sibility for the settlement of the German question and for the reunification of Germany.

In this regard, it should be recalled that at the Geneva Conference, on July 23, 1955, the Heads of Government of France, the United Kingdom, the United States and the USSR declared:

"The Heads of Government, recognizing their common responsibility for the settlement of the German question and the re-unification of Germany, have agreed that the settlement of the German question and the re-unification of Germany by means of free elections shall be carried out in conformity with the national interests of the German people and the interests of European security."'

For their part, the Governments of France, the United Kingdom and the United States have always striven to promote a solution of this question by implementation of the principle of self-determination. They will continue their efforts to achieve this aim. Attempts to establish the so-called German Democratic Republic as a separate state can only frustrate this objective and thus make more difficult a peaceful settlement in Europe.

We shall be grateful if Your Excellency will have this letter circulated as an official document.

Document II-21

Statement Made by the U.S. Representative (Goldberg) in the U.N. Security Council, June 21, 1966

United States Support for the Admission of Guyana to Membership in the United Nations

Text in the Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 1, 1966, pp. 188-189. The colony of British Guiana became the independent state of Guyana with Forbes Burnham (People's National Congress) as Prime Minister on May 26, 1966. U.N. Security Council Resolution 223 (1966), adopted unanimously

on June 21, 1966, recommended the admission of Guyana to membership in the United Nations (U.N. doc. S/INF/21, p. 17). U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2133 (XXI), adopted by acclamation on Sept. 20, 1966, admitted Guyana to membership (U.N. doc. A/6316, p. 1). See post, doc. III-26.

Document II-22

Replies Made by the Secretary of State (Rusk) to Questions Asked at a News Conference, August 25, 1966°

· · ·

"There Is No Point in Speculating About [Representation of Communist as Well as Nationalist China in the United Nations] Now"

I didn't [discuss the question of Communist China's entry into the United Nations at the Cabinet meeting] here this morning, but the matter did come up before Senator Stennis' committee earlier today." I pointed out that the United Nations runs into the same problem that we run into in our bilateral contacts with Peking. They keep saying there is nothing to discuss unless we are prepared to surrender Formosa.

When we make it clear it is not for us to surrender 13 million or 14 million people against their will and we can't do that, we find it impossible to have any constructive discussions with Peking about Southeast Asia or disarmament or exchanges or anything else.

We don't believe there is a majority of the U.N. willing to expel this nation

Department of State Bulletin, Sept. 19, 1966, pp. 422-423.

For the text of a statement made by Secretary Rusk before the Senate Preparedness Subcommittee on Aug. 25, see ibid., Sept. 12, 1966, pp. 377-381. [Footnote in source text.]

At a news conference after a meeting at the White House with President Johnson on Aug. 22, 1966, the U.S. Representative at the U.N. (Goldberg) said the United States "will never agree" to expulsion of Nationalist China from the United Nations as the price of Communist China's entrance into the United Nations (The New York Times, Aug. 23, 1966).

Text ibid., vol. II, pp. 1896-1897.

that has been a charter member, an active and loyal member of the U.N., and is now giving technical assistance to more than 25 members of the U.N.

So as long as the United Nations doesn't do that, Peking isn't going to accept, in any event, any approaches about membership in the U.N.

The major questions of foreign policy are looked at continuously. The fact that there was a tie vote in the General Assembly last time, of course, causes us to look at the question in connection with the forthcoming General Assembly.

Those who say, "Let us admit Peking, but of course we have to protect the position of the Republic of China," just are not in business or not in touch with the real situation. We don't believe that Peking has demonstrated that it is prepared to enter the United Nations as a member, that it would be desirable for them to come in at the expense of the expulsion of the Republic of China.

These are matters that have to be considered in relation to the voting situation in the General Assembly, the attitudes of other members. We are not the only ones who have something to say about this. We haven't seen indications in Peking's attitude or policy of a change in the situation as far as we can see it now. Of course, it is under review and will continue to be as we approach the General Assembly.

