in Viet-Nam

It is the policy of the Government of Viet-Nam to take every possible step to raise the production of food for its people. It is the policy of the United States to assist the Vietnamese in this effort. Many steps have been taken in the past in this direction through the import of fertilizer, the introduction of new strains of livestock, improved growing techniques and other methods. And as a result of the recent Honolulu Conference and the visit to Viet-Nam of Secretary Freeman and a team of agricultural experts, new and more intensive efforts are being undertaken in this direction.

Mr. Nichols 58 has asked how can we and the Vietnamese try to increase food production on the one hand, while defoliating trees and destroying crops on the other. First, these two matters should be separated. Defoliation has been used to deprive Communist guerrillas wherever possible of cover and concealment. It is used

55 "There have been at least 125 instances in which the President has ordered the armed forces to take action or maintain positions abroad without obtaining prior congressional authorization" (source text, p. 484).

56 Department of State files.

57 See footnote 85 to doc. IX-104, ante. 58 Mr. Robert B. Nichols, an architect in New York City, stated in a letter to President Johnson (not printed here) that the U.S. practice of defoliation in Viet-Nam was inconsistent with its policy of agricultural development. Mr. Nichols found the reply to his letter from a member of the White House staff (not printed here) unsatisfactory and he went on a hunger strike in protest against the use of defoliants in Viet-Nam.

along roads, railroads and canals, where the Viet Cong have regularly taken advantage of thick foliage to set up ambushes against both military and civilian traffic. It is used against remote Viet Cong base areas where the Communists have used thick natural cover to conceal their heavily fortified training and regroupment centers. It is used against known trail routes which the Communists have used as supply channels for men and weapons in South Viet-Nam.

In some cases herbicides have been used to destroy crops in remote areas long occupied by the Viet Cong. The areas affected are known to be used to produce food for Viet Cong military units in the area. In war food is as essential to the effectiveness of a military unit as its weapons and ammunition. In this connection, several things might be noted. The areas affected by this limited crop destruction program are remote and thinly populated. They are known from intelligence sources to be occupied by Viet Cong military units. The herbicides which are used are nontoxic and neither dangerous to man nor animal life. The land is not affected in terms of future use.

The Viet Cong and any innocent persons in the area are warned of the planned action. They are asked to leave the area. They are promised food and good treatment when they move out. Those who have moved from Viet Cong territory for this reason have been fed and cared for.

As a second point, all defoliation and crop destruction actions are initiated by the Vietnamese themselves, usually by a district or province chief who has located an area of known Viet Cong occupation. The aircraft and technical capability for this program is largely American, for the good reason that the Vietnamese do not yet have the personnel and necessary equipment, but there is Vietnamese participation at every stage; and, as I have said, all the initiative comes from the Vietnamese.

Document IX-112

Address by the Vice President (Humphrey) at the National Press Club, (ExWashingon, March 11, 1966 cerpt) 59

59 Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 4, 1966, pp. 523-528.

United States Rejection of Any Viet Cong Role in a South Vietnamese Coalition Government Not Earned in Free Elections

I have reason to bring home a message of encouragement about VietNam.

I know that our opponents are diligent and determined. They are wellorganized, and in many areas have a long head start on us.

Thus far they have not responded to our unconditional offer of negotiation 60-an offer which still standsnor have they responded to the good offices of other nations," of the United

eo Text in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pp. 848-852.

61 During the period, Feb. 15-Mar. 11, 1966, France, the United Kingdom and Canada contacted North Viet-Nam with a view toward a negotiated settlement of the war. On Feb. 23, 1966, British Minister of State Lord Chalfont, who was with Prime Minister Wilson in Moscow for talks with Chairman Kosygin and General Secretary Brezhnev, Feb. 22-24, met with North Vietnamese Charge d'Affaires Li Chang and, as a result, succeeded, according to Prime Minister Wilson, in "getting a line open" to Hanoi on possible peace talks. On Feb. 21, Canadian Foreign Minister Paul Martin stated that Victor Moore, the Canadian Representative on the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Viet-Nam, had a "very fruitful discussion" in the last 10 days with high North Vietnamese officials in Hanoi on "matters which would interest all who wanted to see a cease-fire and an end to the war in VietNam." Mr. Moore accompanied Chester A. Ronning, a personal representative of Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson, to Hanoi on Mar. 7, where Mr. Ronning reportedly delivered a letter from Prime Minister Pearson to President Ho Chi Minh and met with Prime Minister Pham Van Dong and Deputy Prime Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh, and to Saigon on Mar. 11. On returning to Canada, on Mar. 15, Mr. Ronning said that the International Commission could help bring about negotiations, but he believed the other and Commission members, India Poland, felt that the time was not yet right. (News Dictionary, 1966 (New York, Facts on File, Inc., 1967), pp. 409-410.)