We are now consulting with many governments on this question at the present time. I just would expect that the situation in the General Assembly this year will be what it was at the conclusion of the General Assembly last year. There will be no change in the Assembly.

That [suggestion for al combination [of Peking coming into the United Nations and Nationalist China maintaining its representation] is not going to produce any change in the situation. That, in effect, is a combination which produces status quo.

8 See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pp. 118-125.

That is a hypothetical question [-whether the U.S. would agree to joint U.N. representation for the two Chinas if Peking agreed to accept it—] that just doesn't appear on the horizon at the present time; so there is no point in speculating about it now.

Document II-23

Statement Made by the President of the U.N. General Assembly (Pazhwak), September 28, 1966 *

Indonesian Resumption of Full Participation in the Activities of the United Nations

10

Members will recall that the telegram of 19 September 1966, which I read at the outset of my statement, refers to the decision of the Government of Indonesia "to resume full cooperation with the United Nations". It would therefore appear that the Government of Indonesia considers that its recent absence from the Organization was based not upon a withdrawal from the United Nations but upon a cessation of co-operation." The action so far taken by the United Nations on this matter would not appear to preclude this view.12 If this is also the general view of the membership, the Secretary-General would give instructions for the necessary administrative actions to be taken for Indonesia to participate again in the proceedings of the Organization. It may be assumed that, from the time that Indonesia resumes participation, it will meet in full its budgetary obligations. If it is the general view that the bond of membership has continued throughout the period of non-partici

9 U.N. doc. A/PV.1420.

10 U.N. doc. S/7498.

11 See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pp. 116-118.

12 Indonesia ceased to be listed as a Member of the United Nations, Mar. 1, 1966.

pation, it would be the intention of the Secretary-General to negotiate an appropriate payment with the representatives of Indonesia for that period and to report the outcome of his negotiations to the Fifth Committee for its consideration.13

Unless I hear any objection, I would assume that it is the will of the membership that Indonesia should resume full participation in the activities of the United Nations and that the Secretary-General may proceed in the manner I have outlined.

There being no objection, I invite the representatives of Indonesia to take their seats in the General Assembly.

Document II-24

Statement Made by the Deputy U.S. Representative (Nabrit) in the U.N. Security Council, October 14, 1966

United States Support for the Admission of Botswana and Lesotho to Membership in the United Nations

Text in the Department of State Bulletin, Nov. 14, 1966, pp. 758-759. The British protectorate of Bechuanaland became independent as the Republic of Botswana, with former Prime Minister Sir Seretse Khama as President on Sept. 30, 1966. The British colony of Basutoland became independent as the Kingdom of Lesotho, with Paramount Chief Moshoeshoe II as King and Leabua Jonathan as Prime Minister on Oct. 4, 1966. U.N. Security Council Resolution 224 (1966) and 225 (1966), adopted unanimously on Oct. 14, 1966, recommended the admission of Botswana and Lesotho to membership in the United Nations (U.N. doc. S/INF/ 21, pp. 17-18). U.N. General Assembly Resolutions 2136 (XXI) and 2137

13 See footnote 2 to doc. II-10, ante.

(XXI), adopted by acclamation on Oct. 17, 1966, admitted the two states to membership (U.N. doc. A/6316, p. 2).

Document II-25

Statement Made by the U.S. Representative (Goldberg) Before the U.N. General Assembly, November 21, 1966

14

United States Support
for Establishment of a
Committee To Explore the
Question of Chinese
Representation in the
United Nations

As the General Assembly turns to the question of the representation of China in the United Nations-one of the most difficult and important questions that confront this organization-three draft resolutions lie before us.