Mr. Ronning visited Hanol again from June 14 to 18, 1966, in an effort to seek a basis for "direct informal discussions" among "the parties primarily concerned in the Viet-Nam conflict" and "to explore the attitudes of interested governments on the basis for a peaceful solution of the Viet-Nam situation." In his statement, on June 22, before the Canadian House of Commons concerning the second Ronning trip to Hanoi, Canadian Foreign Minister Paul Martin said "it would be wrong to try at this stage to assess the results of this visit." (Canada, House of Commons Debates, June 22, 1966, p. 6755.)

Nations," of the Pope and other religious leaders who seek to bring the conflict to the conference table.

And they have not responded, I am sure, because they still believe that time is on their side, that we will ultimately tire and withdraw, either abandoning South Viet-Nam or accepting a settlement which will give the Viet Cong an open road on one of its three publicly declared routes to victory.

The first two routes-a general uprising and the famous Mao-Giap three-stage guerrilla war-have been stymied by resistance of the South Vietnamese Government and her allies. The third declared route to power is through a coalition government.

Document IX-113

Address by the Secretary of State (Rusk) at the Founder's Day Banquet of the Boston University School of Public Communications, March 14, 1966 (Excerpts) 67

"It Is Now Just as Much in Our Interest... To Repel Communist Aggression There [-in Viet-Nam-] as It Was When We Made Those Earlier Commitments"

I wish to talk to you quietly this evening about Viet-Nam. Some of you may feel that enough has been said on that subject, but it remains dangerous and overshadows many other relationships in the present world scene.

One hears a good deal about the word "confusion" these days. Let me say, I hope without too much presumption, that I am not confusedand President Johnson is not confused -about the facts, the issues, United States policy, and the present attitude of Hanoi and Peiping. We are concerned, as any rational man would be, but we are not confused. It is my impression that there are some who, when they say, "I am confused," really mean, "I do not agree." It is important that all who debate these issues declare, and not conceal, their major premises otherwise we are not able to understand what else they are saying.

It is altogether clear from irrefutable evidence that the assault on South Viet-Nam was organized and has been directed by the Communist regime of North Viet-Nam. It has involved not only ordering into action Communist cadres left behind for that purpose when Viet-Nam was divided in 1954 but the infiltration from the North of tens of thousands of trained men and increasing quantities of arms. For well over a year the forces infiltrated from

67 Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 4, 1966, pp. 514-521.

the North have included organized units of regimental or larger strength of the regular army of North VietNam.

And it is not just South Viet-Nam and the United States which hold that view. At Manila, in April 1964, the SEATO Council of Ministers declared that the attack on South VietNam was a "Communist aggression (an) organized campaign directed, supplied and supported by the Communist regime in North Vietnam, in flagrant violation of the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962." 68 They declared "that the defeat of the Communist campaign is essential not only to the security of the Republic of Vietnam, but to that of South-East Asia."

I have read that I said that the obligation of the United States to oppose an armed attack against the territory covered by the Southeast Asia treaty "did not depend on all other members agreeing to oppose it." That is neither novel nor remarkable. It is based on the plain language of the treaty and the official explanations which accompanied the consideration of the treaty by the Senate. If action under the treaty required a unanimous vote, then one or more members-the smallest or the most distant could veto action by the rest. This impediment was not written into SEATO, nor was it written into NATO.

I do believe that the United States must keep its pledged word. That is not only a matter of national honor but an essential to the preservation of peace. For the backbone of world peace is the integrity of the commitment of the United States.

There would be no possibility of preserving peace if our allies or, even more important, our adversaries should come to believe that the United States will not do what it says it will do. Doubt about that could lead to catastrophic miscalculations by our adversaries. Let me illustrate by two examples. It was necessary for both President Eisenhower and President Kennedy to inform Mr. Khrushchev that the United States would not yield to an ultimatum concerning Berlin." Had Mr. Khrushchev not believed that, there would have been war. Again, in the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, had not Mr. Khrushchev believed it when President Kennedy said those missiles must go, there might have been war."

72 Text in American Foreign Policy, 19501955: Basic Documents, vol. I, pp. 912-916. 13 Text ibid., pp. 897-898.

14 Text ibid., pp. 945-947.

75 See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958, pp. 591 ff. and ibid., 1961, pp. 584 ff.

76 See ibid., 1962, pp. 399-471.