These, in the order of their introduction, and in the order in which they are to be considered under the established rules of the General Assembly, are as follows:

-First, a resolution submitted by Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Gabon, Italy, Japan, Madagascar, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Philippines, Thailand, and the United States (document A/L. 494) confirming that, under the charter, any proposal to change the representation of China is an important question requiring a two-thirds majority for adoption.15

-Second, a resolution submitted by Albania, Algeria, Cambodia, Congo (Brazzaville), Cuba, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Pakistan, Romania, and Syria (document A/L. 496) which would expel the representatives of the

14 Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 19, 1966, pp. 926-929.

15 Infra.

Republic of China and put representatives of Peking in their place.16

-Third, a resolution submitted by Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Italy, and Trinidad and Tobago (document A/L. 500) proposing that a study and inquiry be made into the question of Chinese representation and a report made to the 22d General Assembly."

The United States believes that it can best contribute at this opening stage of the debate by stating simply, briefly, and forthrightly its position on these three proposals.

One, the United States is a cosponsor of the "important question" resolution. This resolution confirms that any proposal to change the representation of China in the United Nations, such as the Albanian resolution, is an important question. It is obviously of transcendent importance, and therefore under the Charter of the United Nations a two-thirds majority is required for its adoption.18 The basic issue here, I wish to emphasize, is not one of tactical advantage for one side or the other but of the fidelity of the United Nations to its constitution and its established procedures. We will vote for the importantquestion resolution and strongly urge its adoption.

Second, the United States will vote against the Albanian resolution, which would expel the Republic of China from the United Nations and put Peking in its place. This proposal is repugnant to the charter and to the interests of world peace. Moreover, it

16 Text in the Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 19, 1966, p. 929. See footnote 35 to doc. II-26, infra.

An editorial in Jenmin Jih Pao, official newspaper of the Communist Party of China, Dec. 2, 1966, thanked the supporters of this resolution and stated: "Unless the United Nations rids itself of U.S. control, it is impossible to expel the Chiang Kai-shek gang and restore to China her legitimate rights in the United Nations. Therefore, the fundamental question now, as it has been in the past, is one of freeing the United Nations from the control of the United States and its collaborators, thoroughly reorganizing it and completely rectifying all the mistakes it has committed" (Peking Review, Dec. 9, 1966, pp. 26-27).

17 Text in the Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 19, 1966, p. 929. See footnote 35 to doc. II-26, infra.

Communist China rejected this proposal as a maneuver to seat both Communist China and Nationalist China in the United Nations (see Peking Review, Dec. 9, 1966, pp. 26-27).

18 For the text of the U.N. Charter, see American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents, vol. I, pp. 134–161.

flies in the face of the aim of universality which its sponsors claim for it. We vigorously oppose the Albanian resolution, and we urge that it be decisively rejected.

Third, the United States will vote for the study-committee resolution for a sober, deliberate, and constructive consideration of the problem of the representation of China in keeping with the principles and purposes of the charter.

I shall now set forth the considerations which have led us to these conclusions.

First, the important-question resolution. The 14-power importantquestion resolution confirms what the charter provides and intends. Article 18 of the charter says: "Decisions of the General Assembly on important questions shall be made by a twothirds majority of the members present and voting."

No one can seriously deny that a proposal to change the representation of China in the United Nations, such as the Albanian resolution, is important. Indeed, if there is any aspect of the matter on which both the proponents and the opponents of the Albanian resolution could hardly disagree, it is that the action proposed in the resolution holds important and far-reaching implications for the United Nations, vitally concerns the maintenance of international peace and security, and is directly connected with the rights and privileges of membership.

This commonsense interpretation of the charter and the consequent applicability of the two-thirds majority requirement to resolutions of the Albanian type have long been accepted by the General Assembly. In 1961, the first year it debated a substantive proposal to change China's representation, the Assembly so explicitly decided in Resolution 1668 (XVI).19 The continued validity of this resolution was affirmed in 1965 in Resolution 2025 (XX). The present 14-power important-question resolution simply affirms the continuing validity of the Assembly's prior decision on this vital point.

Mr. President, it is my Government's deep conviction, based upon

19 Text in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, p. 145.

20 Text ibid., 1965, p. 125.